SoVote

Decentralized Democracy

Rhéal Éloi Fortin

  • Member of Parliament
  • Member of Parliament
  • Bloc Québécois
  • Rivière-du-Nord
  • Quebec
  • Voting Attendance: 68%
  • Expenses Last Quarter: $105,330.31

  • Government Page
  • Feb/16/23 12:18:26 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question. I have a great deal of respect for him as well. I know that there are many health care issues in British Columbia. My heart goes out to the people in that province. That said, I agree with the premise of the motion, which is to prohibit private health care and try to improve public health care. Yesterday, Quebec introduced Bill 10, a bill to restrict the use of staffing agencies and self-employed workers in the health and social services sector. Last spring, in April 2022, it adopted a plan to implement necessary changes in health care. We are concerned about this issue, and we are working on it. I am convinced the same thing is happening in British Columbia, Ontario and elsewhere in Canada. We just have to do things our way, and the federal government must stop interfering in the provinces' management of health care—
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  • Feb/16/23 12:16:27 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question. I know this member as a great parliamentarian and a very competent legal expert. That said, obviously we are not against mental health care. I have never met anyone in Quebec who was against apple pie. Everyone likes it. People with mental health issues need to be taken care of. I hope the rest of Canada has the same concerns. In fact, I have no doubt that they feel the same way. The issue is not whether we want to take care of people with mental health issues. The issue is who is going to take care of them. Pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1867, could each province not have its own provisions to address its own specific concerns, which differ from one province to the next? After all, that is a fact of life.
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  • Feb/16/23 12:14:46 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, what I can tell my colleague is that we dream similar dreams but have different ideas about how to achieve those dreams. He dreams of a great nation from coast to coast to coast with rules that apply from coast to coast to coast to everyone who lives from coast to coast to coast. We dream of our own country, of Quebec. We know that we have one way of doing things. It is not better, but it is different from how things are done elsewhere in Canada. We dream of the alliance my colleague talked about. I have nothing against the Canadian Confederation. On the day that Quebec becomes a country, we are not going to build a fence around Quebec and tell others they must stay out and we will stay in. We want an alliance and trade relations. We want a lot of things. We are going to get along with our neighbours. However, this marriage has a problem, because we do not see things the same way. We want to make our rules, and we want Canada to make its rules. Then we will see what we can agree on. I will always be happy to shake hands with my colleague and work with him to make life better for everyone in the great and beautiful country of Canada and in Quebec.
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  • Feb/16/23 12:04:35 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I want to begin by saying that I agree with my colleague from Jonquière. He is very reasonable. I would add to the list of the problems with this government the fact that it has been unable to issue paycheques properly for years. I have been a member of the House since 2015, and we have been hearing about the Phoenix pay system all this time. I was a lawyer before I became an MP, and I had business clients. If they had not been able to give their employees paycheques, they would have gone bankrupt and been taken to court. I will move on to other topics, but let us just say that this government has not proven it has the competence to manage the affairs of the provinces. I would say that there are two big problems with this NDP motion. First, it does not respect the division of powers set out in the Constitution Act, 1867. We know that health is not a federal but a provincial jurisdiction. The federal government's role, with all due respect to my colleague opposite, is to transfer money to the provinces so they can manage their health care systems. As was mentioned, the federal government has no competence in many areas, certainly including health care. The federal government does not manage any hospitals, clinics or anything else to do with health care. It is dreaming if it thinks it can impose its vision on the provinces. Second, there is the issue of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court ruled that, under the charter, the federal government cannot restrict access to private health care in the provinces. I will talk about that in more detail later. When I look at this constitutional problem, I realize that the NDP does not seem to understand that the feds have nothing to do with health. I was thinking about it this morning and thought it felt like a legend. The NDP dreams of a totalitarian federal government that controls everything and of