44th Parl. 1st Sess.
June 9, 2022 10:00AM
- Jun/9/22 11:08:39 a.m.
- Watch
- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, what I am suggesting is that science and evidence have borne out that giving judicial discretion improves community safety. What does that mean? It means that a judge can look at an individual situation and consider—
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
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- Jun/9/22 11:19:53 a.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, I think that this is precisely right. The reality is that not only is this bill exceptionally important for what it is going to do in the circumstances that the member has just referenced, but we have a lot of other important legislation that we have to get done in the next 10 days. Therefore, it is important that we move forward.
On the point that the member raised specifically, it is important to note that judicial discretion means that one can look at a case and if it is in fact very serious, one can go much higher than the mandatory minimum. If it is a circumstance where there were mitigating circumstances, community safety was not at risk, or an individual had an underlying mental health or other issue, there could be other means and other options available to make sure that this person was rehabilitated, healthy and back in the community. That means that this individual is less likely to reoffend and less likely to have violence in the community. It means that the costs are radically lower. It is proved in evidence. It is all there.
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- Jun/9/22 12:48:08 p.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, today we are debating Bill C-5 at report stage. I am profoundly disappointed as a parliamentarian and deeply ashamed as a former Crown attorney that this seriously flawed, reckless and dangerous bill has made it this far in the process.
I left behind a proud and rewarding legal career as a public servant for the Province of Ontario, a career defined by holding criminals accountable for their actions, which ranged from mischief all the way through to and including first degree murder. It was a career further defined by advocating for victims' rights, which is a concept that is completely alien to this virtue-signalling government. Neither this bill nor Bill C-21 makes any reference to the rights and protection of victims.
I was frustrated as a Crown attorney that the judicial system was out of balance. The proverbial pendulum over my career was significantly shifting in favour of the accused at the expense of protecting victims of crime. There must be a balance.
The government will repeatedly make statements in the House that it cares deeply for victims and that their rights matter, but it is simply talk with no action. An example of this lip service is the fact the government has not replaced the federal ombudsman for victims of crime, a position left vacant since last October 1. It is shameful.
It is time to dispel the myths and misinformation coming from the government whenever its members speak about this bill.
Number one, this is not legislation targeted at low-risk offenders. Use of a firearm in the commission of an offence, possession of an unauthorized firearm, possession of a firearm with ammunition, weapons trafficking, importing and exporting of firearms, discharging a firearm with intent, reckless discharge of a firearm and robbery with a firearm are indeed extremely serious violent offences for which judges across this country routinely impose significant jail sentences and often prison on the offenders.
These are not the types of people described by our Attorney General when the bill was introduced. We all remember that story: We are to imagine a young man who has too many pops on a Saturday night and decides to pick up a loaded gun and shoot into a barn. According to our Attorney General, we should feel sorry for this individual, as it would be a cruel and unusual punishment to impose a mandatory minimum penalty.
Number two, this is not legislation that would reverse former PM Harper's Safe Streets and Communities Act. Several of the charges outlined in Bill C-5 include mandatory minimum penalties that were introduced by Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1977 and Jean Chrétien in 1995, two Liberal majority governments.
Third, according to the government and supported by its NDP partners and Green Party members, mandatory minimums are ineffective in reducing crime or keeping our communities safe. The simple fact is that if they actually believed this, instead of virtue signalling to Canadians, they would table legislation to remove all mandatory minimums. There are 53 offences that would remain in the Criminal Code if this bill passes. This includes impaired operation of a vehicle. Apparently it is important to hold drunk drivers accountable while allowing criminals and thugs to terrorize our communities by shooting up our streets.
The fourth point is that according to the government, courts from across this country, including appellate courts and the Supreme Court of Canada, are striking down mandatory minimum penalties as being contrary to the charter. For reasons previously described, mandatory minimums introduced by previous Liberal governments have been upheld by various courts for over 40 years.
