Senator Dalphond: Yes.

Hon. Pierre J. Dalphond: Honourable senators, I’d like to begin by thanking Senator Clement for taking over from Senator Jaffer and Senator Pate, who have been advocating for the elimination of mandatory minimum sentences for years now. They are not the only ones campaigning for this.

For example, in 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was chaired by our former colleague, the Honourable Murray Sinclair, recommended an option similar to what Senator Clement proposed because mandatory minimum sentences resulted in the overrepresentation of Indigenous individuals in provincial and federal prisons.

The National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, which our colleague, Senator Audette, was part of, called for it too, asking federal, provincial and territorial governments to, and I quote:

 . . . thoroughly evaluate the impact of mandatory minimum sentences as it relates to the sentencing and over‑incarceration of Indigenous women, girls, and . . . people and to take appropriate action to address their over‑incarceration.

The Parliamentary Black Caucus, which senators Bernard, Clement, Gerba, Mégie and Moodie belong to, also recommends the elimination of mandatory minimum sentences because it finds that they result in the overrepresentation of racialized groups in prisons and penitentiaries. The Canadian Association of Black Lawyers concurs.

These are important messages from credible people. It would be a mistake for any government to ignore them.

The government chose to respond not by repealing all mandatory minimum sentences, but by proposing three targeted measures.

I would point out, incidentally, that nowhere in the Prime Minister’s mandate letter to the Minister of Justice does it say that he must work to repeal all minimum sentences, but rather that he must reduce reliance on mandatory minimum penalties and develop an Indigenous justice strategy as well as a Black Canadians justice strategy.

Here are the targeted measures the government included in Bill C-5. First, the abolition of all mandatory minimum sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which were one year, eighteen months, two years or three years, depending on the nature of the offence, many of which have been declared unconstitutional, either by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nur or by decisions of the Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec courts of appeal.

However, the jurisprudence is rather confusing when it comes to superior courts and provincial courts, which do not have the authority to declare provisions unconstitutional.

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Second, the bill proposes to do away with about 15 minimum sentences set out in the Criminal Code for offences that, according to the government’s analyses, are associated with an overrepresentation of Indigenous and Black people in prisons and penitentiaries.

Third, the bill proposes to repeal most of the exclusions in the regime for accessing sentences served in the community, also known as conditional sentences.

Clearly, all of these measures will expand the options available to judges when it comes to sentencing, including the possibility of imposing shorter prison sentences and more conditional sentences. According to the Department of Justice’s analyses, that should significantly reduce the rate of incarceration of Indigenous and Black people who are found guilty of an offence. However, only time will tell whether that is indeed the case.

[English]

Instead of proposing to eliminate all mandatory minimum penalties, also called MMPs, the amendment now before us would maintain the majority of MMPs and add a provision authorizing judges not to apply them on a case-by-case basis. Such a provision is called a “safety valve” by some, and an “escape clause” by others.

At the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Senator Pate proposed an escape clause that would have allowed judges not to apply any remaining MMPs, including in cases of first- and second-degree murder, if the judge were satisfied that doing so would be in the interests of justice. A debate followed, and this amendment was defeated by a vote of 9 to 4.

The escape clause now before us is different. It will be applicable only in exceptional circumstances — a higher standard to meet. As mentioned by Senator Clement, this is the threshold applied by judges in England and Wales to justify the imposition of an imprisonment term lesser than the applicable MMP.

At committee, a leading expert in sentencing — a Canadian, incidentally — Professor Julian Roberts of the University of Oxford described this threshold as the highest one. With that context in mind, let me add that the Supreme Court of Canada considers that it is not only legal, but legitimate for Parliament, in considering sentencing policy options, to enact MMPs in order to send a powerful message of deterrence and denunciation. Previous governments have all enacted some MMPs going back, incidentally, to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. However, the court said that when Parliament decides to enact an MMP, it should act carefully to avoid casting too wide of a net that could result in a breach of section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that protects all Canadians against cruel punishment.

In the recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the Bissonnette case, which was released in May 2022, the Supreme Court stated that an MMP is cruel only if it results, in some cases, in a punishment that is grossly disproportionate in effect to what would have been appropriate otherwise. That said, for the Supreme Court, an MMP of 25 years further to a conviction for a first-degree murder is not a cruel punishment.

