So V ote

Nov/6/23 6:14:16 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Madam Speaker, we know that the current Prime Minister has the utmost admiration for the President of China. Again, when it comes to totalitarian countries like China that want to acquire Canadian technologies, it is vital that we find a way to act. I think that our amendments were designed to help—

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Nov/6/23 6:13:00 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Madam Speaker, that is an important question since, indeed, when we talk about national security and the security of companies that might be acquired or that have a national security interest, it is vital that we ensure that the process is done properly. Unfortunately, several of the amendments we proposed were rejected. They would have enhanced the quality of the work that the government in place should have done to ensure that we do not get taken for a ride, which is what happened in several cases where the minister approved acquisitions in Canada that never should have happened.

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Nov/6/23 6:10:57 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Madam Speaker, what I was saying is that I hope the Bloc will vote with us on this amendment. The possibility of having two ministers from Ontario or British Columbia who would be responsible for public safety, innovation and industry would mean that no one in cabinet would have any power or say over a decision concerning a company that could be sold in Quebec and acquired by other companies around the world. We therefore fail to understand the Bloc's position on this matter.

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Nov/6/23 6:10:05 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Madam Speaker, I agree with my colleague. It is quite incredible to see the Bloc Québécois aligning itself with the government again today to vote against an opposition motion to remove the carbon tax on all types of home heating. The Bloc Québécois is in an odd position here, because we are proposing an amendment that would keep us—

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Mr. Bernard Généreux (Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, CPC)

Nov/6/23 5:59:40 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to speak to this bill for the second time. Last February, I gave a speech on Bill C-34, an act to amend the Investment Canada Act. At the time, I talked about the many problems with this legislation and our intention to improve it in committee. I will come back later to the amendments we proposed. Some of them were adopted, while others were, unfortunately, rejected. I will start by talking about the genesis of this bill. In the December 2021 mandate letter given to him by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry was asked to do the following, and I quote: Contribute to broader efforts to promote economic security and combat foreign interference by reviewing and modernizing the Investment Canada Act to strengthen the national security review process and better identify and mitigate economic security threats from foreign investment. I have to say that that was a legitimate request. Recently, there have been far too many cases where Canada's national security was potentially compromised because of the acquisition of Canadian businesses by foreign interests that are a bit too close to the central power. An update was more than welcome. I sit on the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology. I would like to commend my Conservative Party colleagues, who are doing admirable work on the committee. I see it every week. Over the past two years, we have looked into several of this government's missteps regarding transactions and contracts that could compromise our national security. One of the most recent examples is from 2017, when the Minister of Industry failed to request a full national security review of the acquisition of telecommunications company Norsat International and its subsidiary Sinclair Technologies by the Chinese company Hytera Communications, which is partly owned by the People's Republic of China. This is just one of many examples. After eight years of this government, too many foreign state-owned enterprises have acquired Canadian companies, intellectual property, intangible assets and citizens' data. Rather than taking the situation seriously, the minister is giving himself more powers with this bill and not making up for the negligence that allowed the contracting incidents involving Zijin Mining, Hytera and the RCMP to happen. A few weeks ago, during study of the bill in committee, security experts were invited to highlight the acquisitions that were not subject to a national security or net benefit review, even though the threshold under the Canada Investment Act had been met. Other witnesses pointed out the evolution of the dynamic of the Chinese private sector economy and the fact that many Chinese businesses operating on an international level are now beholden to the demands made by the Chinese Communist Party, even though they are not directly controlled by the state. Charles Burton argued in favour of a stricter review framework for state-owned enterprises entering into Canada, including those belonging to the private sector who have their head offices in authoritarian countries like China. We proposed an amendment to that effect. We asked that the definition of state-owned enterprise be reviewed to include private enterprises that have their offices or their head offices in an authoritarian country. Unfortunately, that amendment was rejected. The definition of state-owned enterprise therefore remains too vague in our opinion. Another point raised by witnesses was the need for greater clarity on which sectors should be considered strategic in order to ensure a more consistent review process. Professor Patrick Leblond argued that establishing a list of specific sectors necessary to ensure national security would prevent the review system from becoming entirely politicized. Knowing what we do about this government, more safeguards are needed. To sum up what we studied in committee and what the witnesses told us, it is safe to say that this is too little, too late. There are too many flaws in this bill. It appears that this government is not taking sensitive transactions seriously and is not doing the necessary due diligence, putting the security of our government and our citizens at risk. The most significant change this bill makes is the power that the minister is giving himself. I think this is unacceptable, which is why we introduced the amendment we are discussing today. Under the current act, the minister must submit to cabinet his intention to conduct a security review when a foreign interest acquires a Canadian company. Cabinet must give its approval. In the bill before us, the minister gives himself the power to decide whether to conduct a security review with the consent of the Minister of Public Safety, but without cabinet approval. Only two ministers would be responsible for decisions with potentially very serious repercussions. Imagine two Ontario ministers deciding the future of a Quebec company without any other Quebec cabinet minister having a say in the matter. I hope that my Bloc Québécois colleagues are listening to me carefully and that they will vote in favour of our amendment. We know that this Liberal cabinet has made some very bad decisions, but this is a safeguard that needs to stay in place. Here are a few more examples of the changes we were able to make to this bill, which was overly flawed. We secured a reduced threshold to trigger a national security review for all state-owned enterprises. It went from $512 million to zero dollars in asset value for companies not listed as trade agreement investors. This ensures that all investments made by state-owned enterprises will be reviewable. We also implemented a requirement that an automatic national security review be conducted whenever a company has previously been convicted of corruption charges. We managed to add another factor to ensure that the elements reviewed as part of the national security review process include asset acquisitions by state-owned enterprises, not only new business locations, share purchases and acquisitions. Finally, we implemented a requirement for the minister to conduct a national security review each time the investment review threshold is reached. Simply put, this amendment requires that the minister review any investments or acquisitions made in Canada that exceed $1.9 billion in enterprise value instead of it being an option. The amendments that we proposed sought to create a more robust review process. We could have made even more improvements to this bill, but unfortunately at least seven of our amendments were rejected. We are talking about national security here. This government did not take some of our issues and concerns seriously, and that is extremely important. For example, we sought to authorize the government to go back and redo a security review for Canadian businesses acquired by state-owned companies to allow for a more flexible process. The Liberals rejected our proposals. As I said earlier, this government's desire to address the matter of national security is too little too late. The dynamic between nations is changing, and the future is uncertain. The Government of Canada must be more vigilant than ever. On this side of the House, we have always taken the matter of national security seriously, and Canadians can count on us to ensure that it will be a top priority in the future. I want to once again add that I sincerely thank my colleagues on the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology, because they have a very good reputation and do outstanding work to ensure our country's national security.

