Senator Plett: Again, Senator McPhedran, I don’t know that you said it, but there was almost a suggestion there that I am doing this because it would hurt our electoral chances. I don’t think I mentioned that. I can bring a number of 16-year-olds forward that would vote for our party and a number that wouldn’t. That is not my reason. My reason, I think, was very clear. It had nothing to do with whose electoral chances would be enhanced or taken away.

Let me suggest this, Senator McPhedran. I think we’re starting at the wrong area. Let’s change some of our other laws. We could make 16-year-olds adults, but we don’t. Sixteen-year-olds are youth offenders. We can’t try them as adults unless there is special provision made and, obviously, a most serious and heinous crime. The same thing would apply for drinking, the same thing in the military. We’re going to suggest, or you’re suggesting, that we allow a person to vote, but we don’t allow that person to sit in Parliament. Maybe we should start with municipal elections, and we should lower the voting age of a person being able to represent me.

I don’t think somebody should be able to vote for me if they can’t take my spot in the House of Commons. Clearly, they can’t here. We have different ages here as well, but if they can’t take their place in the House of Commons, I don’t think they should vote.

Therefore, your idea of saying 16-year-olds are mature enough is laudable, and they may well be. However, if they are mature enough and if they are adults, then let’s treat them like adults all the way through. Let’s start from the beginning and move to here. Starting from this end and going backwards is the wrong way. We start from here and move forward.

Hon. Donald Neil Plett (Leader of the Opposition): Honourable senators, I’m rising to speak to Bill S-201, voting age, as the opposition critic to this legislation. It has been adjourned in Senator Dean’s name, and of course, if he would like it to be adjourned in his name again, I would be happy with that, but I will leave that for him to decide.

Colleagues, on October 23, 1969, the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Although the change was made with little public consultation, it was broadly accepted as the right decision.

There were numerous factors that contributed to the ease with which this change was made. For starters, over 700,000 military personnel under the voting age of 21 were already permitted to vote due to their military service.

In addition, many provinces had been moving in this direction for some time. Alberta had lowered its provincial voting age to 19 back in 1944. Saskatchewan had changed theirs to 18 in 1945. British Columbia followed suit, lowering theirs to 19 in 1952, followed by Quebec, Prince Edward Island and Manitoba who all reduced their voting age to 18.

By the time the federal government changed the general voting age, it was far from a radical idea. But while the change in the general voting age from 21 to 18 took more than 100 years to transpire, it took less than two decades before a push began to see the voting age lowered even further — to the age of 16.

It’s not clear what initially fuelled the efforts to see the voting age reduced to 16, but between 1969 and 1989 a significant development had taken place in Canada. We now had a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Charter had given every citizen of Canada the right to vote in an election. This meant that, as explained in the 1991 report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, the Charter had shifted the onus of the argument from “Why should we change the voting age?” to “Why should we not?”

In 1969, a case had to be made to extend the franchise. But now, as the report noted in 1991, “. . . a case must be made to restrict the franchise.” Since every Canadian now had the Charter right to vote, the shoe was on the other foot.

The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform — known as the “Lortie Commission” — was the first to tackle the question: Why 18 and not 16?

According to the commission, when the government lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, three things were considered. The first was the question of the extent to which those to be enfranchised had a stake in the governance of society. The second was the extent to which they could be expected to exercise a mature and informed vote. And the third was their level of participation in activities of citizenship.

The commission then applied these same criteria to the idea of lowering the voting age further, from 18 to 16. On the first criterion of the extent to which 16-year-olds had a stake in the governance of society, the commission said:

The nature and extent of ’adult’ responsibilities entrusted to those under 18 are considerable. In 1990, for instance, almost 50 per cent of Canada’s 700 000 16- and 17‑year‑olds were in the work force; close to 50 per cent of 16‑year‑olds filed income tax returns. Rights and responsibilities are also conferred on 16-year-olds under provincial laws on social and employment policy. The ability to obtain a driver’s permit is one example.

On the second criterion, the extent to which 16- and 17‑year‑olds could be expected to exercise a mature, informed vote, they noted:

. . . by the age of 15 or 16, most young people have acquired a view of the social and political world that is not significantly different from the perceptions and understanding of adults. In addition, although the amount and depth of civics education vary between and within provinces, courses are now generally offered in high schools across the country. . . . Moreover, as with the rest of the population, today’s youth have more sources of information on current affairs than was the case even two decades ago. Thus, in terms of political competence, 16 could be just as defensible an age as 18.

And on the third criterion, the level of participation of 16- and 17-year-olds in activities of citizenship, they noted the following:

The third criterion, responsible citizenship, raises the question of whether young people generally act responsibly when they participate in public affairs. There is no evidence to suggest that they act otherwise. Research on their political attitudes indicates that they tend to be less cynical about the political process and are more likely than older persons to have a sense of political efficacy — a feeling that participating in the political process is meaningful and worthwhile.