Incidentally, in Lloyd, another judgment of the Supreme Court released in 2016, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin said that to avoid constitutional challenges to MMPs that cast a wide net, Parliament should consider narrowing their reach so that they only catch offenders that merit the mandatory minimum sentences. She added that another option would be for Parliament to establish a safety valve that would allow judges to exempt outliers for whom the MMP will constitute a cruel punishment. She went on to say that this residual discretion is usually confined in other countries to exceptional cases, and may require the judge to give reasons justifying departing from MMPs prescribed by the law. This is what Senator Clement is now proposing.

With all this in mind, let me explain why I cannot support this new attempt to introduce an escape clause into Bill C-5.

First, the proposed escape clause is drafted to apply to all remaining MMPs, including first- and second-degree murders, high treason, crimes against humanity, impaired driving causing death and child sexual offences. To me, MMPs are fully justified in such cases to send a powerful message of deterrence and denunciation.

Incidentally, in the U.K., the escape clause does not apply to all kinds of murders.

Here in Canada, in 2013, the Criminal Section of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, a working group that includes prosecutors, defence lawyers, academics and others, did not recommend removing MMPs for murders, nor did the Canadian Bar Association, which appeared before our Senate committee. By adopting the proposed amendment — assuming it is within the scope of the bill, which I also doubt for the reasons mentioned by Senator Cotter on Tuesday — we will go further than any country in the world. I am not prepared to do that, and I do not think such a change would reflect Canadian society’s values.

Second, the opportunity of adding such an escape clause at third reading and thus returning Bill C-5 to the House of Commons instead of sending it to Rideau Hall for Royal Assent relies on the assumption that it will significantly reduce the frequency of the imposition of MMPs by Canadian judges. However, the evidence before the Senate committee is to the contrary. In a written answer to my questions at the committee, Professor Roberts wrote that such an escape clause in England, because of its very high threshold, has been narrowly interpreted by the courts in England and Wales and used by sentencing judges in only a very small number of cases. Therefore, this is not a change that would bring a lot of significant changes.

Third, many witnesses have argued against the adoption of an escape provision — whatever its content — because they fear that the systemic discrimination that exists toward racialized, Indigenous and vulnerable people will not result in fewer MMPs being imposed on these groups by the justice system. In fact, they fear that such an escape clause will tend to benefit White offenders and those with privileged access to legal representation, resulting in new inequalities.

This concern makes sense if you assume that the overrepresentation of Indigenous and racialized people in our jails is due to overpolicing, overcharging, poor access to adequate defence counsels and bias in the court system.

Fourth, some witnesses pointed out that, contrary to the U.K. where there is no constitutional authority for judges to declare a cruel sentence to be unconstitutional, in Canada, we have section 12 of the Charter. In cases where an MMP may result in a breach of section 12 or section 15 — the equality right — Canadian judges can declare it unconstitutional and thus invalid. Such invalidity will apply to all persons exposed to that MMP, and will not be on a case-by-case basis.

As indicated previously, to avoid constitutional challenges, Parliament has two options: to draft individual offences and penalties properly or to add an escape clause applicable in exceptional circumstances. In other words, the adoption of the proposed escape clause would provide a shield against attack pursuant to section 12 of the Charter of Rights and may encourage future parliaments to adopt more MMPs, with the possible safety valve, contrary to the very goal that is pursued by the proponents of the amendment.

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Finally, I want to mention that the Minister of Justice and the NDP justice critic, MP Randall Garrison, are publicly urging the Senate to adopt Bill C-5 as soon as possible, since it will immediately broaden the ability of judges to render conditional sentences when more appropriate than imprisonment in provincial jail. Most witnesses before our committee support the broadening of that judicial discretion.

Further, as to the recent Sharma decision, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, the Canadian Bar Association and the Canadian Association of Black Lawyers, many scholars and other stakeholders have written to us, and on social media, urging us to adopt Bill C-5 without any further delay. I don’t see, in the reasons being exposed to justify the amendment, a justification to remain deaf to these calls.

For all these reasons, colleagues, I invite you to vote against this amendment. Thank you, meegwetch.

Senator Dalphond: It is impossible for me to comment on the Supreme Court jurisprudence and correct any false perceptions of the rulings in 10 seconds.

Senator Dalphond: I would ask if the house is ready to allow me five more minutes.

Senator Dalphond: Don’t you think the real problem is the root cause of this violence? That the real answer is to address the real cause of this violence — that jail is not the answer to it, that three months or three weeks in jail is not going to change a person, that the judge should impose conditions that the person go to therapy to follow some education to better understand his reaction and to have to wear a bracelet that will signal to the victim he’s coming by? Don’t you think three weeks in jail is not protecting the victim enough? There are other ways. We have to address the real issues. It may be sensational to say, “He shall serve three weeks in jail because he did something to deserve jail,” but is that the answer?