Five, this is not legislation targeting people charged with simple possession. Bill C-5 would eliminate six mandatory minimums under the CDSA, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. These include the very serious offences of trafficking, importing, exporting and production of controlled substances. Drugs such as fentanyl and carfentanil are the most deadly and lethal form of street drugs, and an amount the size of a grain of salt is capable of killing an elephant. These drugs are not serious enough for the government. These are the same drugs that are causing an opioid crisis that results in daily overdoses and deaths. Do these killer criminals deserve mercy from the Liberal government? What has this country become?
Finally, this legislation is supposed to address racism and reduce the over-incarceration of Black Canadians and indigenous offenders.
The Alberta minister of justice, Kaycee Madu, a Black Canadian, noted:
While Ottawa’s new justice bill...contains some reasonable measures, I am deeply concerned about the decision to gut tough sentencing provisions for gun crimes...
Removing tough, mandatory penalties for actual gun crimes undermines the very minority communities that are so often victimized by brazen gun violence. I also find it disingenuous for Ottawa to exploit a genuine issue like systemic racism to push through their soft-on-crime bills.
I have prosecuted in the trenches for close two decades, unlike the Attorney General and members of the Liberal government. I can state on authority that the overriding sentencing consideration associated with the crimes relating to Bill C-5 are denunciation, deterrence and separation from society. In other words, it does not matter one's gender, ethnicity or race. Upon conviction, criminals are going to jail, period. It is time for the government to be honest with Canadians and accept that Bill C-5 will not substantially address the over-incarceration issue.
Throughout the entire time this bill has been debated, I and other colleagues, most notably the member for Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, have argued that there is a compromise for the government to consider. A constitutional exemption to all the charges outlined in the bill would give trial judges the legal authority to exempt criminals from a mandatory minimum penalty if they belong to a vulnerable population that is overrepresented in the criminal justice system and who are disadvantaged with regard to sentencing. This exemption would preserve the mandatory minimum penalties, but give judges the flexibility to craft an appropriate sentence. My amendment to this bill at committee was summarily dismissed by the Liberal chair as outside the scope of the study, which is shameful.
Brantford police chief Rob Davis, the only indigenous leader of a municipal police service in Ontario, testified at committee: “With Bill C-5 and the proposed changes now, we are going to see sentencing become a joke”. He continued, “With...turning sentences into conditional sentences...the justice system is being brought into disrepute. People will operate with impunity and the victims' rights are going to be given away [for] the rights of the criminal.”
Chief Davis also said, “Victims of communities will live in fear of gun violence and fearful of retaliation by armed criminals, and people will continue to overdose”.
The committee also heard from Chief Darren Montour from the Six Nations Police Service, whose testimony was clear. He stated:
...proposed conditional sentences for violent offences will not deter offenders from committing further crimes. We are not in a position to continuously monitor sentenced offenders to ensure their compliance with...restrictions handed down by the courts. Police services across the country, and especially those within indigenous communities, are significantly understaffed. We are continuously asked to do more with less, and we cannot sustain this workload.
He also stated that he can appreciate the statistics regarding the over-incarceration issue, “but along with the rights of offenders, victims and victims' families deserve rights as well.”
Hundreds of Canadians from coast to coast signed the petition on my website, which I recently presented in the House. They called on the government to immediately withdraw Bill C-5. Here is a news release for the Liberal government: Canadians are terrified at the prospect that criminals convicted of sex assault and kidnapping will also enjoy serving that sentence in the comfort of their homes, the very same homes in which they committed their crimes. It is deeply shameful.
The number one priority for the federal government is to keep Canadians safe. The government has been derelict in its responsibility.
I, together with my Conservative caucus members, will always stand on the side of victims and keeping our communities safe by holding criminals accountable for their actions. I will be very strongly voting against this bill, and I encourage all members in the House to do the same.
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- Jun/9/22 1:55:29 p.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, I look at Bill C-5 as a positive piece of legislation. I understand the member's concerns with respect to dividing it, which is what the Bloc wanted to see, but overall I think it is important that we understand and appreciate judicial independence. The idea is that our judges need to have discretionary authority to deal with issues such as systemic racism, which is very real in our court system.