a country where the federal government is all-powerful, like a supreme authority. That is the federal legend and the NDP's dream. Mr. Mario Simard: Is it the myth? Mr. Rhéal Fortin: Madam Speaker, the myth, the legend, that is what we are talking about today. Beyond the legend, there is a constitutional problem, because health is not a federal responsibility, but rather a provincial one. There is also a problem in relation to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects a certain number of rights. It protects privacy in section 7, among other things. This is not the first time a situation of this kind has been brought before the courts. My colleague from Jonquière talked briefly about the Supreme Court of Canada's Chaoulli decision from 2005. The chief justice, Justice McLachlin, supported by Justices Major and Bastarache, agreed with the findings of Justice Deschamps. I quote: [T]he prohibition on private health insurance violates s. 1 of the Quebec Charter and is not justifiable under s. 9.1...The prohibition also violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter and is not justifiable under s. 1...While the decision about the type of health care system Quebec should adopt falls to the legislature of that province, the resulting legislation, like all laws, must comply with the Canadian Charter. Again, it states that “the type of health care system Quebec should adopt falls to the legislature of that province”. The Supreme Court wrote that over 15 years ago, but the NDP members did not read the Supreme Court decisions, and that is okay. I know they have other things to do, like dreaming up this legend of a totalitarian Canadian government and trying to promote it. That cannot be easy, and I would not want to be in their shoes. I understand why they might be busy. However, it is still important to read the Constitution and the charter at least once, to know what we are talking about and to avoid such huge traps. The New Democrats set this trap for themselves by proposing, on the one hand, that the federal government meddle in provincial and Quebec jurisdictions and, on the other hand, that the federal government completely violate the provisions of the charter. That said, is it a fatal error? Yes, interfering in provincial jurisdictions is a fatal error. I do not think that the federal government has any business meddling in areas under provincial jurisdiction. It can try, but it will end up in court. After a few years, the Supreme Court will say, as it already has, that this cannot be done. The federal government can try if it wants. We shall see. Is the charter question fatal? No, it is not. I must concur. We could contravene the provisions of the charter and say, “Too bad for section 7, we are still going ahead with a measure that would prohibit nurses from accessing private health care.” Even if it violates the charter, it could be done. How would we go about it? It is easy. The charter contains just such a provision. It is section 33, which reads as follows: Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. The Chaoulli decision dealt with section 7. When I read the charter, I see that it can be overridden. Yes, what the NDP is proposing violates the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That is a major sacrilege, clearly, but section 33 allows for the charter to be overridden. The only problem is that just this week, mere hours ago, the NDP was getting all worked up and crying foul because Quebec had the nerve to use this notwithstanding clause to protect French and secularism in Quebec. Scandalized, our Canadian federal Prime Minister said that he would go to the Supreme Court and ask it to declare that the provinces cannot use the notwithstanding clause that his father gave them many years ago when he had this legislation passed. He said that they should have to go through the courts first and so on. We argued that this did not make much sense since section 33 states, “Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature”. That is what Quebec did, that is what the federal government detests and that is what the NDP finds so outrageous and astounding. However, that is what the NDP will have to do if they want to follow their motion to its logical conclusion. Are they going to follow their motion to its logical conclusion? Perhaps. If they do, we will bring back our motion, which they defeated this week. After all, a person cannot enjoy ice cream one day, be allergic to it the next, and then enjoy it again the day after. It either works or it does not. If they want it to work, I am willing to consider it. There will still be the jurisdictional issue, which remains unresolved, but we could at least resolve the charter aspect. If they want to continue down that path, with that reasoning, we will follow their lead and allow them to apply for a charter exemption. We know that they are entirely within their rights. However, if they persist in saying that we are not allowed to do it, it is hard for me to see how they can logically say to us that they want to contravene the charter and violate the division of powers. Again, this legend exists only in the minds of my esteemed colleagues in the New Democratic Party or, should I say, the New Liberal-Democratic Party. I am not sure what to call it anymore.
