- Member of Parliament
- Member of the panel of chairs for the legislative committees
- Conservative
- Wellington—Halton Hills
- Ontario
- Voting Attendance: 65%
- Expenses Last Quarter: $120,269.09
- Government Page
Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for the following motion, which would see the bill voted on at third reading by Wednesday, June 12, at end of day.
That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, shall be disposed of as follows:
(a) at the expiry of the time provided for government orders later today, the bill would be deemed adopted at second reading and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security;
(b) during the consideration of the bill by the committee: (1) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings; (2) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3; Tuesday, June 4; Wednesday, June 5; and Thursday, June 6, to gather evidence from witnesses; (3) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear; (4) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 9 a.m. on Monday, June 10; (5) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill; (6) the committee shall meet at 3.30 p.m. on Monday, June 10—
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- May/29/24 5:09:51 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, my father came here in 1952 from Hong Kong as a Chinese immigrant, several years after the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed. However, even though that legislation had been repealed, the sentiments that underpinned it still remained in Canada.
We have to be acutely sensitive to diaspora communities. I note that this bill is agnostic when it comes to foreign states and foreign governments. It would require all persons to register, regardless of the foreign entity or foreign principle they are acting on behalf of, in association with or at the direction of. It is a fair bill that would ensure there is greater sunlight and transparency, which also makes it an important tool to ensure that diaspora communities are not unfairly targeted. When information is made public, bad actors are made known and everyone else is understood to be innocent.
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- May/29/24 5:07:43 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, there are measures in this bill that will give CSIS the power to disclose classified information to universities, municipalities and provinces to ensure that they have the information they need to protect their interests. We support this measure. We think it is very important to give our national security agencies the power to do that.
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- May/29/24 5:06:04 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I note that part 4 of the bill provides for the creation of a commissioner. That commissioner would be situated within the machinery of government, within the Department of Public Safety Canada, and would be appointed at the advice of the Prime Minister. An amendment that would perhaps strengthen the independence of that office would be to appoint the commissioner after the Prime Minister has consulted with leaders of the recognized parties in the House of Commons and the Senate and after resolutions have been adopted by both the House and Senate. Perhaps that amendment would strengthen the independence of the office.
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Mr. Speaker, Canadians expect their institutions to protect them from the malign threat activities of authoritarian states. Canadians expect the whole of the Government of Canada, including its intelligence agencies and law enforcement, to protect our elections and democratic institutions from the coercive, clandestine and corrupt foreign interference threat activities of authoritarian states. That is what Canadians expect, and that is why Canadians were so shocked when the extent of foreign interference in our democracy was revealed to Parliament and to the public.
Justice Hogue, who was leading the foreign interference public inquiry, concluded in the inquiry's initial report that “interference occurred in the last two general elections” and became so serious that it “diminished the ability of some voters to cast an informed vote”. She also concluded that foreign interference had a negative impact on the broader electoral ecosystem in the 2019 and 2021 elections, and that it undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy.
The government was slow to act on the advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other national security bodies, who had identified these threatening activities years ago, before the two general elections that followed.
The Prime Minister was first warned in 2018 by the director of CSIS of the existential threat from foreign interference threat activities of the People's Republic of China here in Canada. National security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including legislation. It took years for the government to introduce Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, but finally it has been introduced. Let me outline our views on this bill.
The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 proposes amendments to the CSIS Act. These amendments are the most significant changes to the act in decades. As my hon. colleague, the minister, pointed out, the CSIS Act was introduced in 1984, just after disco but before the introduction of the Internet, social media, smart phones and many other technologies. The amendments would allow CSIS to obtain preservation and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records or documents through a single attempt. They would allow CSIS to better collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. They would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence for the first time and would allow CSIS to disclose classified information outside of the government, to provinces, municipalities, universities and companies.