And yet, colleagues, even after acknowledging these positive qualities of 16- and 17-year-olds, the commission still came to the following conclusion:

These arguments for lowering the voting age to 16 constitute the best case for this proposal, but they are not sufficiently compelling. Ultimately, any decision on the voting age involves the judgement of a society about when individuals reach maturity as citizens. Under most statutes, a person is not considered an adult until age 18; for example, a person under 18 is not an adult for purposes of criminal proceedings unless special application is made under the Young Offenders Act. Further, a minor requires parental consent for many important decisions, including applying for citizenship, getting married and seeking certain medical interventions. As expressed many times at our hearings, there remains a strong conviction that the time has not come to lower the voting age.

The primary point that the commission was making was that, even though all three criteria seem to be met, there was an overwhelming consideration: When do individuals reach maturity as citizens?

The commission did not provide any definitive answers to that question, but rather acknowledged that there was no consensus at that time to lower the voting age further.

Ten years later, in 2001, the question of whether 16- and 17‑year‑olds should be permitted to vote was brought before the courts by two 16-year-old Albertans. In Fitzgerald v. Alberta, Eryn Fitzgerald and Christine Jairamsingh challenged the age restriction’s constitutionality. This was not the first Charter challenge around voting rights, but it was the first one that focused on whether the legislated age limits contravened the rights of Canadians.

In his decision, Justice Lefsrud agreed with the applicants that the age restriction on voting violated their rights under section 3 of the Charter. Section 3 says:

Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Furthermore, as the justice pointed out, if “every citizen” has the right to vote, then legislation that limits that right to those 18 or over is a violation of this Charter right. It is not only a violation of the Charter rights of 16- and 17-year-olds but, colleagues, of all Canadian citizens under the age of 18.

Justice Lefsrud also found that the voting age limit violated the rights of the applicants under section 15(1) of the Charter, which reads:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Those who argue that not allowing 16-year-olds to vote violates their Charter rights are correct; on that there is no debate. However, as many Canadians learned during the pandemic, Charter rights are not absolute. They are subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

In his deliberations in the 2002 Fitzgerald v. Alberta case, Justice Lefsrud had the advantage of decisions made in previous cases challenging the legislated limitations on voting rights. These limitations had already been tested by the courts, most notably in the 2002 case of Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), when the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the prohibitions on the rights of prisoners to vote.

In Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), Chief Justice McLachlin noted the following:

The framers of the Charter signaled the special importance of this right not only by its broad, untrammeled language, but by exempting it from legislative override under s. 33’s notwithstanding clause.

The Chief Justice went on to say:

Charter rights are not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of membership in the Canadian polity that cannot lightly be cast aside. This is manifestly true of the right to vote, the cornerstone of democracy, exempt from the incursion permitted on other rights through s. 33 override.

The court was pointing out that not only is the right to vote protected by the Charter, but the language of the right is intentionally and unusually strong and cannot be overridden by governments choosing to use the “notwithstanding” clause.

As you know, the “notwithstanding” clause permits governments to override Charter rights in various matters and has been used many times at the provincial level. However, it cannot be invoked to override voting rights.

Furthermore, while the court often defers to the will of Parliament in its deliberations, Chief Justice McLachlin noted that such deference on the right to vote was not appropriate:

While a posture of judicial deference to legislative decisions about social policy may be appropriate in some cases, the legislation at issue does not fall into this category. To the contrary, it is precisely when legislative choices threaten to undermine the foundations of the participatory democracy guaranteed by the Charter that courts must be vigilant in fulfilling their constitutional duty to protect the integrity of this system.

Colleagues, I point these things out for two reasons, the first of which is to underscore that any limitations on the right to vote are not taken lightly by our courts and should not be taken lightly by parliamentarians. The right to vote is, as the Chief Justice stated, “fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law.”

But, second, these facts are significant to our consideration of Bill S-201 because all of them were taken under consideration in the 2002 Fitzgerald case, when the question of lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 was first considered by the courts.

When he made his ruling in Fitzgerald, Justice Lefsrud had the ruling of Chief Justice McLachlin in his hands. The Sauvé v. Canada decision had been released three months earlier in October of 2002.

And yet, even after noting the Supreme Court’s decision that the voting age limit violated the Charter rights of Canadians under the age of 18, and even after concurring with the observations made by Chief Justice McLachlin about the sanctity and priority of the right to vote, Justice Lefsrud still found that limiting the right to vote to those aged 18 and over was justified under section 1 of the Charter.

Colleagues, the obvious question is: Why did the justice come to this decision, and his analysis in doing so relevant in our deliberations today? On that point, it is interesting to note that those who are advocating today for 16-year-olds to have the right to vote have not strayed far from the same arguments that were made in the 1991 Lortie commission’s report, and in the Fitzgerald case.

Senator McPhedran said in her speech that, “Maturity and social responsibility should play the defining role in deciding whether to allow someone to vote . . . .”

On that point, I agree with Senator McPhedran. The Lortie commission noted the same in 1991, stating:

Ultimately, any decision on the voting age involves the judgement of a society about when individuals reach maturity as citizens.

Justice Lefsrud also echoed this sentiment, saying:

In drawing the line at age 18, it is clear that the legislature’s objective was to ensure, as much as possible, that those eligible to vote are mature enough to make rational and informed decisions about who should represent them in government.

