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Jun/15/23 10:28:12 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, even though it is late, we are wrapping up our work and we may be a little jagged, it is a pleasure to speak to the return of Bill C‑9 as amended by the Senate. This all feels a bit like groundhog day. I was rereading the notes from my last speech on Bill C‑9 and they begin with a reminder to wish everyone a merry Christmas. In my notes, I was talking about the fact that I had spoken to Bill C‑9 or its equivalent, Bill S‑5, before the 2021 election. All that to say that I have spoken to Bill C‑9 many times now. I feel like I am repeating myself, unfortunately. It may be a feeling shared by my colleagues, either in their own speech or in having to listen to mine for the umpteenth time this evening. This has been mentioned many times: There is a real urgency to look into the misconduct of federally appointed judges, as current events are reminding us. There is the case of Justice Brown, for instance, where there were unending delays in the probe of what seemed to be alleged misconduct. In a context where, unfortunately, there is a shortage of judges, we are reminded that we need to streamline the process for studying misconduct and that we need to do so in two ways. First, Bill C‑9 provides for fewer judges to study a case of misconduct. Second, it provides fewer possibilities for using delaying tactics throughout the process to ensure that the work is done diligently and that the judges are assigned for a shorter period of time. With respect to the amendments proposed by the Senate, only two were retained by the government and the rest were rejected. I will spend a little more time on one of the amendments, which prompted some questions that I have already asked my colleagues. It concerns an amendment to clause 84, which follows up on the clauses that provide for the creation of a list of judges and laypersons who can be involved in the different stages of the process for studying the misconduct. There is a diversity provision for this list. The initial clause read as follows: 84 As far as possible, the Council shall name persons who reflect the diversity of the Canadian population to the roster of judges and to the roster of lay persons. The amendment suggested by the Senate and accepted by the government would delete “as far as possible”. As I mentioned, this points to a shift away from what seemed like an obligation of diligence to an obligation of result. To the extent possible, the aim was to incorporate diversity into the list of judges and laypersons for selection. However, by deleting “as far as possible”, I get a sense that we are creating more of an obligation of result, which raises a number of issues. We are told that there is currently a shortage of judges. We cannot change the current number of judges simply by snapping our fingers. It would be nice if we could because we need them, but we have to work with what we have. If we absolutely had to start reflecting diversity now, with our very small pool of existing judges, we could run into certain problems by selecting judges concentrated in certain geographic areas, where there is better representation. We could end up relying more heavily on specific locations to find judges more representative of diversity. We could also run the risk of sidelining certain other necessary or useful criteria in selecting the judges we want to include on our lists. One example could be knowledge of both official languages. By making diversity an obligation rather than something we are striving for or want, we could be limiting our options at a time when resources are already scarce. When I asked the minister whether it might not create obstacles that are more difficult to overcome if we make it an obligation of result rather than an obligation of diligence, I got the impression that he somewhat agreed that it was perhaps not the best amendment that the Senate could have suggested. He seemed to be saying that we can live with it, it is not so bad, but that, clearly, we could have done without it. When it comes to this aspect of creating an obligation of result when drawing up a list, I think we could have done without this amendment. It creates an obligation that may be difficult to fulfill. I do not necessarily share the Minister of Justice's optimism when he says that the Canadian Judicial Council is of the impression that it will be able to fulfill this obligation. The other amendment that was proposed and welcomed by the government is to add the term “sexual misconduct” to the list of complaints that cannot be systematically dismissed by a screening officer who receives complaints. It therefore says that “A screening officer shall not dismiss a complaint that alleges sexual misconduct [that is the term being added] or sexual harassment or that alleges discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act.” In the complaints analysis process, a complaint can be dismissed from the outset if it is frivolous, vexatious or obviously unfounded because the grounds for complaint are not sufficiently substantiated. A complaint cannot be rejected if there is an element of sexual misconduct, sexual harassment or discrimination. This amendment is timely in the context of the #MeToo movement, as we increasingly seek to eliminate everything to do with sexual misconduct. We do not want this to be such a specific criterion that we never reach it. We want to widen the scope. I think it is a good thing to add “sexual misconduct” to the list of criteria for not automatically dismissing a complaint. In that regard, I believe that good work was done. In my opinion and in the Bloc Québécois's opinion, the minister clearly explained the reasons for which he supports these two amendments, although we do not entirely agree with one of them. However, this will not prevent us from voting in favour of the motion, because it will finally make it possible to implement Bill C-9. This is