I wonder if my colleague could provide her thoughts with regard to that aspect of the legislation and how it would benefit that issue.
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- Jun/9/22 4:20:15 p.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, I hope the interpreters are able to deliver the content, but I am entitled to give my speech as a member, and I hope that, given I have provided the notes in advance, this issue will be addressed.
I was speaking about under-representation in post-secondary institutions. I imagine if I were to propose that the way to reduce under-representation of Black and indigenous peoples in universities was to reduce the length of degree programs, we would recognize that did not make sense. If I were to claim that reducing the length of an undergraduate degree from four years to three years would address the under-representation of people from particular communities, we would recognize that is obviously absurd, because changing the length of a degree program does nothing to change the proportion of people from different communities who are there or to address the underlying factors that lead to under-representation. What is true for the length of degree programs is also true for the length of criminal penalties, which is that changing the overall length does not change the proportion.
I want to now speak about the relationship between racial justice and judicial discretion. Bill C-5 lowers sentences for a variety of crimes, including very serious crimes, and does so in part by widening the window for judicial discretion. I believe that judicial discretion, as well as the setting of benchmarks and parameters by the legislature, are both important elements in sentencing. In a democratic society, it is right and important for the people's representatives to deliberate and give direction about the kinds of sentences they see as appropriate for certain categories of crimes. It is also important for judges to be able to exercise their discretion in accordance with the particular facts of each case, using the parameters and formulas established by the people's representatives.
One key function of sentencing parameters set by the legislature is to help ensure relative consistency. If the facts of two different cases are virtually identical, then the sentences should also be virtually identical, even if the two defendants go before two different judges. The most effective way to ensure that two different judges in two different courtrooms apply a similar sentence to a similar set of facts is to have something such as sentencing starting points set by the legislative branch. Too much individual discretion leads to inconsistent decision-making. One risk of giving too much discretion to judges is that they, like all of us, have unconscious bias, a possible partial explanation for the over-representation of Black and indigenous peoples in prisons is that the unconscious bias of judges leads to relatively longer sentences being applied in cases with Black and indigenous defendants.
To be fair to judges, I do not know for sure if that is the case or not, but insofar as parliamentarians regularly identify the presence of systemic racism and unconscious bias in virtually all other institutions, it seems at least consistent to acknowledge that unconscious bias impacts the decisions of judges as well. If that is the case, then widening the range of judicial discretion, as Bill C-5 does, actually risks exacerbating the problem of over-representation by allowing more space for subjective determinations based on how a judge evaluates the character and motivation of a defendant.
Relying more on the work of legislatures to establish that a certain type of crime should carry a certain type of sentence in general reduces the range of difference that could be informed by unconscious bias applied to individual cases. This is not necessarily a defence of the idea of mandatory minimums as such, but I simply want to point out that, insofar as unconscious bias leads to differential outcomes when a decision-maker has broad discretion, a law which broadens the range for that discretion is more likely to increase than decrease the problem of over-representation.
I suspect many members of this House will be familiar with the iconic opening of The Godfather trilogy. It is a scene about criminal justice and also about racism. The character Amerigo Bonasera, a Sicilian immigrant who had long trusted the American justice system, is seeking justice for a daughter who was violently beaten by two privileged young men. The racial element implied in the film is clear in the original novel, with Bonasera noting that the parents of the perpetrators in this case were “his age but more American in their dress”. The judge opts to be lenient to the perpetrators saying, “"because of your youth, your clean records, because of your fine families, and because the law in its majesty does not seek vengeance.... Sentence to be suspended.'” This injustice, the exempting of two young men from the consequences of their crime because of their so-called “fine families”, leads Amerigo to lose faith in the legal system and instead rely on the mafia to get what he considers justice.
This is fictionalization of course, but it is compelling because it is very real to the circumstances and experiences of many people. Judicial discretion creates the space for preferencing those whose experience and background the decision-maker identifies with and, in this case, drives a further wedge between a minority community and the state, because Bonasera sees how the system is less likely to have the back of a person who comes from his background.