Colleagues, numerous other arguments have been made about why 16-year-olds should be allowed to vote. I would argue that most of them are simply not relevant to our consideration of this issue. For example, consider the argument we have been presented with a number of times where we are told that we should decrease the voting age in order to increase voter turnout. This same argument could be made for reducing the voting age to 14, or perhaps 12, or maybe even 10.

Increasing voter turnout is commendable, but it is not an appropriate standard to use in a decision to lower the voting age. If we have a problem with voter turnout, we should be addressing the root causes behind that, not simply broadening the voting criteria to inflate the numbers of those who turn out on election day.

Another argument that we hear is that if you allow 16‑year‑olds to vote, they are likely to continue voting later in life and will take a greater interest in their civics education. Again, this is interesting and voter engagement is important, but the same argument could be applied to 14-year-olds and probably even 10‑year-olds. I am certain that by giving 14-year-olds the right to vote, you are likely to increase the attention of at least some of them in their social studies classes. But, again, as commendable as this objective may be, it is irrelevant as a criterion regarding whether the voting age should be lowered to 16.

During debate on this bill, one senator advocated that since our youth are eloquent, confident and asking to be included in our democratic process, they should be allowed to vote. I applaud the eloquence, confidence and the eagerness of our youth. But, once again, I disagree strongly that this constitutes a solid rationale for reducing the voting age. I have seen eloquent and confident four‑year-olds on YouTube, but I doubt anyone would be advocating for them to be able to vote. Eloquence, confidence and interest are not the metrics we should be using when determining who should be able to vote.

My point, senators, is that we must be precise in how we assess whether the voting age should be lowered. This is not whether we value the voices and the engagement of young people, as I know we all do. It is not about our respect for them and the fact that they are already leaders in their own right. It is not about making them feel good or included or some other emotional metric. This decision turns on the question of maturity.

As I noted earlier, Justice Lefsrud was clear on this point, stating that:

The objective of the age requirement is similarly clear if one considers that, in the absence of an age requirement, babies meeting the citizenship and residency requirements would be eligible to vote. In drawing the line at age 18, it is clear that the legislature’s objective was to ensure, as much as possible, that those eligible to vote are mature enough to make rational and informed decisions about who should represent them in government. A rational and informed electorate is essential to the integrity of the electoral process, the maintenance of which is “always of pressing and substantial concern in any society that purports to operate in accordance with the tenets of a free and democratic society.”

Justice Lefsrud concluded by saying:

. . . I find that the government’s objective of ensuring, as much as possible, that individuals eligible to vote will have sufficient maturity to make rational and informed voting decisions is pressing and substantial.

With the understanding that Charter rights are being infringed upon by the age restriction, and that the purpose of that infringement is to ensure a sufficiently mature voting population, the next question is, to quote Justice Lefsrud:

. . . whether setting the age at 18, rather than 16, 17 or some other age, impairs the right to vote and the right to equality as little as reasonably possible.

This is the crux of the issue before us in this chamber: Are 16-year-olds mature enough to make rational and informed decisions about who should represent them in government?

Colleagues, I will concede that, as noted by the Lortie commission in 1991, the issue is somewhat arbitrary, which makes it difficult to be dogmatic on either side of the debate. How do you define maturity? How do you address the fact that in every age demographic there will be a wide array of maturity? These are issues that have been examined by academics for years.

In her lengthy article published in 2012 in the Brooklyn Law Review, Professor Vivian Hamilton — who advocates for dropping the voting age to 16 — noted that “. . . no principled conception of electoral competence exists . . . .” Professor Hamilton explained — as others before her have done — how age has become an imperfect proxy for competence. She wrote:

It is thus young people’s lack of the relevant competence that must justify their electoral exclusion. There can be little dispute that newborns lack that competence, or that the typical person acquires it at some point over the course of his or her development. Age and cognitive development are predictably correlated. There is, then, a temporal element to the attainment of electoral competence, for which age is arguably the most reasonable proxy. The impracticality of widespread individual competence assessments, moreover, makes an age-based qualification reasonable.

A voting-age qualification thus helps ensure that voters will satisfy the criterion of electoral competence. What electoral competence entails, however, remains ill-defined, even among voting experts.

This poses significant challenges for those who are attempting to change the voting age. With no clear criteria by which to define and measure “maturity,” it is simply difficult to justify lowering the voting age further. Perhaps that is why at least 15 bills to lower the voting age to 16 have been presented in Parliament since 1998 and not one has made it past committee stage in the originating chamber.

If you ask the average person on the street whether 16‑year‑olds should vote, you will get a range of responses. I do not have an official study to back this up, but I suspect that for most people their response is based on their impression of the 16‑year‑olds whom they know personally.

Even young people themselves are divided on the issue. While a survey by Children First Canada indicated that the majority of young people supported lowering the voting age, many did not. It is simply difficult to get around the subjectiveness of the question.