becoming increasingly urgent. We need to get this done as quickly as possible, so we can truly streamline the complaints analysis process. The government rejected the rest of the Senate amendments in order to prevent the complaints analysis process from becoming more cumbersome, given that the original intent of the bill was to streamline it. In our opinion, it was warranted to reject the proposed amendments. I want to come back to the fact that this bill was debated at length on multiple occasions and in various incarnations. The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights has done a lot of work on this, and it seemed as though we finally had a version that parliamentarians agreed on. Bill C‑9 was unanimously passed at third reading. I think we could have done without the Senate deciding to get involved and adding its two cents. I will not get into the details of Bloc Québécois's position on the very existence of a second chamber. However, I would like to come back to the general purpose of the bill. It is important to remind members of that. The community, all jurists, have been asking for this bill for a long time. What is more, as I mentioned recently, after the news broke about Justice Brown, the Right Hon. Richard Wagner once again emphasized the urgent need to take action and pass Bill C‑9. He also mentioned that it was too bad that the bill was still being examined by the House. This allows me to add this little grain of salt: If not for the snap 2021 election, we would already have a bill in place. I mention the following purely as a hypothesis, since I do not have a crystal ball, but Justice Russell Brown's case might have gone differently had it been handled under the future version of Bill C‑9, which we will likely adopt, instead of under the old complaints process, which is several decades old. This bill, which seeks to shorten the process and therefore lower the cost, is well balanced. It helps speed up the process and make it more efficient, while upholding the rights of any judge who may be the subject of complaints for misconduct of all kinds within or outside their practice. The other thing we really liked about the bill is that it gets us out of a binary repression mode, a binary method for sanctioning complaints. In the first version, either the judge was cleared of the charges and remained in their position, or they were found guilty of the charges and had to be removed. There was no grey area between the two for less serious misconduct, for example. That is something that has been corrected in Bill C‑9. I think it is still worth mentioning a few things that are now possible. I did this last time, and I think it is still relevant to repeat it again today. Clause 102 of the bill states: “If the review panel does not refer the complaint to the Council under section 101, it may dismiss the complaint or take one or more of the following actions if it considers it appropriate to do so in the circumstances”. One of the things the panel can do is “issue a private or public expression of concern” about the judge's alleged conduct. It can “issue a private or public warning”. It can also “issue a private or public reprimand”. Once again, these measures may be more appropriate depending on the type of misconduct that may have occurred, rather than an all-or-nothing approach, in other words removal or no removal. The panel can also “order the judge to apologize, either privately or publicly, by whatever means the panel considers appropriate in the circumstances”. This means the judge can be supported through an apology process that would be tailored to the situation. It can “order the judge to take specific measures, including attending counselling or a continuing education course”. There is a rehabilitation aspect. This is a much more positive approach that shows a desire to retrain judges, if they make honest mistakes, for example. The panel can “take any action that the panel considers to be equivalent to any of the actions referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e)”. This provides the panel with a fair bit of latitude in the actions it can take. Finally, the panel can, “with the consent of the judge, take any other action that the panel considers appropriate in the circumstances”. The fact that the judge's consent is absolutely required for measures beyond the scope of those mentioned is perhaps the aspect of the bill that made us hesitate a little more. Generally speaking, this is a bill that has long been awaited and desired by the judiciary and the bar associations. We are pleased to finally see it come to fruition, to completion. We hope that, despite the little game of ping-pong between the House of Commons and the Senate, no more obstacles will be thrown in the way. I would like to point out that the fact that another amendment has been proposed just this evening worries me a little. I hope that this will not prevent the bill from being passed before the summer, or before what could happen in the fall. Nobody here has a crystal ball. I hope this will not be the umpteenth bill to die on the Order Paper. We could fill a lot of shelves with all the bills that have died on the Order Paper. Unfortunately, we are making a lot of work for shelving manufacturers. In general, we feel that the government's motion assessing the Senate amendments is balanced. It prevents excessive amendments from undermining the bill's original substance and its original objective of streamlining the process and making it much more efficient. We still have some uncertainty about deleting the words “as far as possible” and imposing an obligation of result. However, we can live with that uncertainty. I think that voting in favour of the government's motion is worthwhile, because it will finally allow the bill to be implemented. With that in mind, the Bloc Québécois has no problem in supporting the motion. Most of all, we hope that the next steps will be taken in a timely manner and will finally produce an acceptable bill.

