- Member of Parliament
- Member of Parliament
- Conservative
- Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup
- Quebec
- Voting Attendance: 68%
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Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑34, the national security review of investments modernization act, which was introduced by the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry.
As the minister, my colleague from Saint‑Maurice—Champlain, mentioned, this bill is an attempt to update and strengthen the Investment Canada Act through seven amendments.
I will not list them all, but I will say that the government is seeking to streamline the minister's ability to investigate national security reviews of investments, strengthen penalties, create a list of industries in which acquisitions would automatically be subject to national security reviews, give the minister the power to impose interim conditions, remove the Governor in Council from the process for making an order for further national security reviews and substitute the minister, and improve coordination with international partners.
The act was last modernized in 2009. It is true that an update is needed. As my colleague from South Shore—St. Margarets and shadow minister for industry mentioned, I can confirm from the outset that we will be voting in favour of this bill at second reading. We will, however, work to make improvements to it.
If there is one phrase that sums up how we feel about this bill, it is “too little, too late”. After eight years of this Liberal government approving countless acquisitions of Canadian companies by state-owned firms, we are skeptical that protecting our national security interests is important to this government.
There is no shortage of examples of breaches. There have been numerous cases over the past few years where this government failed to take the real threats posed by foreign investments seriously.
I am proud to be a member of the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology. Over the past two years, we have examined several cases of government failures during transactions and contracting processes that had the potential to compromise national security.
I will share a few examples, some of which are very disturbing.
In January 2022, the Minister of Industry failed to follow his own guidelines when he fast-tracked the takeover of the Canadian company Neo Lithium by Chinese state-owned Zijin Mining without a national security review.
It seems to me that when a company controlled by the Chinese Communist regime wants to buy a Canadian company, that should raise a red flag. Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case. We are talking about rare materials that are important in dealing with climate change, for making more batteries and such. Lithium is an extremely important element in the production of batteries. A review should have been done.
As I just mentioned, this is a Canadian company specializing in critical minerals, like lithium. Unfortunately, this government did not sound the alarm or issue warnings. We should already be doing everything we can to protect our companies in such a key sector, but, when the buyer has ties to the Chinese Communist regime, that is stating the obvious. A serious and rigorous review should have automatically been considered.
The Standing Committee on Industry and Technology undertook an urgent study on this subject to investigate this questionable transaction. Following this study, we made three recommendations.
The first recommendation reads as follows: “That the government create a formalized and transparent process...by which government departments provide advice to the Minister...regarding decisions made under the Investment Canada Act”.
The second recommendation reads as follows, “That the Minister issue a notice...for all investments by firms from authoritarian regimes considered to be state-owned enterprises under the Investment Canada Act”.
It is worth noting that in China, the government often controls many companies, either partially or fully, through various means, so we need to have a closer look at that.
The third recommendation reads, “That the Minister release in a timely manner a full and comprehensive Critical Minerals Strategy”.
A year has passed, but it is clear that nothing has been done in that regard, unfortunately.
I will give a second example of a dubious contract. In December 2022, the RCMP awarded a contract for sensitive communications equipment to Sinclair Technologies, which is a subsidiary of Norsat.
It is important to note that Norsat, which was founded and based in Richmond, British Columbia, had itself been acquired by Hytera Communications. Who owns Hytera?
It is headquartered in China and is therefore partly owned by the Communist regime of the People's Republic of China. The company is even a major supplier to China's national security department. The $500,000 contract was awarded without any thorough investigation or verification, even though it is known within the federal public service that China and the companies it controls have attempted to interfere in Canadian affairs.
When the media broke the story, the minister responsible took swift action and cancelled the contract. Still, it is astounding that, once again, no one in government saw this coming, no one realized how dangerous the situation was.
Hytera has been charged with 21 counts of espionage in the United States. President Biden has banned the company from doing business in the U.S., but it is free to operate here, no problem. The Prime Minister trusts everyone. Forgive me for questioning the severity of what the government wanted to do at that time.
I have one final, particularly troubling example that I would like to present here. It was identified by the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. In 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs awarded a contract to the Chinese company Nuctech, founded by the son of the former secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, to supply X-ray equipment to 170 Canadian embassies and consulates. The contract was worth $6.8 million.
Although it was assured that this equipment would not be connected to embassy networks, the contracts included delivery, installation, and maintenance. Again, this is a question of national security. It is extremely important to verify these things.
During his testimony before the committee, David Mulroney, Canada's former ambassador to China, had some very harsh, but very fair, words for the government. He said that the experience gives us a troubling glimpse into this government's incompetence in dealing with China, considering that it has received clear, daily warnings that China is a strategic challenge to our country. However, there is no sign that the government is any more aware, no sign it has developed a greater sense of urgency to identify and better manage China-related issues. There is no evidence of any efforts to galvanize the government as a whole. All departments and agencies need to make an urgent effort to ensure that this does not happen.
This shows an appalling lack of leadership. Once again, history has repeated itself. We are hoping for changes to the bill. After second reading, it will go to committee, where we will be able to propose amendments.
