- Member of Parliament
- Member of the panel of chairs for the legislative committees
- Conservative
- Wellington—Halton Hills
- Ontario
- Voting Attendance: 65%
- Expenses Last Quarter: $120,269.09
- Government Page
Mr. Speaker, Canadians expect their institutions to protect them from the malign threat activities of authoritarian states. Canadians expect the whole of the Government of Canada, including its intelligence agencies and law enforcement, to protect our elections and democratic institutions from the coercive, clandestine and corrupt foreign interference threat activities of authoritarian states. That is what Canadians expect, and that is why Canadians were so shocked when the extent of foreign interference in our democracy was revealed to Parliament and to the public.
Justice Hogue, who was leading the foreign interference public inquiry, concluded in the inquiry's initial report that “interference occurred in the last two general elections” and became so serious that it “diminished the ability of some voters to cast an informed vote”. She also concluded that foreign interference had a negative impact on the broader electoral ecosystem in the 2019 and 2021 elections, and that it undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy.
The government was slow to act on the advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other national security bodies, who had identified these threatening activities years ago, before the two general elections that followed.
The Prime Minister was first warned in 2018 by the director of CSIS of the existential threat from foreign interference threat activities of the People's Republic of China here in Canada. National security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including legislation. It took years for the government to introduce Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, but finally it has been introduced. Let me outline our views on this bill.
The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 proposes amendments to the CSIS Act. These amendments are the most significant changes to the act in decades. As my hon. colleague, the minister, pointed out, the CSIS Act was introduced in 1984, just after disco but before the introduction of the Internet, social media, smart phones and many other technologies. The amendments would allow CSIS to obtain preservation and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records or documents through a single attempt. They would allow CSIS to better collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. They would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence for the first time and would allow CSIS to disclose classified information outside of the government, to provinces, municipalities, universities and companies.
Part 2 would amend the Security of Information Act and the Criminal Code to create new foreign interference offences. The bill would create a new offence of up to life in prison for a person who commits any indictable offence under the Criminal Code or under any other act of Parliament at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. The bill would also create new offences for a person who engages in clandestine activities at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of Canada or to influence the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
The bill facilitates foreign interference proceedings by eliminating the need for the Crown to demonstrate that the purpose of the foreign interference is to harm Canadian interests if the person who committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
Finally, part 2 would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the offence of sabotage to include sabotage against essential infrastructure, which is defined as transportation, information and communication technology, water and waste water, energy and utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure. Sabotage is defined as anyone who “interferes with access to essential infrastructure” or anyone who “causes an essential infrastructure to be lost, inoperable, unsafe or unfit for use” with the intent to “endanger the safety, security or defence of Canada” or the armed forces of an ally in Canada, or to cause “serious risk to the health or safety of the public”. As the minister pointed out earlier, the minister's view is that essential infrastructure includes the construction of essential infrastructure.
The sabotage offence provided for in the bill is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and for greater certainty, part 2 makes it clear that it exempts legal advocacy, protest or dissent that does not intend to cause harm.
Part 3 would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential amendments to other acts to create a general scheme to deal with information related to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings. It proposes amendments that would permit the appointment of a special counsel to protect the interests of non-governmental parties in those proceedings.
The fourth and final part of the bill would establish the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which creates a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. Any person under the direction of or in association with a foreign state or foreign government, or any entity controlled by that state or government, and who communicates with a public office holder, who communicates or disseminates information to the public about political or governmental processes, or who distributes money or items of value, or provides a service or the use of a facility, must register.
The bill would create an indictable offence of up to five years in prison and up to $5 million in administrative monetary penalties for failing to register, for providing false or misleading information to the commissioner or for obstructing the commissioner's work. These are tough penalties for failing to register, and they will have a deterring effect on those thinking about acting on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign-controlled entity in a corrupt, coercive and clandestine manner.
For those who do act in such a manner and, as I expect, do not register, tools are available to law enforcement and other enforcement entities, such as the commissioner, to hold these individuals accountable for their activities, either through the new administrative monetary penalties of up to $5 million, which have a much lower threshold for use, or through a referral to the appropriate police of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.
The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals engaged in influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The act provides that the commissioner is to provide reports to the public safety minister and Parliament. The commissioner is appointed by Governor in Council, effectively by the Prime Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the House of Commons and Senate. However, ultimately the decision to appoint the commissioner is a decision of the Prime Minister's alone.
In principle, we support Bill C-70. Now that it has finally been introduced, the government, the official opposition and other recognized parties in this House must work together to ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of authoritarian states. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.
As our general election draws closer and as the life of this Parliament draws to an end, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections through legislation.
That is why the Conservatives are proposing to work with the government and the other parties in the House to fast-track the adoption of Bill C‑70 in the House of Commons and in committee, leaving enough time to implement foreign interference protection measures before the election.