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Dec/9/22 12:52:03 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech and for the work that he did in committee that he mentioned in his speech. It is always interesting to see what arguments were presented there. First, for the record, I want to confirm to my colleague that I am not suggesting that there are judges who are impartial because of the appointment process, but rather that we must ensure that the appointment process itself does not give the appearance of partiality. With regard to the addition that he wanted to make to the bill of the possibility of appealing to the Federal Court of Canada, we know that not all appeals in the justice system are appeals as of right. Did my colleague want the appeal to the Federal Court to be an appeal as of right? If so, would that not be opening the door to unduly lengthening the proceedings? If he was talking about an appeal with leave, which is mostly the case at the Supreme Court, one must, at the very least, show that there are grounds for appeal, rather than just using this as purely dilatory measure.

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Dec/9/22 12:40:03 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Mr. Speaker, I think the member's question is exactly why people are cynical. That is the issue. They want us to identify people and they say that we should not question the judicial system because that could undermine it. I say we must question it. There is always room for improvement. I do not believe for a second that the best way to bolster public confidence in the judicial system is to close our eyes. I think it is better to be as transparent as possible and as open to improvement as possible. That does not seem to be an approach the Liberals embrace.

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Dec/9/22 12:38:27 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Mr. Speaker, if, every time we talk about reviewing the judicial appointment process, the government basically systematically closes the door on it when all we want is for the issue to be examined or considered, then, of course, that will likely not help with transparency and the public's confidence in the justice system. It is important to remember that judges rise through the courts. When a judge is appointed to a superior court, it is possible that they will one day serve on the Supreme Court, but it is rare for a Supreme Court justice to be appointed without first being appointed to a lower court. Taking a bottom-up approach would involve starting with the appointment of judges in the superior courts of Quebec and the provinces, and reviewing that process from the bottom up would likely lead de facto to better confidence in the rest of the process and in the path that judges may take to the Supreme Court.

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Dec/9/22 12:35:48 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Mr. Speaker, I am tempted to talk about a bunch of things that stand out from that question. With regard to the review process referred to by the hon. member, one of the amendments adopted in committee was that, if the complaint is dismissed, the person who made the complaint should at least be informed of the reasons for dismissing it. This implies that a minimum of work must be done to explain why the complaint is not being pursued any further. This seems to have been a concern in the case my colleague mentioned. As for partisan appointments, having a transparent committee to select judges is already a step in the right direction, in order to ensure that judges are not always Liberal leaning, for example. This is what we have unfortunately seen in the past with the “Liberalist”. However, if we want to go a little further, there is one thing we must also consider: What happens to judges once they have completed their term on the bench? Many of them go to large firms, but others go to work for lobbies or for groups that are a little more partisan. Perhaps we should also review the possibility for judges, at the end of their term, to work in the private sector in businesses, groups, companies that may be considered more politically oriented, for example? There is work that could be done throughout a judge's life, from appointment to retirement, to ensure greater impartiality, generally speaking, and greater public confidence in the system.

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Dec/9/22 12:33:12 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his very specific and interesting question. I reviewed the work that was done in committee, the recommendations that were retained and those that were not. When we look at the proposed structure, we see that there are nevertheless many possible appeal processes. From the very first level of appeal by the review panel, there is the possibility of appealing to the reduced hearing panel. That is the first option. Next an appeal can be lodged with the appeal panel, which is set out in the bill. Thus, there is a second possibility of appeal, and after that, a third, but only by leave of the Supreme Court. The process already provides for three stages of appeal. I think that should be enough to respect procedural guarantees and fairness. There are already three levels of appeal as is the case in regular courts. Would it be appropriate to add another to ensure procedural fairness? I believe that, with the process that has already been put in place, there are sufficient guarantees to ensure respect for the rights of judges under review.