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Feb/17/23 12:35:17 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Mr. Speaker, my colleague is correct. Indeed, companies run or controlled by entities such as China, which is a communist regime, pose a risk. The threat to Canada comes from that type of country. There is a fundamental difference between private companies and companies run by countries.

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Feb/17/23 12:34:02 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Mr. Speaker, I completely agree with my colleague that we need to implement the necessary safeguards to prevent national security risks for Canadians, whether it be in telecommunications, business or health. In every area, we need to ensure that these safeguards are broad enough to ensure that nothing harmful gets through and avoid this type of incident.

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Feb/17/23 12:32:46 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Mr. Speaker, I thank my Bloc colleague for that very important question. We will vote in favour of the bill at second reading. Together, we can make sure all the necessary elements are in place to do a review. Obviously, China is not the only country that could pose a national security risk to Canada. We want to work together to make sure the strictest standards and safeguards are in place to prevent incidents like those we have seen in recent years.

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Feb/17/23 12:31:25 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Mr. Speaker, when we made that decision several years ago, the reality was that the value of international investments was much higher. We wanted the flexibility to conduct the reviews for contracts within those amounts. Yes, I agree with the amounts. Given the current cost of living, the cost of building or repairing a home or buying a business has increased spectacularly because of the inflation caused by the current government. Inevitably, greater flexibility was required in conducting these reviews.

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Mr. Bernard Généreux (Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, CPC)

Feb/17/23 12:22:36 p.m.
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Re: Bill C-34