This raises a critical question: What does this bill do for Black, indigenous and other minority communities who are victims of crime and who want the police and courts to be present and consistent in order to protect them and their families from crime? What does Bill C-5 offer them? It offers them nothing. In fact, it offers them worse than nothing because it does not actually address the real problem of racism. It does not address differential outcomes, and it makes every community less safe by causing the early release of serious violent criminals from any and all backgrounds.
I have one more point I want to make. Black and indigenous people are over-represented in the prison population. Another group that is over-represented in the prison population is men. Men actually account for over 90% of adult admissions to federal custody. That is a very significant over-representation problem.
It becomes even more striking when we overlay statistics for race and gender. Indigenous women make up about 2.5% of the total population and 3% of federal prison admissions. That is relatively close. Statistically speaking, the phenomenon of indigenous over-representation in prison is overwhelmingly a problem of the over-representation of indigenous men. Over 25% of total federal prison admissions are indigenous men. Clearly, gender as well as race has to be part of the conversation about over-representation.
This raises challenging questions. Does our justice system have a problem with systemic sexism? How might the government go about trying to address the over-representation of men in the system?
I do not have time to answer those questions, but what is clear is that Bill C-5 does nothing to address the issue of over-representation of particular communities. The bill itself makes no mention of the issue of over-representation or racism, and it contains no measures which targets those problems. Reducing sentences for serious crimes makes our communities less safe, and it makes victims and potential victims of all races and from all communities more vulnerable.
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- Jun/9/22 4:27:14 p.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, the member identified a number of stakeholders who have a particular point of view, and I do not doubt that the committee heard from a broad range of stakeholders with different points of view on the bill.
My point was fairly specific. It was simply to say that when we broaden the range of discretion for decision-making in a situation where the decision-maker may, or likely does, have unconscious bias, broadening the range of discretion for that decision-maker does not make the problem better. It makes the problem worse.
We could talk about alternative mechanisms, like sentencing, starting points or clearer parameters for judicial decision-making, but in the absence of those things, when the government proposes a bill that widens the latitude for judicial discretion and there are concerns about unconscious bias, it does not make any sense to me to say that that is somehow going to address the problem of over-representation. It is not.
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- Jun/9/22 4:29:11 p.m.
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- Re: Bill C-5
Madam Speaker, clearly, judicial discretion and parameters set by legislators both have a role.
The question of what is the appropriate sentence for a particular category of crime is a philosophical question. It is a moral question. It is something that in a democratic society the legislature, in general terms, should pronounce on.
The question to what extent those broad parameters apply to the particulars of a case is a question of the facts of the case at hand, a question that requires surgical discretion that responds to the particular factors. That is why the legislature should not say this particular offence always or in every case carries exactly this sentence. It is legitimate for the legislature to say that, in general, we wish to express that we think this type of crime proportionately accords with this type of sentence.
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Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill S‑206, which is before the House for a fourth time, if we count the three previous versions of the bill introduced in previous Parliaments. Regardless, the bill we are studying today is still the same bill.
Bill S‑206 essentially proposes a change to the existing rules regarding the confidentiality of deliberations between members of a jury who have to decide the fate of an accused person. The jury secrecy rule is set out in section 649 of the Criminal Code and is also called “Lord Mansfield's rule”. It is a cornerstone of common law and the British criminal justice system.
This rule is anything but trivial. The jury is the trier of fact. The judge presiding over a trial is the trier of law. The judge adjudicates matters of law that arise over the course of the trial and gives the necessary advice to inform and guide the jury regarding these matters. That said, at the end of the day, as intended by the legislator, it is the members of the jury who decide whether the accused is guilty or innocent.
The role of jurors is therefore vitally important to the judicial process. When they deliberate, they need to feel completely free to say what they think out loud without worrying about being publicly quoted later as having put forward a certain idea or opinion. Obviously, jurors will often disagree with one another when they first begin their deliberations, but they will work together to consider all the facts entered into evidence during the trial, which may have gone on for many weeks in some cases.