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Dec/9/22 12:31:27 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Mr. Speaker, I mentioned Albania because we had a discussion with Albania's justice minister. He said that the process for selecting judges is not just the responsibility of the government. It is an independent committee that is in charge of appointing judges. The parliamentary secretary mentions that there is no risk of a political appointment being made by the government. More than that, what matters is that there is no appearance of a risk. That is what a committee made up of parliamentarians from all parties represented in the House would allow. I think that is a solution that would clearly improve public trust in the process and at least deserves to be studied. We are not asking for more than that. I more than welcome the opportunity to have this debate at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

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Dec/9/22 12:13:34 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I understand that I have about 18 and a half minutes left. I will do my best, but I cannot promise that I will use up all of that time. I am just pointing that out for the benefit of the person who is speaking next. Now that all the Christmas wishes and greetings have been sent, I want to come back to Bill C-9, which I spoke about in June, as I mentioned. It will come as no surprise to anyone that the Bloc Québécois will support this bill at third reading for a number of reasons. One of them is that the community has been calling for this bill for quite a long time. It has been calling for a review of the system for removing judges who engage in conduct unbecoming of the profession. This bill will also help shorten the process and, incidentally, reduce the cost associated with assessing judicial misconduct, while still maintaining sufficient procedural equity that a judge who is facing sanctions can make their case and ultimately exercise their right to full answer and defence. In a way, this bill is streamlining a process that, in the past, was unfortunately inconsistently applied and abused, as in the case of Judge Girouard, who has been mentioned quite a bit in the House. It took nearly a decade to come to a final decision on the acts he was accused of. It is worth mentioning that this bill introduces a mechanism to deal with less serious complaints that would not necessarily require removing a judge who has committed wrongdoing. This mechanism would still allow the judge to be punished for their actions. It is no longer a purely black-and-white system where there are only two possible outcomes to a sanction: either to reject the sanction outright or to remove the judge from office, which is the ultimate sanction for misconduct. Under the old law, there was no in-between. The new bill allows for a slightly fuller range of options, with different shades of grey—not that I am naming a particular book—in terms of the sanctions that can be imposed. Realistically, we cannot expect Bill C‑9 to change much on a day-to-day basis, because not that many judges face possible sanctions, which is a good thing. My colleagues have said that about eight cases have come under the microscope. This is not something that happens very often. However, the bill will affect the way people perceive the justice system. If a judge is put under the microscope, we can expect the process to elicit far less criticism and complaint from the public, because it will presumably be much more effective. As I said, we will vote in favour of the bill. Based on what my colleagues have said, most if not all members of the House will do likewise. The only real criticism we heard during members' speeches had less to do with the content of the bill than with the timeline of its passage, which should take place in the coming days. This is not our first time studying a bill like Bill C-9 in the House. We saw a previous version, Bill C-5, which ended up dying on the Order Paper because the government decided to call a basically useless election in August 2021, so again, this is not the first time we are indirectly talking about Bill C-9 in the House. However, there is so much consensus on it that, hopefully, this will be the last time. Bill C-9 upholds a principle that is absolutely critical in our democracy, namely, the principle of security of tenure for judges. This principle is set out in section 99(1) of the Constitution. I think section 99(1) bears quoting. It states: ...the judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons. With respect to this aspect, Justice Dalphond, who is now a senator, spoke to Bill S‑5. He said the following: By imposing a process that makes it the responsibility of judges, first and foremost, to deal with allegations of misconduct against a judge, the Judges Act protects judges from acts of intimidation or retaliation by the executive power or litigants. In addition, since the act provides for parliamentarians to exercise their constitutional power to remove a judge only after having received the report and recommendation of the council in this regard, Canadians can rest assured that this measure, intended to be exceptional, will only be taken when it is truly justified. This essentially separates the different branches of democracy, namely the executive, legislative and judicial branches, by ensuring that if a judge is removed, it is not for purely political reasons, for example. Although the current system for removing judges in cases of wrongdoing is recognized as one of the best in the world, there was room for improvement. I will name a few of the drawbacks that have been identified. As I mentioned, the current process can be extremely long. Along the way, there is always the possibility of countless appeals and judicial reviews. Under the act, the review panel was seen as a sort of administrative tribunal that opened the door to using the regular court system, meaning filing an appeal, reviewing a decision or applying for a judicial review. As a result, some cases dragged on for over a decade. One of the problems that was identified is that a judge who may be at fault could have a financial interest in dragging out the proceedings with stalling tactics, because the judge still gets paid while the process is underway. They can keep contributing to their retirement fund, so the benefits continue to add up. The judge therefore has an incentive to make sure the final decision on their alleged conduct does not come out too quickly. That is something that has been corrected through proposed section 126 of the new bill. Proposed subsection 126(1) states: For the purposes of calculating an annuity under