Part 2 would amend the Security of Information Act and the Criminal Code to create new foreign interference offences. The bill would create a new offence of up to life in prison for a person who commits any indictable offence under the Criminal Code or under any other act of Parliament at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. The bill would also create new offences for a person who engages in clandestine activities at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of Canada or to influence the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
The bill facilitates foreign interference proceedings by eliminating the need for the Crown to demonstrate that the purpose of the foreign interference is to harm Canadian interests if the person who committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
Finally, part 2 would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the offence of sabotage to include sabotage against essential infrastructure, which is defined as transportation, information and communication technology, water and waste water, energy and utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure. Sabotage is defined as anyone who “interferes with access to essential infrastructure” or anyone who “causes an essential infrastructure to be lost, inoperable, unsafe or unfit for use” with the intent to “endanger the safety, security or defence of Canada” or the armed forces of an ally in Canada, or to cause “serious risk to the health or safety of the public”. As the minister pointed out earlier, the minister's view is that essential infrastructure includes the construction of essential infrastructure.
The sabotage offence provided for in the bill is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and for greater certainty, part 2 makes it clear that it exempts legal advocacy, protest or dissent that does not intend to cause harm.
Part 3 would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential amendments to other acts to create a general scheme to deal with information related to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings. It proposes amendments that would permit the appointment of a special counsel to protect the interests of non-governmental parties in those proceedings.
The fourth and final part of the bill would establish the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which creates a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. Any person under the direction of or in association with a foreign state or foreign government, or any entity controlled by that state or government, and who communicates with a public office holder, who communicates or disseminates information to the public about political or governmental processes, or who distributes money or items of value, or provides a service or the use of a facility, must register.
The bill would create an indictable offence of up to five years in prison and up to $5 million in administrative monetary penalties for failing to register, for providing false or misleading information to the commissioner or for obstructing the commissioner's work. These are tough penalties for failing to register, and they will have a deterring effect on those thinking about acting on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign-controlled entity in a corrupt, coercive and clandestine manner.
For those who do act in such a manner and, as I expect, do not register, tools are available to law enforcement and other enforcement entities, such as the commissioner, to hold these individuals accountable for their activities, either through the new administrative monetary penalties of up to $5 million, which have a much lower threshold for use, or through a referral to the appropriate police of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.
The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals engaged in influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The act provides that the commissioner is to provide reports to the public safety minister and Parliament. The commissioner is appointed by Governor in Council, effectively by the Prime Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the House of Commons and Senate. However, ultimately the decision to appoint the commissioner is a decision of the Prime Minister's alone.
In principle, we support Bill C-70. Now that it has finally been introduced, the government, the official opposition and other recognized parties in this House must work together to ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of authoritarian states. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.
As our general election draws closer and as the life of this Parliament draws to an end, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections through legislation.
That is why the Conservatives are proposing to work with the government and the other parties in the House to fast-track the adoption of Bill C‑70 in the House of Commons and in committee, leaving enough time to implement foreign interference protection measures before the election.
Conservatives will work in good faith to ensure the rapid progress of Bill C-70 through the House while ensuring sufficient scrutiny of its provisions. We are willing to consider amendments to the bill, but we want it to pass.
The government has often asked the official opposition to work with it, and this is an instance in which we will.
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- May/29/24 4:55:23 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for me to split my time with the member for St. Albert—Edmonton.
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- May/29/24 4:45:18 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, part 2 of the bill would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include essential infrastructure such as transportation, information and telecommunication technology, water and waste water, energy, utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure.
My simple question for the minister is this: Does the definition of essential infrastructure include, in his view, the construction of essential infrastructure?
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- May/9/24 11:05:09 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I think that we need a full range of tools, which is what experts have been telling the government.
The government needs to implement a full range of tools to counter these foreign interference threat operations, and one of the tools that it needs to start using, which it is not very good at, is sunlight and transparency. The government needs to tell us and the public about foreign interference threats that it has derived from intelligence so that we are equipped with information to ensure that we become more resilient as a Parliament and more resilient as a society to counter the threats coming from authoritarian states.
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- May/9/24 11:02:26 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague for all the work she has done on countering PRC foreign interference. It has been very constructive.
The member rightfully points out that Justice Hogue found that the PRC interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections. That is incontrovertible. That is a finding of fact by Justice Hogue. She also concluded that the intelligence relating to the member for Don Valley North led to well-grounded suspicions that the PRC's interference could have impacted the individual who was elected in Don Valley North to this place. She said, “This is significant.”