These are not new challenges. In Fitzgerald v. Alberta, Justice Lefsrud made some astute observations that I believe continue to inform the debate today. With your indulgence, I would like to read three paragraphs from his judgment:

Since an age-based voting restriction is necessary, the only matter remaining to be considered is whether setting the age at 18, rather than 16, 17 or some other age, impairs the right to vote and the right to equality as little as reasonably possible. Since individuals mature and develop at different rates, and their life experience varies greatly, any reasonable age-based restriction is going to exclude some individuals who could cast a rational and informed vote, and include some individuals who cannot.

Common sense dictates that setting the restriction at age 18 does not go further than necessary to achieve the legislative objective. In general, 18 year olds as a group have completed high school and are starting to make their own life decisions. They must decide whether to continue with their schooling or join the workforce. This often coincides with the decision whether to remain at home with their parents, or move out on their own. It makes sense that they take on the responsibility of voting at the same time as they take on a greater responsibility for the direction of their own lives. Experience is a legitimate consideration in evaluating a voting restriction.

Furthermore, it can be assumed that by age 18 most individuals will have completed high school social studies courses giving them some information about our political system and our history as a nation. The completion of these courses gives these individuals important background knowledge for rational and informed voting.

I am aware that age 18 does not coincide for every individual with graduation from high school. Some graduate when they are younger than 18, some turn 18 after they graduate, and some do not graduate at all. I am also aware that many individuals are forced to make difficult life choices, such as moving away from home, before graduation from high school. However, as stated above, any age-based restriction will be imperfect in its application, and no other age relates more closely to this relevant changing point in an individual’s life. As such, I am satisfied that 18 is the appropriate age at which to draw the line.

I would point out that this decision was later appealed by the applicants, and in 2004, the Court of Appeal of Alberta upheld the original judgment, stating:

Upon a thorough review of his reasons, we find no error and are in substantial agreement with his analysis and his decision.

Colleagues, this is an excellent summary of why the voting age should remain at 18, and it is as relevant today as it was 20 years ago when it was written.

In fact, if anything, since that time, the societal definition of when a person becomes a fully responsible citizen has coalesced further around the age of 18, not moved lower.

For almost 20 years after the voting age was lowered to 18, 17‑year-olds who were in the Canadian Forces were allowed to vote. The Lortie commission noted that this was problematic under the Charter, stating:

“This is discrimination with respect to those under 18 years of age who are not in service as members of the forces. It would be difficult to support such discrimination by applying the criteria identified in section 1 of the Charter.” Given this inconsistency, the question arises whether the voting age should be lowered to 17 for all citizens or raised to 18 for those in the forces to ensure equality before the law. Colleagues, the outcome was the latter. The right of 17‑year-olds in the Canadian Forces to vote was removed in the 1990s, and the voting age reverted to 18.

Consider also the evolution of driver’s licences in Canada. Prior to 1994, when you got your driver’s licence at age 16, you immediately had unrestricted driving privileges. In 1994, provinces began introducing graduated driver’s licences, which restricted your driving privileges for certain periods of time and contingent upon additional testing. Sixteen-year-olds have had their rights to drive walked back, not forward, over the last 30 years. In Ontario, these enhanced driving restrictions are not lifted fully until the age of 20. In Alberta, it’s 18.

Also, as I mentioned earlier, under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 16- and 17-year-olds are treated differently than 18‑year‑olds. In three provinces, the minimum legal drinking age is 18, and in the rest, it is 19. In most provinces, the age of majority is 19, while federally, it is 18. Everywhere you look, the evidence indicates that society still believes that its citizens reach maturity around the age of 18.

Colleagues, as I said earlier, this decision is neither clear-cut nor scientific. But on balance, I believe that we have already struck the right compromise at the age of 18 and that this is consistent with the societal consensus regarding what constitutes adulthood. To borrow a quote from Justice Lefsrud:

. . . any age-based restriction will be imperfect in its application, and no other age relates more closely to this relevant changing point in an individual’s life. As such, I am satisfied that 18 is the appropriate age . . . .

— and we should not be lowering it any further.

In closing, I would like to draw your attention to one other consideration. As parliamentarians who are appointed and not elected, I do not believe that a bill which attempts to change the legal voting age should originate in this chamber. That, in my view, is the prerogative of the elected house, not this one.

I would further note that Bill C-210, which is identical to this bill before us today, is currently proceeding through second reading in the other place, which begs the question: Why are we using precious Senate time and resources to duplicate what is already under way in the other chamber? We should wait and allow the other place to render its decision on Bill C-210. If they pass the legislation, it will come to us for consideration. If they do not, then we have the decision we are looking for.

Colleagues, as most of you know, I normally support sending bills to committee for further study. However, in this case and for the reasons I just mentioned, I cannot and will not be doing so. Thank you, colleagues.

Senator McPhedran: Thank you. There are numerous cases of the Senate introducing bills that sought to amend the Canada Elections Act, and my question is geared to whether you recall that many of those were actually introduced by Conservative senators.