Part I, if a full hearing panel decides that the removal from office of a judge who is the subject of a complaint is justified, the day after the day on which the judge is given notice of the full hearing panel's decision is the day to be used to determine the number of years the judge has been in judicial office and the salary annexed to the office held by the judge at the time of his or her resignation, removal or attaining the age of retirement unless (a) the decision is set aside by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, or by the decision of an appeal panel if the appeal panel's decision is final; (b) the Minister's response under subsection 140(1) provides that no action is to be taken to remove the judge from office; or (c) the matter of removal of the judge from office is put to one or both Houses of Parliament and is rejected by either of them. Should the complaint be rejected, the judge could retain all benefits associated with their office. From now on, pension and benefits accumulation ceases as of the day on which notice of the decision is given. That removes any incentive for a judge to draw out proceedings. As I also mentioned, one of the benefits of the bill is that it now offers a wider range of sanctions than was available under the old act. The act did not, for example, allow for mandatory sanctions, so it made them seem like half-measures. The parties could make them mandatory by mutual agreement, but there was no real possibility of imposing anything. That is no longer the case. There is now a range of different measures. Let me read some more of the bill. Proposed section 102 of the new bill provides as follows: If the review panel does not refer the complaint to the Council under section 101, it may dismiss the complaint or take one or more of the following actions if it considers it appropriate to do so in the circumstances: (a) issue a private or public expression of concern; (b) issue a private or public warning; (c) issue a private or public reprimand; (d) order the judge to apologize, either privately or publicly, by whatever means the panel considers appropriate in the circumstances; (e) order the judge to take specific measures, including attending counselling or a continuing education course; (f) take any action that the panel considers to be equivalent to any of the actions referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e); (g) with the consent of the judge, take any other action that the panel considers appropriate in the circumstances. It uses the word “order”. That means it would be mandatory, and the panel has a lot of latitude. There are plenty of measures that can be taken to improve the quality of a judge's work in the future, without having to resort to the extreme punishment of removing their right to sit on the bench. The bill improves what can be done within the system while also reducing the burden of what is required to make the review process work. In the past, under the Judges Act, no fewer than 17 judges might be needed to convene a review panel to examine a case. There is currently a shortage of judges. The courts are operating at a slower pace. If a judge were to be accused of something, we cannot afford to take 17 judges out of the system when there is a shortage everywhere. Under the new version of the act, a panel can be formed with slightly fewer judges than what was required in the past. The bill also creates an internal appeal process, which will limit reliance on external courts and therefore limit the possibility of invoking the legal system for disciplinary matters involving judges. I am making an aside on this aspect because the issue of tying up courts and judges cannot be solved by Bill C‑9 alone. We had a discussion about Bill S‑4 and the possibility of making greater use of virtual tools to hear cases. This debate may continue in the days to come. That would help, but even if we add the option of virtual hearings, if there are no judges to hold these hearings, it does not matter that platforms like Zoom are available because the system will not work. That is why, in addition to Bills C‑9 and S‑4, it is important that the Minister of Justice quickly appoint judges to fill vacancies. Currently, there are nine vacancies. The chief justice of the Quebec Superior Court is even recommending that a dozen judges be added to those currently sitting. This would increase the minimum number of justices that can sit on the Quebec Superior Court. Let us hope that this message will be heard by the Minister of Justice. Basically, Bill C‑9 is about improving people's trust in the judicial system. However, as I said, it may be relatively limited in scope, because most people will not read the contents of Bill C‑9. If a judge were to commit a wrongful act, people might be interested in this new process that exists to reprimand judges. Beyond the possibility of reprimanding a judge who has already been appointed, if we really want to improve public trust in the system, we must also address the issue of judicial appointments. Some work has been done. The Liberals have mentioned that they are going to abandon the infamous Liberalist, but that may not be enough. The process is still potentially partisan. The power to select and recommend who will be appointed as a judge is still in the hands of the executive branch of government. That is why the Bloc Québécois recommends creating a truly all-party committee tasked with evaluating candidates for judicial positions in courts under federal jurisdiction, such as superior courts. This is what Albania did in hopes of joining the EU. It had to change a lot of its judicial practices to meet EU standards and bolster public confidence in its institutions. At present, Albania's justice minister has no power over judicial appointments. An independent committee is in charge. The justice minister's primary responsibility is to oversee sound administration of the courts. The minister monitors statistics to ensure that hearings are progressing without wait lists or undue delays, but is not actually responsible for appointing judges. That allows for true separation between the powers of the executive and the judiciary. The House may consider following suit as it develops a different judicial appointment system. It is on this wish that I will end my speech. Bill C‑9 is a good thing. It is an improvement that has long been called for. It may have taken a long time for it to come to fruition, but we commend the initiative nonetheless. There is still work to be done on the judiciary. The Bloc Québécois will always be a very approachable partner when it comes to improving the legal system. I think that begins with a review of the judicial appointment system.