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Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill S‑206, which is before the House for a fourth time, if we count the three previous versions of the bill introduced in previous Parliaments. Regardless, the bill we are studying today is still the same bill. Bill S‑206 essentially proposes a change to the existing rules regarding the confidentiality of deliberations between members of a jury who have to decide the fate of an accused person. The jury secrecy rule is set out in section 649 of the Criminal Code and is also called “Lord Mansfield's rule”. It is a cornerstone of common law and the British criminal justice system. This rule is anything but trivial. The jury is the trier of fact. The judge presiding over a trial is the trier of law. The judge adjudicates matters of law that arise over the course of the trial and gives the necessary advice to inform and guide the jury regarding these matters. That said, at the end of the day, as intended by the legislator, it is the members of the jury who decide whether the accused is guilty or innocent. The role of jurors is therefore vitally important to the judicial process. When they deliberate, they need to feel completely free to say what they think out loud without worrying about being publicly quoted later as having put forward a certain idea or opinion. Obviously, jurors will often disagree with one another when they first begin their deliberations, but they will work together to consider all the facts entered into evidence during the trial, which may have gone on for many weeks in some cases. At that point, the success of their work will basically depend on the flow of their debate and how comfortable they feel talking freely and unreservedly among themselves. I am thinking of the ability to share the uninhibited, unfiltered thoughts that come into our minds as we think about what we are going to say. The legislator grants the jury a type of legal status—a partial, temporary status—that lasts only as long as the trial. The jury will then speak with one voice and render a unanimous verdict, like a single person who speaks after carefully considering and weighing all aspects of an issue. It is therefore easy to see that a sound decision requires absolute confidence in the confidentiality of their deliberations, just as every one of us refuses to compromise the integrity and inviolability of our thoughts. Anyone who, rightly or wrongly, believes someone else is probing their thoughts will self‑censor and be unable to think freely. That is anathema to a healthy thought process and wise deliberation. Section 649 of the Criminal Code states that it is an offence for a jury member or anyone assisting them to disclose “any information relating to the proceedings of the jury, when it was absent from the courtroom that was not subsequently disclosed in open court”. In this regard, the Supreme Court has already ruled as follows in R. v. Pan and R. v. Sawyer in 2001: The common law rule, in combination with s. 649 of the Code, helps to ensure that jurors feel comfortable freely expressing their views in the jury room and that jurors who hold minority viewpoints do not feel pressured to retreat from their opinions because of possible negative repercussions associated with the disclosure of their positions. We therefore understand that this is the rule that ensures sound, reasonable decisions. That said, jury duty is not always easy. Sometimes, the facts and evidence of a criminal case can be so intense that they have a significant impact on the jury members hearing the case. Unfortunately, violence and horror can feature prominently in the crimes a person is accused of. Furthermore, jury deliberations can often be very emotional. It is extremely stressful to stand alone against 11 other jurors and defend a point of view that none of them agree with. Add to that the often heavy consequences that the jury's decision will have for the accused, and I have no difficulty imagining that the situation can become untenable. In some cases, jury members can be traumatized to such an extent that they have to consult a health professional to deal with it. Some experiences have drastically transformed the lives of jurors left to cope with their trauma alone. These people did not choose to be jurors; they were chosen, and they had a legal obligation to fulfil that duty. They clearly deserve our gratitude and our support. As things stand now, it is more difficult for them to receive care and adequate treatment for what they are suffering, as they cannot speak freely about their trauma without contravening section 649 of the Criminal Code. Ensuring access to adequate and efficient health services for those who generously contributed to the justice system is obviously paramount. It is our responsibility. It is only common sense that we concur with what is fair and obvious. Bill S‑206 proposes to allow members of a jury to be exempt from this rule of confidentiality if they require professional health services for medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling provided after the trial. This bill asks us to examine a proposed new paragraph (c) under section 649 of the Criminal Code, adding new exceptions to those already established in paragraphs (a) and (b) to allow for evidence to be given in obstruction of justice cases. The proposed paragraph (c) adds an exemption from the confidentiality obligation for the purposes of: (c) any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling that a person referred to in subsection (1) receives from a health care professional after the completion of the trial in relation to health issues arising out of or related to the person's service at the trial as a juror or as a person who provided support services to a juror. The proposed subsection 649(3) also adds that the health care professional who provides any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling must be entitled to do so under the laws of a province. This is a small loophole in the absolutely essential integrity of the confidentiality of jury deliberations. However, the loophole is closed by the confidentiality obligation in the rules of ethical conduct that professional associations impose on their members. The House must now weigh the benefits to the justice system of keeping jury deliberations confidential against the benefits to jury members of having more accessible and certainly more effective consultation services between each other and, if applicable, their health professionals. These decent individuals already do not receive the compensation and consideration they deserve in light of their valuable contribution to the justice system. They are at the heart of some legal as well as moral debates for which they were never prepared. They are calling for a bit of support and recognition, which seems like the bare minimum. As I said, they deserve our respect, our recognition and better working conditions. One day, we will probably have to think about what more we can do to acknowledge their true value. Under the circumstances, the Bloc Québécois will be voting in favour of this bill.