If we’re to accept that any legislation that deals with the Canada Elections Act should originate in the other place, how do we account for former senator Linda Frum’s proposed legislation in Bill S-239 that sought to open up the Canada Elections Act, former senator Lowell Murray who, in the 40th Parliament, introduced Bill S-202, a bill to repeal fixed elections, or former senator Wilfred P. Moore who, in the 39th Parliament, introduced Bill S-224, which sought to amend the Parliament of Canada Act by setting time limits? Any of these bills would surely impact the conduct of elections in this country, yet all of them started here, and all of them were debated here.

Senator Plett, why is what’s good for the goose, with previous senators, not also good for the gander?

Hon. Marilou McPhedran: Senator Plett, would you take a question?

Senator Plett: Let me suggest that when I was 16 I believed at that time that I was mature enough to vote, and I believed I was mature enough to do almost anything except going to adult court. At that point, I was a child offender or whatever the terminology is.

Do I believe it has shifted? By all means it has shifted, Senator Deacon. When I talk to my grandchildren — and I bragged about one of them a week ago — she is much more mature than I was at the age of 17. There is no doubt in my mind.

I wish today that I had maybe asked some of my grandchildren, “Do you think you’re old enough to vote?” I haven’t; I probably should and probably will.

But, as I said in my speech, we will probably base our judgment on the 16-year-olds we know personally. I would like to believe that my three 16-year-old and 17-year-old grandchildren, two boys and a girl, are the most mature 16- and 17-year-olds around. They aren’t, but I would like to believe they are.

Are they old enough to make these decisions? Yes. Are they old enough to be a member of Parliament? No, by no means. As I said to Senator McPhedran, I think we’re starting at the wrong end. I’m not saying they’re not mature. Neither did the justices say they’re not mature. They said they felt they had reached a good balance. The first one, as I said in my speech, took 100 years to move; the next one started in 20 years. I think we need a bit more time. I think we need to start at a different spot than this.

Senator M. Deacon: I would say then to my colleague that I look forward to further discussion on what that focused, targeted criteria are for making this decision in 2022, working through this together.

Senator Plett: I would certainly support that, and I hope there will be many senators who will stand up in the chamber and speak to that. It doesn’t change my opinion about where I believe a bill should start. It doesn’t change my opinion about the fact that there is a bill that mirrors this one.

Even if I accept Senator McPhedran’s assertion that we should be able to start them here as well as over there, I don’t think it makes a lot of sense for the House to use resources over there to study what we are studying here. Clearly, the bill has to pass both chambers. If there is a bill in the House — which I believe is where it should start — and they turn it down there, they would probably turn ours down if we sent it over there. If they turn it down, we won’t receive it; if they accept it, we will have an opportunity to give it sober second thought here.

Senator Plett: Certainly.

Senator Duncan: I just wanted to thank Senator Plett for his response and to clarify that for the record. Thank you very much.

Hon. Ratna Omidvar: Honourable senators, I rise to speak in support of Bill S-215, An Act respecting measures in relation to the financial stability of post-secondary institutions. I would like to thank Senator Moncion for her initiative because it opens the doors for a necessary and imperative conversation.

I know that we can all agree on a lot of things, but we can agree that education, especially post-secondary education, is one of the most essential pillars of nation building. It is the bedrock of our prosperity, our innovation and our place in the world in economic, scientific and cultural terms.

For individuals, it leads to careers and jobs, but simply measuring the value of a good post-secondary education cannot be done simply in economic terms because that misses the mark. It builds people; it builds a whole person and a whole community. The fact that education is a provincial responsibility should not and must not allow us here in Parliament to simply sit back and shirk our responsibility to the nation.

We can do this in a respectful manner, as Senator Moncion has proposed in her legislation.

Underpinning the health of our post-secondary educational institutions is their financial viability. The scene here is not pretty. In fact, it’s a bit of a mess. If we were to be completely honest about this mess that universities and colleges — especially small and rural institutions — find themselves in, then we would perhaps look at ourselves here on the Hill. We have allowed ourselves to be sucked into a financial model that is unsustainable and needs a serious rethink and reboot.

The system relies on federal transfers, provincial grants to institutions and on tuition fees. The federal government also funds research fellowships directly, and if there is a silver lining in the cloud, it is the announcement in Budget 2022 of an increase of funding for research that is allocated to universities. A mix of revenue streams is generally considered to be a good business model, but this is sadly not the case here.

Outside of federal funding of research fellowships, the rest of the revenue model is in distress. First, government funding from all levels of government, which is their mainstay, has been either stagnant or decreasing. Between 1992-93 and 2015-16, the federal government’s contribution decreased by 40% per student.

Second, some provinces have capped tuition fees and the demand from domestic students is limited. These cuts hurt students the most. Many universities lean now on part-time or adjunct professors, which no doubt has a knock-on effect impacting the quality of education our students are getting.

In fact, research studies show that one in four, and maybe even one in five, students in Ontario colleges and universities are graduating with literacy and numeracy levels that do not meet the OECD standards; just imagine that.

Provincial funding for universities is a patchwork. Some provinces fund by quotas, others by student enrolment and others give grants, but regardless, the system is under stress.

For example, the Province of Alberta last year cut $135 million from operating budgets for universities. Manitoba has cut $10 million in funding for post-secondary institutions over the last three years.