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Dec/9/22 10:58:28 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank you. I was not sure whether you were going to give me a few seconds to start my speech, which I will be pleased to continue after question period. Since the end of this parliamentary period and the holidays are approaching, I want to take a few moments to recognize a few people. We will, of course, recognize those who work with us in the House in the coming week, but I want to take this opportunity to thank the members of my team, which is something that we perhaps do not do often enough. The work of an MP is only as good as the work of those who support them in their riding office. I therefore want to thank Dave, Diane and Hugo, as well as our new recruits, Philippe‑Olivier and Huguette, for their great work, unwavering support and top-notch service. That being said, Bill C-9, which is before us today, seems to have almost unanimous support. I had the pleasure of rising to speak to this bill last June. Generally speaking, the questions asked in the House as part of the debate were not so much about the bill itself as they were about the broader aspects of the justice system review, which shows that the bill's content is not very controversial. In fact, the bill—

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Dec/9/22 10:42:54 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his speech. I had the opportunity to speak at second reading of this bill, and I listened to the speeches given by my other colleagues. One point that kept coming up from the Conservative side was about protecting victims. It was pointed out that, in the review process, victims' views were perhaps not sufficiently taken into account in cases where a sanction was warranted, but not necessarily removal. However, an amendment adopted in committee would allow for victims to at least be notified of the reasons why their complaints were not successful. Does my colleague think this is a step in the right direction? Could Bill C-9 not have done a little more to protect victims?

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Dec/9/22 10:22:23 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank the minister for his speech. I always enjoy hearing him speak. He went on at length about how Bill C‑9 will maintain the public trust, and he also talked about the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, which is just as important and is also maintained in Bill C‑9. However, if there is one thing that makes us question that balance upon which the public trust relies, it is the judicial appointment process that precedes the potential removal of a judge from office, which one hopes would be a very infrequent occurrence. I would like the minister to comment on the possibility of revising the appointment process to make it as non-partisan and transparent as possible, thereby bolstering public confidence in the judicial system.

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Context: House Hansard - 115 - Oct/21/22

Oct/21/22 1:22:34 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Timmins—James Bay for his speech. I would like to hear what he has to say about the fact that, in the bill before us, the voices of victims are not really heard when the review panel decides to dismiss a complaint. The review panel may propose actions, such as therapy or an apology letter, and can impose certain sanctions on the judge. However, we never hear about the participation of victims. Could they be consulted more? I would like to know whether that is an improvement that could be considered when the bill is studied at second reading stage.

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Context: House Hansard - 115 - Oct/21/22

Oct/21/22 10:58:48 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech. Aside from the very specific subject matter of Bill C-9, he talked about a few things that can sometimes contribute to a loss of public trust in our institutions, particularly legal and judicial institutions. Given that Bill C-9 deals with what happens further downstream, that is, after judges are appointed, I wonder if my colleague could comment on what happens upstream, in other words, how judges are appointed. Would this not have been a good opportunity to review the judicial appointment system, so we will never again have to talk about the notorious “Liberalist”?