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑34, the national security review of investments modernization act, which was introduced by the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry. As the minister, my colleague from Saint‑Maurice—Champlain, mentioned, this bill is an attempt to update and strengthen the Investment Canada Act through seven amendments. I will not list them all, but I will say that the government is seeking to streamline the minister's ability to investigate national security reviews of investments, strengthen penalties, create a list of industries in which acquisitions would automatically be subject to national security reviews, give the minister the power to impose interim conditions, remove the Governor in Council from the process for making an order for further national security reviews and substitute the minister, and improve coordination with international partners. The act was last modernized in 2009. It is true that an update is needed. As my colleague from South Shore—St. Margarets and shadow minister for industry mentioned, I can confirm from the outset that we will be voting in favour of this bill at second reading. We will, however, work to make improvements to it. If there is one phrase that sums up how we feel about this bill, it is “too little, too late”. After eight years of this Liberal government approving countless acquisitions of Canadian companies by state-owned firms, we are skeptical that protecting our national security interests is important to this government. There is no shortage of examples of breaches. There have been numerous cases over the past few years where this government failed to take the real threats posed by foreign investments seriously. I am proud to be a member of the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology. Over the past two years, we have examined several cases of government failures during transactions and contracting processes that had the potential to compromise national security. I will share a few examples, some of which are very disturbing. In January 2022, the Minister of Industry failed to follow his own guidelines when he fast-tracked the takeover of the Canadian company Neo Lithium by Chinese state-owned Zijin Mining without a national security review. It seems to me that when a company controlled by the Chinese Communist regime wants to buy a Canadian company, that should raise a red flag. Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case. We are talking about rare materials that are important in dealing with climate change, for making more batteries and such. Lithium is an extremely important element in the production of batteries. A review should have been done. As I just mentioned, this is a Canadian company specializing in critical minerals, like lithium. Unfortunately, this government did not sound the alarm or issue warnings. We should already be doing everything we can to protect our companies in such a key sector, but, when the buyer has ties to the Chinese Communist regime, that is stating the obvious. A serious and rigorous review should have automatically been considered. The Standing Committee on Industry and Technology undertook an urgent study on this subject to investigate this questionable transaction. Following this study, we made three recommendations. The first recommendation reads as follows: “That the government create a formalized and transparent process...by which government departments provide advice to the Minister...regarding decisions made under the Investment Canada Act”. The second recommendation reads as follows, “That the Minister issue a notice...for all investments by firms from authoritarian regimes considered to be state-owned enterprises under the Investment Canada Act”. It is worth noting that in China, the government often controls many companies, either partially or fully, through various means, so we need to have a closer look at that. The third recommendation reads, “That the Minister release in a timely manner a full and comprehensive Critical Minerals Strategy”. A year has passed, but it is clear that nothing has been done in that regard, unfortunately. I will give a second example of a dubious contract. In December 2022, the RCMP awarded a contract for sensitive communications equipment to Sinclair Technologies, which is a subsidiary of Norsat. It is important to note that Norsat, which was founded and based in Richmond, British Columbia, had itself been acquired by Hytera Communications. Who owns Hytera? It is headquartered in China and is therefore partly owned by the Communist regime of the People's Republic of China. The company is even a major supplier to China's national security department. The $500,000 contract was awarded without any thorough investigation or verification, even though it is known within the federal public service that China and the companies it controls have attempted to interfere in Canadian affairs. When the media broke the story, the minister responsible took swift action and cancelled the contract. Still, it is astounding that, once again, no one in government saw this coming, no one realized how dangerous the situation was. Hytera has been charged with 21 counts of espionage in the United States. President Biden has banned the company from doing business in the U.S., but it is free to operate here, no problem. The Prime Minister trusts everyone. Forgive me for questioning the severity of what the government wanted to do at that time. I have one final, particularly troubling example that I would like to present here. It was identified by the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. In 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs awarded a contract to the Chinese company Nuctech, founded by the son of the former secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, to supply X-ray equipment to 170 Canadian embassies and consulates. The contract was worth $6.8 million. Although it was assured that this equipment would not be connected to embassy networks, the contracts included delivery, installation, and maintenance. Again, this is a question of national security. It is extremely important to verify these things. During his testimony before the committee, David Mulroney, Canada's former ambassador to China, had some very harsh, but very fair, words for the government. He said that the experience gives us a troubling glimpse into this government's incompetence in dealing with China, considering that it has received clear, daily warnings that China is a strategic challenge to our country. However, there is no sign that the government is any more aware, no sign it has developed a greater sense of urgency to identify and better manage China-related issues. There is no evidence of any efforts to galvanize the government as a whole. All departments and agencies need to make an urgent effort to ensure that this does not happen. This shows an appalling lack of leadership. Once again, history has repeated itself. We are hoping for changes to the bill. After second reading, it will go to committee, where we will be able to propose amendments. I could say a lot more about this bill, but it is no different from everything else. Everything is broken.

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