Let’s then layer over this stressful financial situation the impact of the COVID crisis. Nationwide, universities and colleges faced a $2.5 billion shortfall. In my province of Ontario, the shortfall was $1.7 billion. The University of Alberta is facing a significant shortfall of $120 million and the same is true for Dalhousie University in Halifax.

Of course, post-secondary institutions have looked to other ways to generate revenue, and for many this means international students. Tuition fees for international students are five times higher than those of domestic students. On average, international students pay $32,000 in tuition annually compared to an average of $6,500 for Canadian kids.

For an international student, Canada is an attractive place. Expensive as the fees are, they are much cheaper than other comparable jurisdictions. In addition, students are allowed to work here under certain conditions and there is a clear pathway to permanency for foreign students. No wonder, then, that we’ve seen a dramatic increase in the number of international foreign students coming to Canada. In 2010, there were just 142,710 international students, but by 2019 this number had grown to 388,782 students who collectively contributed $22 billion to our economy.

This is a good thing. It is to our credit because it was a national imperative to give Australia and the U.S. some competition in this field.

However, most of the schools that attract international students are the big urban schools such as the University of Toronto, McGill or UBC. Smaller and sometimes more rural schools struggle to attract their share of these students. At Laurentian University, whose bankruptcy precipitated this bill, international students comprised only about 3% of the student population.

Nipissing University, which is also under financial stress, has a total of roughly 60 international students out of a student body of 4,500. Smaller institutions are missing out on the only other source of alternative revenue.

Perhaps Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada should consider fast-tracking student applications, giving preference to student applications who are destined for smaller institutions as an incentive to study and stay in smaller places. We all know how very fed up international students are with the backlog of approvals. Programs such as this could get the train moving in the right direction.

I am all in favour of attracting the best and the brightest to Canadian schools, but I am appalled that the general financial health of our post-secondary institutions depends so much on international students. It’s a bit like predicating that all hip surgeries in Canada will be paid for by international patients. I hope we all realize that the outsourcing of revenue is neither healthy nor desirable for Canada in the long term.

And it’s not good for students either, whether they are international or not. And lest we are left with the impression that these international students are all rolling around in fancy cars and staying in fancy mansions, that is not the case. Many scrape together the fees, their families face significant hardship and the parental expectations of these poor, lonely students are extreme.

The Toronto Star has documented these experiences and they have determined that, despite the fact that many are from modest backgrounds, they pay hefty tuition fees not just for a chance to study, but to stay in this country. But they face difficult challenges, unforgiving timelines, social isolation, parental stress and are often prone to exploitation by employers and others.

If you lived in my city, you would have heard about the suicides by international students and, in fact, the sex-trafficking ring that is operated by exploiters of female foreign students who are here, have no protection and cannot meet their rent.

This is a tragedy of our own making. We shouldn’t be burdening international students without providing adequate supports for them just so our institutions can stay afloat. The end in this case may not justify the means.

I don’t want to go further on the plight of international students because I believe very firmly that this is a wonderful subject and an important subject for a committee study all on its own, but I do think we need to rethink the financial health of our post-secondary institutions.

This is why I welcome the intent of this bill and support that, if passed, the minister would develop a proposal for federal initiatives to reduce the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency; protect students, staff and faculty in the event that an institution becomes bankrupt or insolvent; and support communities that would be impacted by an institution becoming bankrupt or insolvent.

Further, in deliberating on this matter, the designated minister may also want to think about the role of the federal government in supporting universities that promote French-language degrees and diplomas as more than simply places of education but as an essential imperative foundation of a bilingual nation. A different consideration, apart from student enrolment or a decline in the francophone population outside Quebec, needs to be considered.

Senator Moncion has mused about direct transfers to French language departments at colleges or university. A case could be made that this falls within federal jurisdiction because it is about strengthening the bilingual foundation of our country.

We feel the impact of this on the Hill. We have debated, discussed and bemoaned the lack of French-language interpreters, which means that we cannot do our work as much as we would like to. I think the Hill plays an important role in this challenge as well. Of course, we always need to stay within our constitutional boundaries and not wander too far out of our lane, as Senator Martin has warned us. But this proposal calls for the federal minister to engage with provincial governments, consult with stakeholders and propose federal solutions and initiatives so that the sustainability of our post-secondary education systems is strengthened.

Colleagues, the second component of Senator Moncion’s bill is a very important loophole that she has identified and that needs to be looked at. This component seeks to prevent publicly funded post-secondary institutions from having recourse to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, or CCAA, or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the BIA — not to be mixed up with the other BIA that we are focusing on — to prevent similar situations to what happened at Laurentian University.

The question is really whether the CCAA, which is under federal jurisdiction, is the right place for colleges and universities to go if they are facing financial issues. I browsed the web and looked at a list of companies that have claimed insolvency protection under the CCAA in the last three months, and here is what I found: a sports franchise, a real estate corporation, a water management company and a pizza company.

The act is, in essence, for the private sector. One must really ask how a publicly funded university fell into this crowd.