Conservatives will work in good faith to ensure the rapid progress of Bill C-70 through the House while ensuring sufficient scrutiny of its provisions. We are willing to consider amendments to the bill, but we want it to pass.
The government has often asked the official opposition to work with it, and this is an instance in which we will.
1355 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/9/24 11:05:09 a.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, I think that we need a full range of tools, which is what experts have been telling the government.
The government needs to implement a full range of tools to counter these foreign interference threat operations, and one of the tools that it needs to start using, which it is not very good at, is sunlight and transparency. The government needs to tell us and the public about foreign interference threats that it has derived from intelligence so that we are equipped with information to ensure that we become more resilient as a Parliament and more resilient as a society to counter the threats coming from authoritarian states.
110 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/9/24 11:02:26 a.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague for all the work she has done on countering PRC foreign interference. It has been very constructive.
The member rightfully points out that Justice Hogue found that the PRC interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections. That is incontrovertible. That is a finding of fact by Justice Hogue. She also concluded that the intelligence relating to the member for Don Valley North led to well-grounded suspicions that the PRC's interference could have impacted the individual who was elected in Don Valley North to this place. She said, “This is significant.”
She also concluded, with respect to the riding of Steveston—Richmond East, it is a reasonable possibility to conclude that the PRC's disinformation operations in Steveston—Richmond East “could have impacted the result in this riding.” Again, these are Justice Hogue's findings. They could have impacted the results in certain ridings. Much of it centres around disinformation operations.
As my hon. colleague stated earlier, we found out that the government did nothing about these disinformation operations in Steveston—Richmond East, but it jumped to attention when a Facebook post was made by the Buffalo Chronicle. A PCO official immediately called up Facebook, using the full weight and threat of the Government of Canada, to tell Facebook to take it down during the election. That shows us how uneven the playing field is with respect to the government's handling of foreign interference during the writ period.
256 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/9/24 10:56:58 a.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, I think opposition parties in the House have been highly responsible in how we have handled the information on foreign interference threat activities that have come to our attention over the last two years.
When these stories broke, they did not break because the government informed members of the House or the House's committees about these foreign interference threat activities. They broke because they were printed on the front page of newspapers like The Globe and Mail.
When we received that information, which the rest of the general public received at the same time, we treated it in a highly non-partisan and responsible manner. In fact, I do not recall many questions in this House about Don Valley North or about Steveston—Richmond East over the course of the last year and a half, because we were not certain what the facts were. It was not until May 3, last week, when Justice Hogue released her initial report, Justice Hogue having found certain things in those ridings, that we began to raise questions, because she received the evidence and made findings based on her judicial judgment.
I think, in this whole matter, opposition parties have been highly responsible in how we have treated this information. I expect that we will be highly responsible going forward if this matter goes to the procedure and House affairs committee.
231 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/6/24 3:04:04 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, I will tell the government what Justice Hogue concluded in Steveston—Richmond East. She found that “there are strong [indications] of PRC involvement and there is a reasonable possibility that these narratives could have impacted the result in this riding.” Again, the Prime Minister said, just several weeks ago, that in “every single constituency election...election integrity held and it was free and fair.”
Does the government agree with Justice Hogue that PRC interference could have impacted the election result in Steveston—Richmond East?
92 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/8/23 4:06:31 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, this is an important question. I am very concerned about the weakening of Canada's national security and intelligence system, the intelligence community, because of what has taken place over the last several months.
I would add that it is not primarily the decision of CSIS whether or not to inform members of foreign interference threat activities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Prime Minister; an open and accountable government is clear. The Prime Minister has primary responsibility among all ministers for national security. The Prime Minister is primarily responsible for the government's relationship to Parliament.
What has clearly broken down here is the direction from the Prime Minister to direct his intelligence community, departments and central agencies to inform members of Parliament and their families, in an appropriate manner, about foreign interference threat activities. He has indicated that this will now happen going forward, but it should have happened as soon as he was appointed to office, in early November 2015.
166 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- May/8/23 4:04:00 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, I believe that a public inquiry into the general problem of foreign interference is needed.
However, I also know and believe one second thing, which is that we cannot allow the process, whether matters have been referred to NSIRA, NSICOP or a special rapporteur, which could lead to a public inquiry, to prevent us, prevent this chamber or its committee, the procedure and House affairs committee, or prevent the Government of Canada, the executive branch of our system, from taking immediate action in regard to threats that are directed to members and their families or directed to Canadians who are members of diaspora ethnocultural communities. We have to be able to do both: take immediate action and, at the same time, look at some of the systemic problems that have been brought to light over the last number of months, as reports about foreign interference threat activities have surfaced.
I say “yes” to a public inquiry, but also “yes” to immediate action, and not delay as a way to prevent action by deflecting to the process of NSIRA, NSICOP or a potential public inquiry.