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Oct/21/22 10:27:28 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech. I am not sure if he is looking for his headset, but I know that he speaks excellent French. He spoke about section 102 and what the review panel can do if it dismisses a complaint against a judge. The panel can take several actions, which include ordering the judge to attend counselling or to apologize publicly. To come back to the member's proverb about sheep and wolves, it seems to me that, in this case, unfortunately, no one is thinking very much about the sheep. When a complaint is filed, it is because someone has been the victim of something. When the panel dismisses the complaint but actions such as therapy, counselling or a public apology are imposed on the judge, should the victim who filed the complaint be more included in the process? Should the inclusion of the victim in the complaint process be one of the things discussed by the committee following second reading of the bill?

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Jun/16/22 11:52:39 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I will not miss any opportunity to say that Quebec is forward-thinking and is doing great things that we should emulate more often. We need to have a much more transparent, non-partisan and depoliticized process. I will say it again, because this is key to having confidence in the justice system: The legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches must be kept separate, which is not the case with the “Liberalist”. This example is painfully obvious. Since most of the judges who sit in Quebec are federally appointed superior court judges, efforts to ensure a non-partisan appointment process will have a particular impact on the routine workings of the courts.

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Jun/16/22 11:50:54 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, whether the role of an ombudsman is to protect victims or offenders, there is always a certain obligation to appoint someone quickly. When a position remains vacant for a long time, there will be a backlog of cases. Unfortunately, that has become this government's specialty. I am thinking in particular about the immigration file, which I carried for two years. I also think there should be more transparency with respect to certain appointments. For example, take the defence file, which is one of my files. We think the ombudsman should be accountable to the House, not the minister. That might have avoided some conflicts in the past, as in the Jonathan Vance case.

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Jun/16/22 11:49:33 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, as the previous speaker did, I too want to thank my colleague for his question, which he asked in French. We really do appreciate it and see it as a sign of respect. We know that it is not always easy. I have already mentioned one possible way to impose sanctions for offences that do not necessarily call for the judge to be removed from office. I talked about including victims more in the process. This could be deliberated by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Unfortunately, I am not a member of that committee, so of course someone else will have to suggest ways to improve the legislation, but that could be a good starting point. With regard to the fees involved in representing the judge, the committee work could also include ensuring that there is no financial incentive to carry on and drag out the proceedings.

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Jun/16/22 11:39:01 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-9