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Mr. Speaker, Bill S-206 proposes a change to the existing rules regarding the confidentiality of deliberations between members of a jury who have to decide the fate of an accused person. The rule about the confidentiality of jury proceedings is set out in section 649 of the Criminal Code and is also called “Lord Mansfield's rule”. It is a cornerstone of common law and the British criminal justice system. This rule is anything but trivial. The jury is the trier of fact. The judge presiding over a trial is the trier of law. The judge adjudicates matters of law that arise over the course of the trial and gives the necessary advice to inform and guide the jury regarding these matters. That said, at the end of the day, as intended by the legislator, it is the members of the jury who decide whether the accused is guilty or innocent. The role of jurors is therefore vitally important to the judicial process. When they deliberate, they need to feel completely free to say what they think out loud without later worrying about being publicly quoted as having put forward a certain idea or opinion. Obviously, the jurors will often disagree with one another when they first begin their deliberations, but they will work together to consider all of the facts entered into evidence during the trial, which could go on for many weeks in some cases. At that point, the success of their work will basically depend on the flow of their debate and how comfortable they feel talking freely and unreservedly among themselves. I am thinking of the ability to share the uninhibited, unfiltered thoughts that come into our minds as we think about what we are going to say. The legislator grants the jury a type of legal status—a partial, temporary status—that lasts only as long as the trial. The jury will then speak with one voice and render a unanimous verdict, like a single person who speaks after carefully considering and weighing all aspects of an issue. It is therefore easy to see that a sound decision requires absolute confidence in the confidentiality of their deliberations, just as every one of us refuses to compromise the integrity and inviolability of our thoughts. Anyone who, rightly or wrongly, believes someone else is probing their thoughts will self-censor and be unable to think freely. That is anathema to a healthy thought process and wise deliberation. Section 649 of the Criminal Code states that it is an offence for a member of a jury or anyone assisting them to: [disclose] any information relating to the proceedings of the jury when it was absent from the courtroom that was not subsequently disclosed in open court.... This is the rule that ensures sound, reasonable decisions. That said, jury duty is not always easy. Sometimes, the facts and evidence of a criminal case can be so intense that they have a significant impact on the jury members hearing the case. Unfortunately, violence and horror can feature prominently in the crimes a person is accused of. In some cases, jury members can be traumatized to such an extent that they have to consult a health professional to deal with it. Some experiences have drastically transformed the lives of jurors left to cope with their trauma alone. These people did not choose to be jurors. They were chosen, and they had a legal obligation to fulfil that duty. They clearly deserve our gratitude and our support. As things stand now, it is more difficult for them to receive care and adequate treatment when they are suffering, as they cannot freely speak about their trauma without contravening section 649 of the Criminal Code. Bill S‑206 proposes to allow members of a jury to be exempt from this rule of confidentiality if they require professional health services for medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling provided after the trial. Ensuring access to adequate and efficient health services for those who generously contributed to the justice system is obviously paramount, as common sense dictates. I can only concur with what is fair and obvious. Bill S-206 asks us to examine a proposed new paragraph (c) under section 649 of the Criminal Code, adding new exceptions to those already established in paragraphs (a) and (b) to allow for evidence to be given in obstruction of justice cases. The proposed paragraph (c) adds an exemption from the confidentiality obligation for the purposes of: any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling that a person referred to in subsection (1) receives from a health care professional after the completion of the trial in relation to health issues arising out of or related to the person's service at the trial as a juror or as a person who provided support services to a juror. The proposed subsection 649(3) also adds that the health care professional who provides any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling must be entitled to do so under the laws of a province. To conclude, Bill S‑206 clearly deserves to be adopted at this stage and referred to a committee. After hearing from experts, we will determine if it can be passed in its current form or if it should be improved or even rejected. At this time, the Bloc Québécois intends to vote in favour of sending Bill S‑206 to a committee.
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