At that point, the success of their work will basically depend on the flow of their debate and how comfortable they feel talking freely and unreservedly among themselves. I am thinking of the ability to share the uninhibited, unfiltered thoughts that come into our minds as we think about what we are going to say. The legislator grants the jury a type of legal status—a partial, temporary status—that lasts only as long as the trial. The jury will then speak with one voice and render a unanimous verdict, like a single person who speaks after carefully considering and weighing all aspects of an issue.
It is therefore easy to see that a sound decision requires absolute confidence in the confidentiality of their deliberations, just as every one of us refuses to compromise the integrity and inviolability of our thoughts. Anyone who, rightly or wrongly, believes someone else is probing their thoughts will self‑censor and be unable to think freely. That is anathema to a healthy thought process and wise deliberation.
Section 649 of the Criminal Code states that it is an offence for a jury member or anyone assisting them to disclose “any information relating to the proceedings of the jury, when it was absent from the courtroom that was not subsequently disclosed in open court”.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has already ruled as follows in R. v. Pan and R. v. Sawyer in 2001:
The common law rule, in combination with s. 649 of the Code, helps to ensure that jurors feel comfortable freely expressing their views in the jury room and that jurors who hold minority viewpoints do not feel pressured to retreat from their opinions because of possible negative repercussions associated with the disclosure of their positions.
We therefore understand that this is the rule that ensures sound, reasonable decisions. That said, jury duty is not always easy.
Sometimes, the facts and evidence of a criminal case can be so intense that they have a significant impact on the jury members hearing the case. Unfortunately, violence and horror can feature prominently in the crimes a person is accused of.
Furthermore, jury deliberations can often be very emotional. It is extremely stressful to stand alone against 11 other jurors and defend a point of view that none of them agree with. Add to that the often heavy consequences that the jury's decision will have for the accused, and I have no difficulty imagining that the situation can become untenable.
In some cases, jury members can be traumatized to such an extent that they have to consult a health professional to deal with it. Some experiences have drastically transformed the lives of jurors left to cope with their trauma alone. These people did not choose to be jurors; they were chosen, and they had a legal obligation to fulfil that duty. They clearly deserve our gratitude and our support. As things stand now, it is more difficult for them to receive care and adequate treatment for what they are suffering, as they cannot speak freely about their trauma without contravening section 649 of the Criminal Code.
Ensuring access to adequate and efficient health services for those who generously contributed to the justice system is obviously paramount. It is our responsibility. It is only common sense that we concur with what is fair and obvious.
Bill S‑206 proposes to allow members of a jury to be exempt from this rule of confidentiality if they require professional health services for medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling provided after the trial.
This bill asks us to examine a proposed new paragraph (c) under section 649 of the Criminal Code, adding new exceptions to those already established in paragraphs (a) and (b) to allow for evidence to be given in obstruction of justice cases. The proposed paragraph (c) adds an exemption from the confidentiality obligation for the purposes of:
(c) any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling that a person referred to in subsection (1) receives from a health care professional after the completion of the trial in relation to health issues arising out of or related to the person's service at the trial as a juror or as a person who provided support services to a juror.
The proposed subsection 649(3) also adds that the health care professional who provides any medical or psychiatric treatment or any therapy or counselling must be entitled to do so under the laws of a province.
This is a small loophole in the absolutely essential integrity of the confidentiality of jury deliberations. However, the loophole is closed by the confidentiality obligation in the rules of ethical conduct that professional associations impose on their members.
The House must now weigh the benefits to the justice system of keeping jury deliberations confidential against the benefits to jury members of having more accessible and certainly more effective consultation services between each other and, if applicable, their health professionals.
These decent individuals already do not receive the compensation and consideration they deserve in light of their valuable contribution to the justice system. They are at the heart of some legal as well as moral debates for which they were never prepared. They are calling for a bit of support and recognition, which seems like the bare minimum. As I said, they deserve our respect, our recognition and better working conditions. One day, we will probably have to think about what more we can do to acknowledge their true value.
Under the circumstances, the Bloc Québécois will be voting in favour of this bill.
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