I could say a lot more about this bill, but it is no different from everything else. Everything is broken.
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Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑34, the national security review of investments modernization act, which was introduced by the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry.
As the minister, my colleague from Saint‑Maurice—Champlain, mentioned, this bill is an attempt to update and strengthen the Investment Canada Act through seven amendments.
I will not list them all, but I will say that the government is seeking to streamline the minister's ability to investigate national security reviews of investments, strengthen penalties, create a list of industries in which acquisitions would automatically be subject to national security reviews, give the minister the power to impose interim conditions, remove the Governor in Council from the process for making an order for further national security reviews and substitute the minister, and improve coordination with international partners.
The act was last modernized in 2009. It is true that an update is needed. As my colleague from South Shore—St. Margarets and shadow minister for industry mentioned, I can confirm from the outset that we will be voting in favour of this bill at second reading. We will, however, work to make improvements to it.
If there is one phrase that sums up how we feel about this bill, it is “too little, too late”. After eight years of this Liberal government approving countless acquisitions of Canadian companies by state-owned firms, we are skeptical that protecting our national security interests is important to this government.
There is no shortage of examples of breaches. There have been numerous cases over the past few years where this government failed to take the real threats posed by foreign investments seriously.
I am proud to be a member of the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology. Over the past two years, we have examined several cases of government failures during transactions and contracting processes that had the potential to compromise national security.
I will share a few examples, some of which are very disturbing.
In January 2022, the Minister of Industry failed to follow his own guidelines when he fast-tracked the takeover of the Canadian company Neo Lithium by Chinese state-owned Zijin Mining without a national security review.
It seems to me that when a company controlled by the Chinese Communist regime wants to buy a Canadian company, that should raise a red flag. Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case. We are talking about rare materials that are important in dealing with climate change, for making more batteries and such. Lithium is an extremely important element in the production of batteries. A review should have been done.
As I just mentioned, this is a Canadian company specializing in critical minerals, like lithium. Unfortunately, this government did not sound the alarm or issue warnings. We should already be doing everything we can to protect our companies in such a key sector, but, when the buyer has ties to the Chinese Communist regime, that is stating the obvious. A serious and rigorous review should have automatically been considered.
The Standing Committee on Industry and Technology undertook an urgent study on this subject to investigate this questionable transaction. Following this study, we made three recommendations.
The first recommendation reads as follows: “That the government create a formalized and transparent process...by which government departments provide advice to the Minister...regarding decisions made under the Investment Canada Act”.
The second recommendation reads as follows, “That the Minister issue a notice...for all investments by firms from authoritarian regimes considered to be state-owned enterprises under the Investment Canada Act”.
It is worth noting that in China, the government often controls many companies, either partially or fully, through various means, so we need to have a closer look at that.
The third recommendation reads, “That the Minister release in a timely manner a full and comprehensive Critical Minerals Strategy”.
A year has passed, but it is clear that nothing has been done in that regard, unfortunately.
I will give a second example of a dubious contract. In December 2022, the RCMP awarded a contract for sensitive communications equipment to Sinclair Technologies, which is a subsidiary of Norsat.
It is important to note that Norsat, which was founded and based in Richmond, British Columbia, had itself been acquired by Hytera Communications. Who owns Hytera?
It is headquartered in China and is therefore partly owned by the Communist regime of the People's Republic of China. The company is even a major supplier to China's national security department. The $500,000 contract was awarded without any thorough investigation or verification, even though it is known within the federal public service that China and the companies it controls have attempted to interfere in Canadian affairs.
When the media broke the story, the minister responsible took swift action and cancelled the contract. Still, it is astounding that, once again, no one in government saw this coming, no one realized how dangerous the situation was.
Hytera has been charged with 21 counts of espionage in the United States. President Biden has banned the company from doing business in the U.S., but it is free to operate here, no problem. The Prime Minister trusts everyone. Forgive me for questioning the severity of what the government wanted to do at that time.
I have one final, particularly troubling example that I would like to present here. It was identified by the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. In 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs awarded a contract to the Chinese company Nuctech, founded by the son of the former secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, to supply X-ray equipment to 170 Canadian embassies and consulates. The contract was worth $6.8 million.
Although it was assured that this equipment would not be connected to embassy networks, the contracts included delivery, installation, and maintenance. Again, this is a question of national security. It is extremely important to verify these things.
During his testimony before the committee, David Mulroney, Canada's former ambassador to China, had some very harsh, but very fair, words for the government. He said that the experience gives us a troubling glimpse into this government's incompetence in dealing with China, considering that it has received clear, daily warnings that China is a strategic challenge to our country. However, there is no sign that the government is any more aware, no sign it has developed a greater sense of urgency to identify and better manage China-related issues. There is no evidence of any efforts to galvanize the government as a whole. All departments and agencies need to make an urgent effort to ensure that this does not happen.
This shows an appalling lack of leadership. Once again, history has repeated itself. We are hoping for changes to the bill. After second reading, it will go to committee, where we will be able to propose amendments.
I could say a lot more about this bill, but it is no different from everything else. Everything is broken.
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