190 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Mar/20/23 4:59:21 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, there is a great BBC article on the case of Christine Lee, dated July 19, 2022, entitled, “Why did MI5 name Christine Lee as an ‘agent of influence’?” I encourage the member and others to read that article because it explains the tactics behind MI5 going public with this information.
To answer his question, at the end of the day, CSIS cannot go public with any information to the Speaker of the House of Commons, to individual members of Parliament or to political parties or candidates without the express authorization of the Prime Minister. What has been happening is that the Prime Minister has refused to grant this authorization for CSIS to go public with the details of these foreign interference threat activities. That is why it is so critically important that we use the tools of this House and its committees to compel testimony from individuals like Ms. Telford and others and get them to answer questions about what exactly is going on. We can then heed the advice of Five Eyes intelligence experts to use sunlight and transparency to publicly reveal the details of what is going on.
196 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Mar/7/23 2:43:06 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, if the government treated the threat seriously, it would listen to the advice of CSIS. CSIS has said that an effective way to counter foreign interference is through sunlight and transparency, to build resilience by informing Canadians about interference threat activities. The government has done the opposite. First it hid behind excuses and accusations, and then it hid behind a secret committee and a special rapporteur. The government has been anything but transparent about this. It is burying the truth in process. Why?
85 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Mar/6/23 2:37:08 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, they concluded overall that they were free and fair.
Last election, the G7 rapid response mechanism in Global Affairs Canada tracked Chinese Communist Party interference targeting candidates like Kenny Chiu. Despite Global Affairs tracking interference in real time during the election, nothing was done. Kenny Chiu was not informed. Clearly, the critical election incident protocol did not work.
Since the PMO had a hand in setting up this protocol, will the PMO let its officials testify in front of a committee in order to tell us why the protocol was set up the way it was?
98 words
All Topics
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Mar/6/23 2:35:49 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, for years, CSIS has tracked Beijing's foreign interference and has said, “foreign interference is a serious threat to the security of Canada.” For years, CSIS has advised the Prime Minister that “Canada can make use of a policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to highlight the point that foreign interference should be exposed to the public.”
Will the Prime Minister heed this advice, be transparent and let PMO officials testify before a parliamentary committee?
85 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Mar/6/23 2:18:43 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, for years, CSIS has assessed that Beijing's foreign interference “can pose serious threats” to the security of Canada. CSIS tracked this interference and brought it to the attention of the Prime Minister, as have others, like Global Affairs Canada's G7 rapid response mechanism.
CSIS advised the Prime Minister that “Canada can make use of a policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to highlight the point that [foreign interference] should be exposed to the public” and that “Canada can counter [foreign interference] activities by building resilience.” To build resilience, Canadians, communities and all levels of government need to be aware of foreign interference threat activities.
The Prime Minister has ignored this advice. He needs to heed the advice of experts, treat Beijing's foreign interference as the serious threat it is and tell us and Canadians exactly what is going on.
154 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Dec/1/22 2:51:13 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, CSIS advised the Prime Minister in its top secret briefing note that the way to combat foreign interference was through “a policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to highlight the point that [foreign interference] should be exposed to the public”.
Why are the Prime Minister and the government not heeding this advice? Why are they not going public and telling Canadians exactly which candidates and which riding associations were involved in Beijing's foreign interference?
83 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Nov/29/22 2:45:56 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, CSIS also said in those briefings that the government's response to foreign interference should be “grounded in transparency and sunlight” so that foreign interference is “exposed to the public”.
The government's response to our legitimate questions has been anything but; it has stonewalled us for weeks. Commissioner Lucki said yesterday that the RCMP has investigations into broad foreign interference, including “interference in democratic processes.”
I have a simple question. Do these investigations include the 2019 or 2021 election?
88 words
All Topics
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Nov/29/22 2:44:50 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, the government is not answering our very legitimate questions. We know the Prime Minister has been briefed at least three times about foreign interference since the 2019 election. In the briefings, CSIS mentioned Beijing’s foreign interference and also mentioned politicians and riding associations being targeted.
I have a simple question. Was the Prime Minister told about Beijing targeting candidates in the 2019 or 2021 election?
69 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- Nov/24/22 2:56:09 p.m.
- Watch
Mr. Speaker, our questions are not about the overall integrity of the 2019 and 2021 elections, nor questioning whether overall our elections are free and fair. We are asking who knew what, when, about Beijing's interference in our elections.
The Prime Minister said, in response to questions, “I do not have any information, nor have I been briefed on any federal candidates receiving any money from China.”
The government is parsing its words and is obfuscating, so let me ask this question. Has the government received any information about election interference by Beijing?
96 words
- Hear!
- Rabble!
- add
- star_border
- share
- menumenu
- notificationsnotifications
- home
- mailmail
- searchsearch
