SoVote

Michael Cooper

Member of Parliament
Member of the Joint Interparliamentary Council
Conservative

St. Albert—Edmonton
Alberta
Voting Attendance: 67%
Expenses Last Quarter: $119,185.60

Government Page

Context: House Hansard - 264 - Dec/8/23

Mr. Michael Cooper

Dec/8/23 4:37:25 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, Conservatives have no confidence in this failed Liberal government. I call for a recorded division.

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Context: House Hansard - 263 - Dec/6/23

Mr. Michael Cooper

Dec/6/23 6:31:09 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I would note that the government House leader has expressed full confidence in the Speaker. The deputy government House leader, the member for Kingston and the Islands, sits as a member of the procedure and House affairs committee. As a loyal deputy of the government House leader, is he going to follow her direction? Is he going to be impartial? I would question that.

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Context: House Hansard - 196 - May/12/23

Mr. Michael Cooper (St. Albert—Edmonton, CPC)

May/12/23 1:49:13 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on Motion No. 79, introduced by the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona. The motion would make substantial changes to the Standing Orders pertaining to confidence votes and the prorogation of Parliament. With respect to confidence votes, it would make significant changes in a number of different ways. Perhaps less of a change is that it would seek to amend the Standing Orders to expressly provide that votes on the main estimates, the budget and the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne be treated as questions of confidence. By convention, for all intents and purposes, these votes are treated as questions of confidence. It would, indeed, be difficult to imagine a scenario in which a government could survive losing any such vote. Even more, however, this motion would significantly regulate and limit the ability of members to bring forward and put on notice motions of non-confidence in the government. It would do so in three ways. First, in order to put such a motion on notice, the signatures of at least 20 members of Parliament from more than one of the recognized parties would be required. Second, only one such motion of non-confidence could be put on notice per supply period. Third, members would be limited to either sponsoring or signing such a motion once per session. With respect to prorogation, this motion would require that the government put on notice a confidence motion upon the Prime Minister expressing the intention to advise and consult the Governor General with respect to prorogation. The hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona is a learned member. He brings a great deal of institutional knowledge and a good understanding of matters of procedure, and I have a lot of respect for him. I appreciate, in that regard, the spirit in which the member is seeking to make changes to the Standing Orders. However, I will be unable to support this motion, primarily because of the process that the member has proposed in making changes to the Standing Orders. Two hours of debate, nothing more, nothing less, is the process that the member has chosen. There would be no study or consultation. Why is this? It is because that is the process for private members' motions, and it is the way in which the hon. member has embarked upon amending the Standing Orders. I would submit that, with regard to the substantial changes that are being proposed, two hours of debate would be completely inadequate under the circumstances. I would submit further that it is all the more inadequate given the fact that many aspects of this motion are seemingly novel, as the hon. member conceded when I put a question to him earlier. Although much ink has been spilled on, for example, the subject of prorogation, and although the procedure and House affairs committee has undertaken multiple studies in recent years on prorogation, what the hon. member is specifically proposing has not been studied. This is that the government should put forward a confidence motion upon the Prime Minister expressing the intention to prorogue Parliament. Similarly, the significant way in which the hon. member is proposing to limit the ability to put on notice other motions of non-confidence in the government has not been considered either. The hon. member is quite right to say that he is not ashamed that some of these ideas are novel ones. It is good to come up with new ideas. All hon. members should make an effort to bring fresh ideas, but new ideas need to be tested. What would have been better is if this motion had contained a clause referring the items and the changes proposed to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. That would have provided an opportunity to hear from witnesses, including experts, to better understand the implications of the many changes that the member is proposing. Had the hon. member included such a clause in the motion, I would have been very open to supporting the motion. It is unfortunate that the motion does not contain such a clause. On that basis alone, I am unable to support the motion. The need for study is further underscored by the fact that the motion could have constitutional implications as it pertains to prorogation. The Governor General derives the authority to prorogue Parliament pursuant to section 38 of the Constitution Act of 1867. More specifically, section 38 provides the Governor General with the authority to summon Parliament and therefore, by extension, to prorogue it. The authority of the Governor General is exercisable according to unwritten constitutional convention upon the Prime Minister providing advice and consulting with the Governor General. It is the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister alone who consults the Governor General on the question of prorogation. By prescribing that a motion of confidence be put before the Prime Minister goes to the Governor General limits the discretion of the Prime Minister to seek prorogation. Moreover, the motion proposes to insert a wedge between the Prime Minister and the Governor General and that, in turn, could impact upon the manner in which the Governor General responds to the advice of the Prime Minister. I would note that, on the question of constitutional implications, section 41(a) of the Constitution Act of 1982 provides that any change respecting the Office of the Governor General requires a constitutional amendment. All of this is to say that there are a number of considerations that need to be studied and considered, and on that basis, it would be premature to adopt the motion at this time.

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Member of the Joint Interparliamentary Council

Michael Cooper