She also concluded, with respect to the riding of Steveston—Richmond East, it is a reasonable possibility to conclude that the PRC's disinformation operations in Steveston—Richmond East “could have impacted the result in this riding.” Again, these are Justice Hogue's findings. They could have impacted the results in certain ridings. Much of it centres around disinformation operations.
As my hon. colleague stated earlier, we found out that the government did nothing about these disinformation operations in Steveston—Richmond East, but it jumped to attention when a Facebook post was made by the Buffalo Chronicle. A PCO official immediately called up Facebook, using the full weight and threat of the Government of Canada, to tell Facebook to take it down during the election. That shows us how uneven the playing field is with respect to the government's handling of foreign interference during the writ period.
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- May/9/24 10:59:44 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I believe that Justice Hogue's initial report is a good start. She will present a second report in December of this year. I will continue working with the commission to ensure that the second report is very strong and contains solid recommendations for building a national security system that will protect our democratic institutions.
I also agree that the government must act. The director of CSIS sounded the alarm in 2018 when he publicly announced that there was a national security problem here in Canada, specifically in relation to the People's Republic of China. That was six or seven years ago. The government dragged its feet over proposing a measure or taking action. As my hon. NDP colleague said, they took too long introducing a bill aimed at creating a registry of foreign agents.
A lot more needs to be done, and I think that the government needs to do these things.
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- May/9/24 10:56:58 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I think opposition parties in the House have been highly responsible in how we have handled the information on foreign interference threat activities that have come to our attention over the last two years.
When these stories broke, they did not break because the government informed members of the House or the House's committees about these foreign interference threat activities. They broke because they were printed on the front page of newspapers like The Globe and Mail.
When we received that information, which the rest of the general public received at the same time, we treated it in a highly non-partisan and responsible manner. In fact, I do not recall many questions in this House about Don Valley North or about Steveston—Richmond East over the course of the last year and a half, because we were not certain what the facts were. It was not until May 3, last week, when Justice Hogue released her initial report, Justice Hogue having found certain things in those ridings, that we began to raise questions, because she received the evidence and made findings based on her judicial judgment.
I think, in this whole matter, opposition parties have been highly responsible in how we have treated this information. I expect that we will be highly responsible going forward if this matter goes to the procedure and House affairs committee.
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- May/9/24 10:45:18 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, what we do in this place matters. This place is the only place at the federal level that is a democratic institution. This is Canada's democratic institution. The other place is not; it is appointed. The Prime Minister and his cabinet are not; they are appointed.
In Canada, we do not elect governments. We do not elect prime ministers. We elect a legislature, a single national legislature of 338 Canadians to sit here on behalf of Canadians to make decisions. The way we make decisions in this country, under our constitutional order, is not through the tip of a sword but through debate. It is through our words, and the words we use in this place influence the votes, which are votes on motions and bills that lead to decisions taken by Parliament.
Therefore, protecting members of Parliament in their execution of their duties, in the words they are freely allowed to use on the floor of the House and in the actions they take, whether it is in respect of legislation in front of the House, motions in front of the House or administrative matters, is incredibly important. Members should be free from interference, from coercion and from threats. That is why what is in front of us today is so very important, because what we do in this place matters. What we did in this place in 2020 and 2021 mattered.
On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to ban Huawei from our national core telecommunications network and also calling on the government to come forward with a robust plan to combat foreign interference. That motion ultimately put enough pressure on the government to make a belated decision to ban Huawei from our national telecommunications network.
Several months later, in early 2021, the House, on February 22, 2021, adopted a motion recognizing that the PRC's repression of some 12 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang province in western China constituted genocide under the 1948 genocide convention. That mattered, because what came out of that was coordinated action between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to impose sanctions on a number of individuals and one entity in Xinjiang in response to these gross human rights violations.
What we did mattered back then, and the PRC noticed. The PRC implemented a full-spectrum response against members of this House, some legitimate and some illegitimate. It pursued legitimate diplomatic action. It pursued legitimate counter-sanction action. That is not in question. What is in question is that it illegitimately violated international law and targeted members of this House.
Justice Hogue, as the previous member outlined, has outlined how the PRC interfered in the 2021 election. CSIS concluded clearly that the PRC interfered in the 2021 election, and Justice Hogue found exactly that in her initial report of May 3, last week.