Senator Dalphond: Thank you for expressing your policy on the issue. I think you’re right: The Supreme Court has made clear there are policy decisions to be made here.

You tell me that conditional release should not be imposed to protect the victims, but here we’re talking about the less serious offences that deserve less than two years.

Are you saying that someone who receives a sentence of three months — and the judge thinks that is the proper sentence, according to all the principles and based on his case-by-case analysis — should serve the time in jail? So after three months, what would you do? The person will be released, and will maybe live next to the victim again.

What are you proposing — that the law be amended to specify that the person be forced to live in a different city? Please explain it to me. I understand the victim’s perspective, and the right to be protected, but you think that the conditional sentence is a fix? I don’t think it is a fix. So after three months, what would you do?

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Hon. Pierre J. Dalphond: Honourable senators, I rise to share my perspective on the amendment proposed by our respected colleague, Senator Boisvenu.

My remarks will centre on the following points: first, some background on sentences to be served in the community; second, the purpose of Bill C-5 in that regard; and third, the scope of Senator Boisvenu’s proposed amendment.

Some of my remarks are inspired by the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, which was handed down on Friday, November 4, in R. v. Sharma, a case that was referred to by the Minister of Justice and Senator Gold, as well as numerous witnesses, during the committee’s consideration of Bill C-5.

I will use Professor Cotter’s three-step approach. First I will provide a little history.

When the first Criminal Code was adopted in 1892, Parliament set out hanging, imprisonment, and fines and forfeiture as possible penalties. The death penalty was abolished in 1968. We have also seen the emergence of other types of sentences, such as conditional release, also known as a probation order, and conditional sentences, which are sentences served in the community.

[English]

Conditional sentences were introduced as part of a 1995 bill entitled An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof. This bill significantly reformed sentencing law by stating the purposes and the principles of sentencing, and by setting out considerations for judges when determining a fit sentence.

In other words, the bill substantially structured the discretion of Canadian judges with regard to sentencing. Nowadays, there are many provisions that start at section 718 and following in the Criminal Code that really structure, if not limit, the discretion of judges.

Among the various principles enunciated, the one relevant to our consideration of the proposed amendment is found at section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. That provision states that all available sanctions other than imprisonment must be considered where reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victims or the community.

Under the 1995 bill, offenders were not eligible for conditional sentences if: one, the offence was punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment — what we call a mandatory minimum penalty, or MMP; two, the court was considering imposing a term of imprisonment of two years or more; three, imposing a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the victim or of the community; or four, a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing. These are the four types of exclusions that make a conditional sentence unavailable.

The principal objectives of Parliament in enacting this new legislation in 1995 were, thus, to reduce the use of sentences of imprisonment in cases that were admissible and to address both punitive and rehabilitative objectives as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx, a judgment rendered in January 2000, which is the most famous judgment on conditional sentences.

In 2007, Parliament adopted a government bill to exclude the possibility for a judge to impose a conditional sentence for those convicted of a serious personal injury offence, a terrorist offence or a criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more. In other words, even if there was no MMP applicable for these offences and the sentencing judge held the view that a sentence of less than two years would be appropriate, this was not possible. Imprisonment was the only way.

In 2012, Parliament adopted another bill called the Safe Streets and Communities Act for the purpose of excluding the possibility of conditional sentences for a long list of additional offences. First, this list included all the offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life. Second, this list included categories of offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment was 10 years that: one, resulted in bodily harm; two, involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs; or three, involved the use of a weapon. These categories of offences are found at paragraph (e) of the current section 742.1 of the Criminal Code. Third, there are 11 specific offences prosecuted by way of indictment: prison breach; criminal harassment; sexual assault; kidnapping; trafficking in persons — material benefit; abduction of person under 14; motor vehicle theft; theft over $5,000; breaking and entering a place other than a dwelling-house; being unlawfully in a dwelling-house; and arson for fraudulent purpose. These 11 specific offences are found at paragraph (f) of current section 742.1 of the code.

Bill C-5 proposes to delete paragraphs (e) and (f). This means broadening judicial discretion in sentencing in connection with offences described a few seconds ago, including all offences related to drugs under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, many of which were declared unconstitutional.

This means that a conditional sentence will again become an available sanction in relation to these categories of offences and specific offences should the judge conclude that, first, an offender deserves a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years — these are not the most serious offences. Second, the offender presents no risk to the community or to the victim. And third, such a conditional sentence would be in accordance with all the sentencing principles including consideration of all available sanctions other than imprisonment where it is reasonable in the circumstances, especially in the case of Indigenous offenders which requires the application of the Gladue principles.