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to stand this morning to discuss Bill C-9. While I was reading the bill, I had a bit of déjà vu. I remember driving on the 417 in the spring while listening to the speeches in the House on Bill S-5, which was sponsored by Senator Dalphond, for whom I have tremendous respect. I still call him “Your Honour”. I know that Bill S‑5 died on the Order Paper because of the election. The fact that I was supposed to discuss Bill C‑9 in the spring but did not get a chance to shows that we may be a bit behind on the legislative agenda. That is the only criticism I will offer today. As for the rest, I am highly satisfied at least with the spirit of the bill we are studying, as is the Canadian Judicial Council, which strongly supports it. We are talking about it today. One of the pillars or cornerstones of the bill is the importance of the separation of powers between the legislative, judicial and executive branches. This has been the case since 1971, when the Canadian Judicial Council was created and made responsible for reviewing complaints. This is maintained in Bill C-9. To ensure the separation of powers, the ability to remove judges is also maintained, as originally provided for in section 99(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which states that “the judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons”. If we relied specifically on this principle, it might appear as though the legislative branch and the executive branch, meaning us here in Parliament, had power over the removal of judges. However, since 1971, the complaint review process has been the responsibility of the Canadian Judicial Council, which must issue recommendations to the Minister of Justice in order for the removal to take place. This complaint review process has been around for over 50 years. With respect to what has been done since 1971, the improvements in Bill C‑9 meet certain needs. In this case, better is not the enemy of good. We tend to think that if something is working reasonably well, we should not necessarily seek perfection. I think that this used to apply in this case. There are three essential issues that the bill resolves. The first is that the current process is extremely long. Given the numerous opportunities to file for appeals and judicial reviews during the process, it can take a very long time to review a complaint. My colleagues mentioned that. Unfortunately, we saw proof of this with a Superior Court judge whose name I will not mention, but whose review process lasted from 2012 to 2021. If I remember correctly, the decision was handed down in 2021. As my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord mentioned, the problem is that, during that whole time, the judge continues to receive their salary and benefits and contribute to their pension. That in itself can be an incentive to come up with endless stalling tactics and draw the process out in order to keep the financial benefits. This bill makes certain changes. In particular, it modifies the process to include the creation of an appeal panel, the final body before the Supreme Court to which a judge who is at fault can apply. This eliminates the need to go through the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal to reach the Supreme Court, assuming it even agrees to hear the appeal. The bill streamlines the process. As my colleagues mentioned, under the current version of the act, judges still receive their salary and benefits. Clause 126(1) of the new act remedies that situation. It states, and I quote: For the purposes of calculating an annuity under Part I, if a full hearing panel decides that the removal from office of a judge who is the subject of a complaint is justified, the day after the day on which the judge is given notice of the full hearing panel’s decision is the day to be used to determine the number of years the judge has been in judicial office and the salary annexed to the office held by the judge at the time of his or her resignation, removal or attaining the age of retirement unless (a) the decision is set aside by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, or by the decision of an appeal panel if the appeal panel’s decision is final; (b) the Minister’s response under subsection 140(1) provides that no action is to be taken to remove the judge from office; or (c) the matter of removal of the judge from office is put to one or both Houses of Parliament and is rejected by either of them. As a result, a judge who is found to be at fault will not receive a salary during that period. Another problem with the previous version of the bill was that there were no half-measures for lesser offences, so to speak. It was all black or white. The panel's only options were to issue a recommendation for removal or to not issue one. The only middle ground involved negotiating some sort of disciplinary action with the judge on a case-by-case basis. However, judges were quite free to say that they did not want any part in that process because it was not mandatory. This bill remedies that situation. As soon as a complaint, which can be based on written submissions to the panel, has been examined, the panel can impose redress measures in cases where the reason for the complaint does not constitute grounds for removal. The review panel can order the judge, for example, to take professional development courses or require him to apologize. In some cases, this can help more effectively remedy a situation when the judge is open to having certain sanctions apply. This may be sufficient, in certain cases, to avoid continuing with a full complaint process and public hearing, which could be long and expensive. One of the options in the new bill is for the council to issue a private or public expression of concern. There is a certain transparency in the process. The council can issue a private or public warning, a private or public reprimand or order the judge to apologize. As I mentioned in my question to the member for Fundy Royal, the only thing that is a little unusual is one of the measures in clause 102, as follows: (g) with the consent of the judge, take any other action that the panel considers appropriate in the circumstances. Perhaps there are questions that should be asked when the bill is referred to a committee for study after second reading, if it gets to that stage, which should not be a problem. For example, why is the judge's consent required? Why do the victims have no say in choosing the sanction to be applied for an offence that is less serious than one that might lead to removal from office? Another thing the bill deals with is how onerous the process is. Previously, the Canadian Judicial Council itself had to make a recommendation to the minister to have a judge removed. The way it was set up, there was one panel that reviewed the case and another panel that, if it received the complaint, had to pass it on to the Canadian Judicial Council itself. The whole thing involved about 17 chief justices or associate chief justices from courts that were not already part of the process. It diverted energy from solving other problems in the courts, and the process did not necessarily help ensure procedural fairness for judges. This bill fixes that. The review panel itself will now be able to make a recommendation to the minister to relieve a judge of her or his duties. This kind of short-circuits a process that was not necessary and did not guarantee procedural fairness. All these factors significantly improve the process. However, as my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord explained, this is not the only way to improve people's perception that the justice system is impartial and create a clear separation between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. I think we also need to look at updating the judicial appointment process. The Bloc Québécois has called for this numerous times by suggesting things like creating a special all-party committee tasked with recommending a new selection process. I have not lost hope. Like my colleague, I believe that human nature is fundamentally good and is capable of doing good things, although I too am sometimes disappointed. Still, I am always willing to work with anyone who is equally willing, and I encourage the government to introduce a bill to review the appointment process.

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