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Decentralized Democracy

Marty Morantz

  • Member of Parliament
  • Member of Parliament
  • Conservative
  • Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia—Headingley
  • Manitoba
  • Voting Attendance: 65%
  • Expenses Last Quarter: $99,486.97

  • Government Page
  • Feb/17/23 10:32:17 a.m.
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  • Re: Bill C-34 
Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Northumberland—Peterborough South. In December 1973, Parliament enacted the Foreign Investment Review Act, which was known as FIRA, to deal with the issue of foreign investors controlling Canadian industry, trade and commerce, and the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic future. These investments would be allowed to proceed only if the government had determined that they were, or were likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada. This net benefit test still exists today, but much has changed given rising national security concerns that necessitate new measures. Let me elaborate. In June 2017, Hytera Communications, a company owned by the Chinese Communist Party, acquired Norsat International, a B.C. telecom company. Just like that, a firm backed by an authoritarian regime took over an essential service provider here in Canada. One would think this takeover would have raised some red flags, but it did not, not for the Liberal government at least. If it had acted rationally, the government would have conducted a national security review into Hytera. However, after eight years in power, it is clear that rationality is in short supply these days. It did not bat an eye when, as all of this was taking place, our own Border Services Agency was using equipment from Hytera. We are talking about a company that has been charged with 21 counts of espionage. That company has been banned from doing business with our neighbour to the south. Up until that point, the Liberals have said that business is business, even when it means letting a hostile regime gain access to our essential services. This sort of lax attitude toward issues of national security is clearly a problem. What is even more problematic is that for five long years after the Hytera fiasco, the government has not learned from its mistakes. In 2020, it gave out a contract to Nuctech, a company founded by the son of a Chinese Community Party secretary general. It would not have taken a national security review to figure out who the company's founder was. A quick Google search would have sufficed. It was not just standard, run-of-the-mill work that this company with Chinese Communist Party connections was doing. Nuctech was supplying X-ray equipment, of all things, to almost 200 Canadian embassies and consulates. Two years ago, it looked like the government was changing its course when it updated its national security review guidelines. This was not the case, or at least it certainly was not the case when the Minister of Industry greenlit the takeover of a Canadian lithium mine by a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Once again, the opportunity was right there. The minister could have requested a national security review. The review framework was even new and improved, or so they would have us think. However, the minister did not act. Delays, half measures and slaps on the wrist. Those have been the Liberal responses to national security threats throughout the past eight years. Huawei is a perfect example of this. By 2021, each and every one of our allies within the Five Eyes had already banned Huawei from using their 5G networks. For years, my colleagues and I have been calling on the government to do the right thing: Listen to our allies, listen to security experts and ban Huawei from accessing 5G. Reluctantly, and far too late, the Liberals finally took our advice and took a stand against the Chinese Communist Party. That was less than a year ago. With the Liberal government's dismal track record in matters related to national security, Bill C-34 feels like too little, too late. It is like the goalie letting in eight goals, then coming onto the ice at the last minute and saying, “Don't worry guys. I've got this.” To be fair, this bill does address Canada's national security. It is a policy area where the government has been complacent for far too long. For that reason, I am prepared to support the bill at this stage, as long as it can be strengthened in committee. For a while, a lot of us had the naive idea that these regimes were emerging partners, and they were slowly moving toward the democratic norm. Putin's war changed all of that, and it is time that Canada acted accordingly. It is time for a reality check. Hostile foreign governments want to subvert and undermine this country. The threat is real and the threat is here. Canadians are well aware. A few weeks ago, all that Canadians had to do was look up and see a Chinese surveillance balloon flying at 60,000 feet. Bill C-34 responds to this new reality, but not well enough and not in its current form. The bill puts the power to request national security reviews in the hands of the Minister of Industry, the same minister whose predecessor did not even request a security review when Hytera took over an essential Canadian telecom provider. It is the same minister who, even after strengthening the security review guidelines in 2021, chose not to investigate the Chinese takeover of a critical Canadian mining company. The bill is only as strong as the minister's scrutiny, whoever that minister may be in the future. Conservatives believe matters of such importance should be scrutinized by all of cabinet to make sure nothing slips through the cracks. There are also existing problems with the Investment Canada Act that are not even addressed in Bill C-34. For no apparent reason, when a state-owned enterprise invests in a Canadian company, a national security review is only triggered if the Canadian company has assets worth more than $454 million. This provision has it all wrong. It is not about the size of the company that is being acquired. It is about the security risks that would inherently arise when a hostile state-owned company gains control over a critical service or product here in Canada. Bill C-34 needs a provision that would trigger an automatic national security review when a state-owned enterprise invests in Canada. The threshold should be zero dollars, not $454 million. Also, the bill would only deal with share purchases and non-asset purchases. Therefore, in theory, there is a roundabout way that foreign investors could acquire assets in Canada and completely circumvent the legislation. It is clearly a loophole that needs to be plugged. Since 2017, Chinese companies have been governed by the national intelligence law. This law compels every citizen and every company to hand over data to Chinese intelligence agencies. For almost six years, so much Canadian information has gone to China's autocratic government that it is hard to even quantify. We need to put an end to this, but right now, Bill C-34 would not do that. Bill C-34 needs a presumption against allowing the takeover of Canadian companies by China's designated state-owned entities. It needs a reformed net benefit test to better account for the potential effects of a transaction on the broader innovation ecosystem, with a particular focus on protecting intellectual property and human capital. It needs automatic review of transactions involving sensitive sectors, such as defence, artificial intelligence and rare earth minerals. It also needs a mandatory national security review for state-owned enterprises where national security is a concern. The act would not attempt to change definitions of state-owned enterprises or look at the issue of what constitutes control. One would not have to buy 50% of a company to control it. Someone could buy small percentages of it, get a number of seats on the board or change management, which Hytera has done. It is clear that Canada needs to improve these protections. Bill C-34 would be a small step in the right direction, but much more needs to be done.