The PRC also illegitimately targeted six members of this place, who have come forward on this point of privilege, and that is the question in front of us today.
These members were cyber-attacked by the PRC. Six members among 18 legislators in Canada were cyber-attacked by the PRC, and some of those 18 are members of the House, six in particular. They were attacked for being members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and simply attacked for doing their job in upholding the international rule of law and criticizing the PRC for its gross violations of international law, whether that is related to the genocide against the Uyghur people, which is a contravention of the 1948 genocide convention; whether it is the PRC's illegitimate and illegal crackdown in Hong Kong, a violation of the 1997 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which guaranteed Hong Kongers their rights and liberties for 50 years from 1997; whether it is the PRC's violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, where it is harassing other states, fishing vessels and other marine vessels in the South China Sea; or whether it is the PRC's violations of the trade system that has been established under WTO rules and the status it obtained in 2000 as a most-favoured nation, which it is obliged to uphold.
As a result of these six members of Parliament being targeted, our counter-intelligence agencies and the Five Eyes alliance started to take action. They started to monitor what was going on with APT31, a hacking group that is an organ of the state of the People's Republic of China, a hacking group that is run out of Hubei's State Security Department, which is an arm of the People's Republic of China's Ministry of State Security. It is a massive secret service state apparatus that is monitoring not only its own citizens in the PRC but citizens of countries abroad.
The FBI discovered this hack by APT31 in 2022, and it immediately passed it along to the Communications Security Establishment, part of the Government of Canada's national security apparatus. CSE, in turn, did its job. It passed the information along to parliamentary officials, and this is where the system broke down. While I have absolutely no doubt that the IT officials and personnel in the House of Commons administration did their job to ensure the integrity of our IT systems, that is not the question in front of us today. The question in front of us today is transparency. The question in front of us today is sunlight and transparency and why six members of this House who were targeted by the PRC through a cyber-attack were not informed at the time the Government of Canada became aware.
The government tells us all the time that we need to be situationally aware. We cannot be situationally aware if we are not armed with information. What the procedure and House affairs committee should be looking at, if this motion is adopted, is why these six members were not informed at the time when the CSE and parliamentary officials were made aware. That, ultimately, is not only the responsibility of the executive branch of government and the CSE, but also the responsibility of the Speaker and officials the Speaker is responsible for.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, elected members of national legislatures are regularly informed about foreign interference threat activities that are directed at them. That is a fact. That has not happened here in this case, and it has not happened in the past. The argument about security clearances in this place, that parliamentary officials knew about these attacks two years ago but could not tell members because they did not have security clearance, does not hold water.
Philippe Dufresne, the former law clerk and parliamentary council, gave a legal opinion to committees of this House on many occasions, indicating that section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, makes it clear that in this place, members of Parliament have an unfettered right for documents and information that is not restricted by anything else, not restricted by laws that have been adopted by this place or by whatever views the Government of Canada may hold on classified materials. Therefore, when parliamentary officials became aware of it, they should have informed these members.
I will finish by encouraging members of this House to vote for the motion so that the procedure and House affairs committee can take this matter up and ensure that in the future, when a Five Eyes intelligence agency notifies part of our national security establishment, whether it be the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Department of National Defence intelligence unit or any other part of the security establishment, that Canadian members of Parliament are being targeted by a foreign state or by non-state actors, those members are informed forthwith so that they can be situationally aware and protect themselves and their families against these hostile threats.
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- May/6/24 3:04:04 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I will tell the government what Justice Hogue concluded in Steveston—Richmond East. She found that “there are strong [indications] of PRC involvement and there is a reasonable possibility that these narratives could have impacted the result in this riding.” Again, the Prime Minister said, just several weeks ago, that in “every single constituency election...election integrity held and it was free and fair.”
Does the government agree with Justice Hogue that PRC interference could have impacted the election result in Steveston—Richmond East?
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- May/6/24 3:02:43 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, on April 11, the Prime Minister said that “it wasn't simply, an overall the election was free and fair”, but that in “every single constituency election...election integrity held and it was free and fair.”
Justice Hogue concluded otherwise. She concluded that well-grounded suspicions about PRC interference in Don Valley North “could...have impacted who was elected to Parliament. This is significant.”
Does the government agree with Justice Hogue that PRC interference could have impacted who was elected to Parliament in Don Valley North?