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The current government has made a policy decision, and this is perfectly valid. In the recent judgment in Sharma, which Senator Batters referred to, the Supreme Court of Canada said:

Parliament has the exclusive authority to legislate in matters of sentencing policy. There is no constitutional right to any particular sentence, including a conditional sentence . . . . Parliament had no positive obligation to create the conditional sentence regime. This Court stated in Proulx that Parliament could “have easily excluded specific offences” from the conditional sentencing regime when it came into force in 1996 . . . . It chose to do so later, and may choose to do so in the future. That is inherent in the role of Parliament, informed by experience and by the wishes of the electorate.

Senator Boisvenu disagrees with the broadening of judicial discretion proposed by Bill C-5 in connection with sentencing, and proposes to revert to the 2012 policies of the Harper government, which Senator Batters referred to.

[Translation]

The senator is proposing, in keeping with the 2012 legislation, to exclude any possibility of conditional sentences for a list that includes nine specific offences, which would become the new paragraph (e) of section 748.2 of the Criminal Code. I want to point out that this list is shorter than the 2012 list, because the senator is proposing to drop the following offences: prison breach; motor vehicle theft; theft over $5,000; breaking and entering a place other than a dwelling-house; and arson for fraudulent purpose.

In doing so, he is dropping four types of offences described in 2012 as being serious property crimes that justified excluding conditional sentences. I note this change.

As he stated in response to one of my questions, he chose to focus on offences against the person. That is why there are two new offences on the proposed list that were not found in the 2012 legislation: causing bodily harm by criminal negligence, and assaulting a peace officer with a weapon or causing bodily harm. I want to point out that in my research, I found very few legal decisions for either of these offences. They do not seem to be used. I would add that I did not hear one witness or read one brief that suggested adding these offences to the list of cases where the use of conditional sentencing would be prohibited.

In his speech leading up to the proposed amendment, Senator Boisvenu repeatedly referred to violence against individuals, especially women and children, to justify the other items on his list. For example, he said it was completely unacceptable for a man convicted of intimate partner violence to serve his sentence in the community.

I agree with him in the case of a repeat offender, and I believe that, in such cases, judges will not even consider a sentence of less than two years. I should add that a conditional sentence is possible only if the judge believes this type of sentence poses no threat to the victim or the community. Unfortunately, Senator Batters did not mention these prerequisites for a conditional sentence in her speech.

Also, in Quebec, judges can require offenders serving a conditional sentence to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet if the victim consents to having a corresponding app installed on their cellphone. My understanding, based on what Senator Batters said two weeks ago, is that this is also being done in Saskatchewan and other provinces.

Senator Boisvenu also mentioned that, according to 2010 figures he obtained from the Syndicat des agents de la paix en services correctionnels du Québec, or CSN, which is the union representing Quebec peace officers in correctional services, 40% of offenders serving conditional sentences don’t comply with the conditions imposed by the Criminal Code and the judges. Unfortunately, we did not hear any witnesses make that claim, nor did we receive any documentation or evidence to support it. Furthermore, we have no information on the nature of the alleged violations, which I am sure must vary in severity.

Finally, I would point out that a conditional sentence can only be imposed on offenders if the judge believes that the appropriate sentence is imprisonment for a period ranging from a few days to two years; in other words, these are offenders who would be sent to provincial corrections facilities. The proposed amendment is tantamount to saying that we will automatically increase the number of inmates in provincial prisons. In my view, we cannot impose that consequence on the provinces unilaterally, without consulting them and giving them the opportunity to express their views on such an amendment in committee. As senators representing the regions, we owe it to the provinces to consult with them before imposing a significant financial burden on them.

In conclusion, it seems to me that this amendment must be rejected. That was the outcome at the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, by a vote of nine to four. Thank you for your attention. Meegwetch.

Senator Dalphond: If I understand correctly, it’s the same amendment that was presented to the committee? That list is the one that is currently in the Criminal Code, except for certain elements that were deleted and others that were added?

Senator Dalphond: Thank you very much.

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Senator Dalphond: In the case of the two you deleted, I understand that you agree with the government that they need to be removed?

Hon. Pierre J. Dalphond: Would Senator Boisvenu agree to take a question? Since we’re repeating the debate a bit and we already had it in committee, Senator Boisvenu, I understand that the list of offences that you propose adding that will make a release in these conditions impossible, isn’t exactly the same list that currently exists in the Criminal Code. What led you to remove some of the offences that were in the Criminal Code and add others in their place?