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  • Dec/13/22 11:47:18 a.m.
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Madam Speaker, I certainly enjoyed my time on the foreign affairs committee working with my colleague. I found him to be a very insightful and knowledgeable person when it came to foreign affairs. I appreciate his comments about the committee being tied up. However, we are here today for a motion about the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. I know he said it is obvious we should pass it, but the Tibetan community is likely watching. I wonder if he would like to elaborate on the importance of this motion to that committee.
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  • May/12/22 12:12:43 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, the question touches on a couple of important areas. When it comes to food security and energy security in Europe, the world changed in February when Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine. That is a really important point. It should not be lost on any member of the House that food security affects countries everywhere, including China. This is just another reason why we need to have this committee: so we can have a good analysis and understanding of the geopolitical implications of China's position on a whole host of issues.
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  • May/12/22 12:11:10 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, what is laughable is that the member seems to want to live seven years in the past. The world has changed substantially. As I said in my speech, we need to be taking the role of China in the world extremely seriously, particularly in the context of Mr. Putin's invasion of Ukraine, how President Xi Jinping views this aggression and how it might impact his decisions as they relate to Taiwan. What is laughable is that the member is living in 2015 when he should be living in 2022.
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  • May/12/22 12:09:38 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, it is plain and simple. The foreign affairs committee is seized with so many issues, and the relationship with China is so complex and multi-faceted, that we really do need another committee to study it. My friend referred to a couple of things, but when I think about the list, there is Huawei, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Uighurs, Tibet, the recent pact with Russia, trade issues, espionage and human rights. There are just simply not the resources or time at the foreign affairs committee to deal with these. Around the discussion of the timing of the committee, that is a reasonable question. Let us see how the debate unfolds.
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  • May/12/22 11:59:35 a.m.
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Madam Speaker, I will be splitting my time with my colleague, the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman. I rise today to speak to the proposal for the creation of a special committee on Canada-China relations. At the outset, I want to make it clear that we have no quarrel with the people of China, who have contributed so much to humanity. As a parliamentarian, I have the greatest respect and admiration for the Chinese people. Chinese-Canadians and Canadians of Chinese descent have helped build this country and have made it a far better place. Their contributions simply cannot be overstated. Our quarrel is with the Chinese Communist Party. In my comments today, when I speak of China, I want to be clear that I am, in all cases, speaking of the Chinese Communist Party. Some members are asking why we need this committee specifically dedicated to Canada-China relations, why we need to study our relationship with China, and why the Conservatives are so concerned about the CCP. It is because Conservatives see an authoritarian China as the most consequential foreign policy relationship Canada will face in a generation. Through policies of repression and aggression, China has frightened countries near and far. In recent years, China has expanded aggressively on multiple fronts. Wolf warrior diplomacy has replaced friendship diplomacy. Perceived slights from foreigners, no matter how small, are met with North Korean-style condemnation. A combative attitude has seeped into every part of China's foreign policy, and it is confronting many countries with their gravest threat in generations. This threat is most apparent in maritime East Asia, where China is moving aggressively to cement its vast territorial claims. Beijing is churning out warships faster than any country has since World War II, and it has flooded Asian sea lanes with Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels. It has strung military outposts across the South China Sea, and dramatically increased its use of ship ramming and aerial interceptions to shove neighbours out of disputed areas. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than 50 combat aircraft, prowl the sea almost daily and simulate attacks on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. China has gone on the economic offensive, as well. Its latest five-year plan calls for dominating what Chinese officials call “choke points”, goods and services that other countries cannot live without, and then using that dominance, plus the lure of China's domestic market, to browbeat countries into concessions. China has become the dominant dispenser of overseas loans, loading up more than 150 countries with over $1 trillion in debt. It has massively subsidized strategic industries to gain a monopoly on hundreds of vital products, and it has stalled the hardware for digital networks in dozens of countries. Armed with economic leverage, it has used coercion against more than a dozen countries over the past number of years. In many cases, the punishment has been disproportionate to the supposed crime. For example, China is slapping tariffs on many of Australia's exports after that country requested an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19, and here at home in Canada, when China wished to steamroll over our courts and the rule of law to free Meng Wanzhou, it banned Canadian canola. This is something that cost the industry over $2 billion. Later that same year, it suspended Canadian beef imports and placed sanctions against our colleague in this House, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. China uses subsidies and espionage to help its firms dominate global markets and protects its domestic market with non-tariff barriers. It censors foreign ideas and companies on its own Internet, and freely accesses the global Internet to steal intellectual property and spread CCP propaganda. China has also become a potent anti-democratic force, and sells advanced tools of tyranny around the world. By combining surveillance cameras with social media monitoring, artificial intelligence, biometrics, and speech and facial recognition technologies, the Chinese government has pioneered a system that allows dictators to watch citizens constantly and punish them instantly by blocking their access to finance, education, employment, telecommunications or travel. The apparatus is a despot's dream, and Chinese companies are already selling and operating aspects of it in more than 80 countries. It is time for this government to take seriously the threats that the Beijing communist leadership poses to Canada's national interests and security, as well as our interests and values. For example, it is has been over a year, and the Liberal government has yet to release the Indo-Pacific strategy. This committee is critical to examining all of these challenges and threats. It would be all-party and multidisciplinary, with the ability to look at all aspects of the Canada-China relationship, from complex consular cases to national security issues and from trade to global affairs, within the context of a committee that could go in camera with respect to sensitive information. It is crucial that we uphold Canada's role in defending the rules-based international order. Canada must play its traditional role as a “linchpin”, as Winston Churchill described us, between Europe and America. We are a G7 nation. We are a NATO nation. We are a NORAD nation, and we are a Five Eyes nation. For a country small in population, Canada punches far above its weight when it comes to building relationships that are necessary to influencing our national interests, the freedom and liberty of others and the interests of the western alliance. We do not need a three-day study at a standing committee. We need a specialized, multidisciplinary committee that has the ability to explore not just complex consular cases, but trade, defence, security and the actions and impacts of China. We need to grapple with the moral and ethical complexities of a bilateral trade relationship with a country that this Parliament has declared is committing genocide against the Uighur people. China is a country that is quickly eroding the strong democracy of Hong Kong. It is a country that, just in February, signed a sweeping, long-term agreement with Russia that challenges the United States as a global power, challenges NATO as a cornerstone of international security and challenges liberal democracy as a model for the world. It is a country whose aspirations toward Taiwan may be emboldened by Mr. Putin's brutal war of tyranny in Ukraine. Also, we must be ever mindful of the threat of espionage in a digital world. All this bellicosity and belligerence on the part of China is simply not working. In fact, it is only sparking an international backlash: one that our Prime Minister seems to have not fully comprehended. That is why we need a committee, independent of the PMO and executive branch of government, to study these issues and take a serious look at our relationship with China. There has never been any doubt about what China wants, because Chinese leaders have declared the same objectives for decades: to keep the Chinese Communist Party in power, reabsorb Taiwan, control the East China Sea and South China Sea, and return China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia and the most powerful country in the world. Competing with and containing China will be fraught with risks for Canada and its allies, but it might be the only way to avoid even greater dangers. That is why it is critical we reinstate the Canada-China committee so that all parliamentarians can study, discuss and carefully consider how best to protect our interests and our sovereignty. I would like to close with a Chinese proverb: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” I humbly ask my colleagues in the House to let us take that step together.
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  • Feb/10/22 2:46:26 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, in a disturbing development last week, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met and jointly called on NATO to rule out expansion in eastern Europe, denounced the new security formation in the Asia-Pacific region and criticized the AUKUS trilateral security pact, all three fundamental to the rules-based international order. Given Russia's aggressive posture on Ukraine and Xi's on Taiwan, can the minister advise on what date specific sanctions will be used to combat this new and very troubling alliance?
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