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- Apr/15/24 6:07:59 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I am rising to support concurrence of the 21st report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, a report that touches on the human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is a report that draws attention of these abuses to the government in the hope that the government would act. We are having this debate here in the House on this very issue in the aftermath of the Iranian regime's attack on the State of Israel this past weekend.
I think it is a timely debate for us to have. I hope members of the House will support concurrence of this report. It also allows us to draw attention to the gross human rights abuses and the violations of international law that the Iranian regime has been perpetrating in recent years. In particular, we need to draw attention to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is a key part of the state apparatus of the leaders in Tehran. It permeates its security apparatus internally in Iran and its military. It is an entity that we believe should be listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code of Canada.
Six years ago, in June 2018, the House adopted a motion calling on the Government of Canada to immediately list the IRGC as a terrorist entity. It has been six long years since the House adopted that motion, since members of the ministry of the government, including the Prime Minister, voted for that motion. However, here we are, six years later, and in the intervening years, the IRGC has continued to promulgate its ruthless and vicious campaign persecuting Iranians in Iran, including people such Nasrin Sotoudeh, an esteemed human rights advocate in Iran, and its campaign of destabilizing the region by attacking liberal democracies, such as the State of Israel. It also continues to attack Canadian interests here at home.
It was in January 2020, some four years ago, when the IRGC fired a missile at Ukrainian International Airlines flight 752, which killed dozens and dozens of Canadian citizens. Those families continue to mourn the loss of their loved ones to this day. They were people who held such promise in their future contributions to this country, whose lives will never be known and who will never be able to make a contribution to this country.
We have had these things happen over the last six years, yet the government continues to stubbornly refuse to take the leadership to list the organization as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code, despite the fact that the Prime Minister himself has called the IRGC a terrorist organization. Despite the fact that the government has labelled it as such, it still refuses to take the ministerial authority they are entrusted with under the Criminal Code to list the entity as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.
The reason this is so very important is that it would allow FINTRAC and our other investigative bodies, such as the RCMP, our provincial police forces of jurisdiction, our CSIS intelligence analysts and operatives, who all work so hard to keep our country safe each and every day, to have another tool to prosecute the flows of money that are so often associated with the threats the IRGC presents, both to the people of Iran in that region and to Canadians here at home.
Iran is subject to vast sanctions regimes. That makes it very difficult for the Islamic Republic of Iran to get the cash it needs to operate. The flows of money that so often accompany the threats that we see, both here and in the region, are essential in cutting off the ability of the IRGC to function.
However, our security forces here in Canada, our intelligence agencies here in Canada and our police forces of jurisdiction have one hand tied behind their backs because they are not allowed to go after people in Canada who are helping the IRGC with flows of money, whether it is helping them clandestinely sell oil on the black market to fund the projects they want to fund or whether it is going to proxy agents of the IRGC who are operating here on Canadian soil and threatening Canadian citizens, doing so with resources they have clandestinely been provided with.
These are the reasons we need to list the IRGC as a terrorist entity. We are calling on the government to do exactly that in the context of the shooting down of Ukrainian International Airlines flight 752, in the context of the attack this past weekend by the IRGC on the State of Israel and in light of its gross human rights abuses and imprisonment of people such as Nasrin Sotoudeh and so many other people in Iran.
We have a government that says it supports the motion that was adopted in the House some six years ago, a government that calls the IRGC a terrorist entity, and a government that still refuses to list the entity as a terrorist organization under the Criminal Code of Canada.
In response to the government's reasons for not listing the IRGC, which is that it is worried about capturing innocent individuals who are compelled to join the IRGC while they are in Iran, its members forget the fact that there is prosecutorial discretion here in Canada. Crown prosecutors have the discretion about whether or not to pursue charges under a terrorist entity listing under the Criminal Code of Canada. Their explanations for why they continue to refuse to list this entity does not make any sense, and we are calling on them to support this concurrence motion and list the IRGC as a terrorist entity.
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- Mar/20/24 11:07:52 p.m.
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Mr. Chair, I enjoyed listening to my hon. colleague's speech. He began his remarks with a comment on Russia's civilization and rich culture. Canada is a western country, a country that, like all democracies, is founded on the principles of the Enlightenment. I believe that the three most important principles of the Enlightenment are democracy, freedom and the rule of law.
