Hon. Terry M. Mercer: Honourable senators, I would like to begin by acknowledging that I am joining you from the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq people.

As a member of the Selection Committee, I rise today to offer some commentary on where we are now in the Senate as it pertains to committees. We adopted the first report of Selection which provides the list of senators nominated to serve on committees. The Senate, by adopting the report, has appointed senators to the committees.

The next step is in dispute. My comments here may be repetitive from the committee’s second report, but I feel it is important to reiterate the arguments for all here in the Senate.

Generally speaking, the practice that “senators appointed to the standing committees and the standing joint committees shall serve for the duration of the session” has existed since Confederation. This is indeed rule 12-2(3), “Term of appointment of members of committees.”

We have followed this rule up until previous sessional orders that were adopted during the first and second sessions of the Forty-third Parliament. These orders introduced the same provisions we are considering in this second report — provisions that:

. . . . preserve the number of committee seats agreed to for each recognized party or recognized parliamentary group, after members were named, even if a senator’s affiliation changed for any reason.

I, and many other senators, have said before: a senator is a senator is a senator. Once a senator has a committee seat, it is their seat. If they decide to change groups, they should be able to keep their seat. This is how our rules work, and this is what we should follow.

However, this report allows us to subvert this rule again. If it is the will of the Senate to continue to do this, why are we not studying these changes in the Rules Committee? Isn’t that the job of the Rules Committee?

The second report of Selection states that:

If a senator ceases to be a member of a particular recognized party or recognized parliamentary group for any reason, he or she simultaneously ceases to be a member of any committee of which he or she is then a member, with the resulting vacancy to be filled by the leader or facilitator of the party or group to which the senator had belonged . . .

I do not agree with these changes which is why, honourable senators, the second report contains a dissenting opinion, and I will review that in short here now.

Whether a senator changes their group affiliation, or a non-affiliated senator joins a group, the Rule ensures the independence of each senator to conduct their committee work, entrusted to them by the Senate itself.

The population of committees is based on negotiations amongst the groups and respects proportionality, but the Senate is the ultimate arbiter of committee seats.

The recent sessional orders have infringed on the independence of individual senators by setting aside rule 12-2(3). Placing the authority over committee seats directly with the leadership of parliamentary groups and political parties, as this report does, is a continuation of that misguided practice.

It continues to be my view, and that of others, that the allocation of committee seats to parliamentary groups and political parties is a step backward in Senate modernization, and removing committee portability entrenches the authority of group and party leadership. That doesn’t sound like reform or independence to me.

For some historical context on the existence of our rule, it should be noted, honourable senators, that other Westminster parliaments have similar rules and practices. The United Kingdom’s House of Lords complies with its Standing Order 63, established in 1975, which states:

The orders of appointment of the following committees, and any of their sub-committees, shall remain in force and effect, notwithstanding the prorogation of Parliament, until such time as the House or committee makes further orders of appointment in the next succeeding session.

In the Australian Senate, members of standing committees are appointed at the beginning of each Parliament. Membership may only be changed by motion which discharges the former member and appoints a new one.

In the other place, Standing Order 114(1) also ensures that members appointed to a standing committee remain members throughout the Parliament. So then why is the Senate of Canada becoming a stand-alone body that is subverting similar rules?

Some of my honourable colleagues continue to argue that this is a proportionality problem. If we do the math, as was done with the negotiations, senators are recommended to the committees based on proportionality. If a senator leaves a group and joins another, does not that group’s proportionality of the total go up? That’s the math. Therefore, the move, with the senator keeping the seat, ultimately continues to respect the principle of proportionality.

Think about that, honourable colleagues.

Lastly, the dissenting opinion concludes:

. . . if the goal is a Senate made up of more independent senators, it is contrary to that goal to remove the right of individual senators to be appointed to committees for the duration of the session, regardless of affiliation. By removing that right and placing committee seats solely in the hands of facilitators, leaders, whips and liaisons, we would be undermining individual independence and limiting the freedom of affiliation of us all.

I challenge all senators to take control of their own destiny and vote against this report. This is your chance, perhaps your only chance, to exercise your independence. Thank you, honourable senators.