As we know from Senator Martin’s speech, it did not have to be this way. The Auditor General of Ontario studied Laurentian University and concluded that it did not have to file for CCAA protection. Instead, despite being offered more money by the province, it strategically planned and chose to take steps to file for creditor protection. This prompted the Auditor General of Ontario, Bonnie Lysyk, to comment that the repercussions of this filing were profound and stirred up strong reactions, especially in Sudbury where the university is an important employer and contributor to the social and economic fabric of the community.

By opting for creditor protection under the CCAA, Laurentian was able to bypass provisions in its collective agreements, allowing the administration to effectively terminate more senior employees and clear a number of long-standing union grievances. Laurentian removed 36% of its programs and fired 195 staff, which severely impacted the aspirations of over 930 students.

The Auditor General concluded that there is a strong argument that the CCAA, an important tool used in the private sector, is an inappropriate remedy for public entities. There are certain principles held high in the public sector — transparency, accountability and the primacy of the public interest — that make the CCAA court-ordered protection a detrimental choice for public entities.

Today it is Laurentian that has chosen this path, and tomorrow it could be a hospital or a museum for all we know. We need to protect the public interest in ensuring the health of our public institutions and close this loophole.

In conclusion, colleagues, I support this bill and wish to have your support in sending it to committee.

Senator Miville-Dechêne: Yes, there is a two-tiered system because the only zoos listed in the bill are those with AZA certification. You name them in the bill. By doing that, you give them additional protection because, even if they lose their certification at some point, they will always be listed in the bill as designated, while the other hundred or so zoos will have to go through a certification program. I know you have adapted the standards, but you have also given the seven zoos listed in the bill a special privilege and a free pass. I see that as a problem, but I think we can continue to think about it.

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore: The senator’s time is up.

(On motion of Senator Martin, debate adjourned.)

[English]

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Patterson, seconded by the Honourable Senator Cormier, for the second reading of Bill S-242, An Act to amend the Radiocommunication Act.

Hon. Julie Miville-Dechêne: Honourable colleagues, I rise today to speak to Bill S-241, the Jane Goodall Act, which was introduced by my colleague, Senator Marty Klyne.

To start, I believe it is necessary to strengthen the protection of wild animals in captivity and to outright ban the purchase and breeding of elephants, great apes and cetaceans. In a world increasingly concerned with animal welfare, keeping wild animals in captivity for human enjoyment is less and less acceptable.

One shameful example of this situation occurred in the heart of Quebec and clearly demonstrated the importance of taking action. In May 2018, 200 neglected and abused animals were seized from the Zoo de Saint-Édouard in Mauricie. It was the largest seizure in Canada. These exotic animals, which included lions, tigers, bears and kangaroos, had been deprived of veterinary care and kept in inadequate and unsanitary facilities. The investigation was sparked by a tip about mistreatment from a woman who had visited the zoo.

This scandal raised many questions about good practices at zoos. The Zoo de Saint-Édouard had been flagged several times, but always managed to hang onto its permits.

How can we prevent such abuse from happening? Some would like to close all zoos and aquariums. However, that is not the intent of Senator Klyne’s bill.

Instead, the bill proposes a complex, comprehensive reform with regard to prohibited species and the necessary permits. The legislation would impose much stricter national regulations regarding the possession of certain species of cats, primates and canines.

The bill would enable zoos and aquariums to keep the wild animals they already have, but it would impose stricter conditions on their captivity for the future.

[English]

Bill S-241 would ban nearly all zoos from keeping more than 800 species of wild animals, including big cats, bears, wolves, seals, sea lions, certain reptiles, like crocodiles, and venomous snakes. These animals were selected because some are more dangerous, or they need more space or a different climate than ours.

If they want to override this ban, the 100 or so wildlife attractions in Canada will have to apply for licences from the federal or provincial government, with strict conditions related to scientific research and the interests of the animal.

Institutions will also be able to obtain a designation as an eligible animal care organization provided they meet a series of conditions, including animal care recognized at the highest standards, best practices and the establishment of a mechanism protecting whistle-blowers employed in zoos.

Some believe that obtaining permits will be complicated. The owner of Parc Safari in Hemmingford, Quebec, also believes that the Bill S-241 project is a first step towards the end of zoological institutions due to restrictions on the import and export of animals.

Personally, I have nothing against raising standards and implementing additional restrictions aimed at better protecting animals, but I’m concerned about the deferential treatment given in this bill to Canadian zoos and aquariums. On the one hand, almost all zoos and aquariums will have to try to obtain permission from the federal administration once the law is enforced. However, the law grants exemptions to seven zoos and aquariums in Canada because they are members of a private American organization: the Association of Zoos and Aquariums, or AZA. These seven organizations are the Zoo de Granby, the Calgary Zoo, the Montréal Biodôme, the Toronto Zoo, Ripley’s Aquarium of Canada, the Assiniboine Park Zoo in Winnipeg and the Vancouver Aquarium. These are generally larger institutions with more resources. Obtaining an AZA accreditation costs around US$12,000, but above all, it takes dedicated staff and months, if not years, of preparation.