Can my colleague comment on these principles, which are the founding principles of all democracies, and on the fact that Russia now does not follow the three principles of the Enlightenment?
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- Mar/20/24 9:23:27 p.m.
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Madam Chair, I want to commend the government for concluding this agreement with Ukraine.
My question is on reconstruction. The former secretary of the treasury Larry Summers, along with others, has advocated for the repurposing of some $300 billion U.S. in seized Russian assets, which are mostly being held in democracies in North America and Europe to be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine in a type of Marshall 2.0 plan.
I am wondering what measures, initiatives and discussions the Government of Canada has undertaken in Washington, London and the European Union, and at the European Commission, about this proposal.
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- Mar/20/24 8:32:37 p.m.
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Madam Chair, my hon. colleague mentioned in his speech how Ukraine and Canada share many similarities, in particular, a shared geography with Russia: Ukraine borders Russia, and Canada shares an Arctic border region with Russia.
In light of the fact that Sweden and Finland have recently joined NATO and that NORAD modernization is going on, as the defence minister has indicated, could he tell the House what the government's views are on Canada's role in the Arctic, particularly as it relates to countering some of the threats the Russian Federation presents not just to the Canadian Arctic but to the other Arctic nations in the NATO alliance?
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- Mar/20/24 8:01:04 p.m.
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Madam Chair, I have a comment and a question for my hon. colleague. First, I said something earlier that I want to correct.
I said earlier that Don Mazankowski was a Ukrainian Canadian. What I should have said is that he was married to a Ukrainian Canadian and that he represented the most Ukrainian Canadian riding in Canada, which at the time was Vegreville. I just wanted to make sure the record was corrected on that.
That being said, I have a question for my colleague. He said that half of the aid that the government announced was not delivered to Ukraine. Can he explain why that is the case? What is the holdup?
He said that the government announced a lot of aid for Ukraine but that only 50% or 60% of it was actually provided to Ukraine. What is the holdup?
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- Mar/20/24 7:44:02 p.m.
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Madam Chair, the member is right to note that Alberta has always been a proud part of our federation and home to millions of Ukrainian Canadians. In fact the deputy prime minister under Brian Mulroney, Don Mazankowski, whom I got to know a little bit, was a proud Ukrainian Canadian. I think many Ukrainians across the country burst with pride when he took on that role in the government of the late prime minister.
With respect to our opposition to the free trade agreement, we indicated it was on a very narrow basis that had to do with the carbon pricing provisions in the agreement. We indicated at the time, in December 2023 when it was in front of the House, that while we were opposed to the agreement, we were not going to obstruct its passage through either the House or the Senate, and I think we have been true to our word. The bill has become law in Canada, so that is also evidence of our constructive approach to Ukraine.
We in the House all support Ukraine, but that does not mean there is going to be unanimity on every single aspect of the government's policy with respect to Ukraine. However, I cannot think of many other areas in foreign policy where there has been such multipartisan support as there has been for Ukraine.
With respect to the path forward, I think the immediate need is a military need. It is clear that Ukraine's offensive stalled. It is clear that the Russian offensive is counterattacking and that territory is being lost as we speak, which is why I think that, even more than humanitarian need, there is a need for military kit and equipment right now for Ukraine. If the U.S. Congress is mired in legislative gridlock on these sorts of issues, then other NATO members should be stepping up to the plate to provide the funds and the equipment that Ukraine needs.
As I said earlier, there are four easy things we think the government could transfer immediately, and actually some of them are surplus in the Canadian Armed Forces. One is surplus Light Armoured Vehicles that Ukraine has indicated it could use. Another is the surplus 83,000 rockets that are to be decommissioned. The NASAMS air defence system that the government announced support for about a year ago is another thing that we believe could be provided to Ukraine. The fourth item is the excess Role 3 mobile hospitals that the Canadian Forces acquired, I believe, in response to the pandemic. These are things we could transfer right now that could provide additional support for Ukraine.
Finally, in addition to all of those things, we really feel the need for the government to step up procurement and production of munitions here in Canada, which not only Ukraine needs but the western alliance also needs to recapitalize its stocks.
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