According to Senator Marty Klyne and the groups he consulted, the treatment given to the seven establishments is justified because AZA applies very high criteria before granting its stamp of approval. AZA is based in Maryland and accredits mainly American attractions but also those in a dozen other countries. Its standards are higher in some respects than those of its Canadian counterpart, Canada’s Accredited Zoos and Aquariums, or CAZA.

I repeat that when it comes to animal welfare, it is very important to put forward the highest standards, as Bill S-241 does. This is not what is at issue, and that is why I support this bill. However, it seems to me to be unfair to favour certain establishments over others. In my opinion, all zoos and aquariums should face the same administrative procedures. Either they all have to go through the same process to obtain a permit or all those who meet the criteria should be exempted, regardless of their AZA accreditation.

The two-tiered system proposed by the bill gives these seven zoos and aquariums a significant advantage, because even if some of them do not respect their obligations in the future, it might be necessary to modify the law, which is not always a quick procedure.

[Translation]

Truth be told, that is the part of the bill that was deemed to be rather unfair by some zoos that have fewer resources but that are making an effort to improve their animals’ living conditions. The Zoo sauvage de Saint-Félicien is one of them. I thank Senator Klyne’s office for taking the time to meet with Lauraine Gagnon, the zoo’s chief executive, who is very concerned that this bill will jeopardize the future of her zoo. She started by contacting her MP, Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, who also did not understand the differential treatment set out in Bill S-241, and that began a dialogue.

The Saint-Félicien zoo is a major tourist attraction in Saguenay—Lac-St-Jean. It drew over 200,000 visitors a year before the pandemic. It is a not-for-profit organization that treats its animals in an exemplary manner. All of the animals are native to the boreal forest, and they have a lot of space. In fact, at this zoo, the visitors are the ones in cages. They ride through the park in a train, while the animals roam relatively freely within a 324‑hectare park. The animals are kept in spacious enclosures that far exceed the requirements. The Saint-Félicien zoo participates in scientific research and is collaborating on a reputable foreign program for endangered species.

Bill S-241 would affect 10 of the 75 species at the Saint-Félicien zoo, which is why the zoo’s director is concerned. She pointed out that her zoo is a not-for-profit organization and that obtaining permits would take time and resources. She would like the zoo to be treated the same as the seven zoos and aquariums that are exempt from the administrative procedures. She doesn’t understand why organizations that meet the standards set out in Bill S-241 are at a disadvantage solely because they are not members of AZA.

The Saint-Félicien zoo is just one example, of course, and I am not claiming to know what kind of living conditions exist for animals in the hundred or so other zoos and aquariums across Canada. However, I think it is worth reviewing the process for issuing the permits to ensure that all of the organizations that meet the standards are treated fairly, without any undue administrative advantage.

Benoît Pelletier, a law professor at the University of Ottawa, says that this special treatment depending on whether an organization belongs to a foreign private association could be challenged on the basis of the principles of natural justice within our own administrative laws.

This legislation could also be complicated to implement. The federal government shares jurisdiction over wild animals in captivity with the provinces. How will the provinces react if the federal government refuses or is slow to grant a designation of animal care organization to an attraction that contributes to regional development? Will the Environment Minister have the means to inspect zoos regularly, or will he rely solely on whistle-blowers, visitors or animal rights organizations? The zoos that will be required to comply with the new rules will have some time to make the transition. They will be able to keep prohibited animals until the animals die. However, the movement towards enhanced standards is unstoppable. The public is increasingly interested in animal welfare, and Indigenous peoples have been for far longer.

Valéry Giroux, a University of Montreal professor who specializes in animal ethics, spoke to this issue on Radio-Canada. She said:

Parents who take their children to the zoo usually have excellent reasons for doing so. They want to foster their children’s interest in nature, their respect for animals. The problem is that the animals in zoos are psychologically disturbed, so they don’t accurately represent their cousins living in the natural environment. Visiting the zoo is not like going out into nature; it’s more like visiting a prison or a psychiatric hospital. By taking children to the zoo, we’re not teaching them to develop compassion for animals or to respect biodiversity. Instead, we’re teaching them that wild animals are meant to be kept in captivity to entertain us. We’re teaching them that it’s okay to capture animals, to deprive them of their freedom, to interfere in their social bonds, all for our own entertainment.

This new vision of animal welfare stands in stark contrast to the way that we saw it as children and that many of us have passed on to our children.

I thank Senator Klyne for this ambitious effort. Further study in committee will help us assess whether amendments are needed to make the bill fairer and to ensure that its implementation is as smooth and efficient as possible.

Thank you.

[English]

Senator Klyne: Thank you for that.

The outcome of that might jeopardize that it will be granted a licence. There is no granting of exemptions just because they are a member of AZA. AZA sets a very high standard, so if you are in compliance with AZA, you would be provided a licence, not an exemption.

All of those zoos need to go through recertifications. Ideally, most of them will pass. Some might have some difficulties, and there will be an abeyance that then causes the minister responsible, if the bill passes, to perhaps question whether they can still keep their licence.

There is no two-tiered system. You do not have to be a member of AZA. In fact —

Hon. Diane Bellemare moved second reading of Bill S-244, An Act to amend the Department of Employment and Social Development Act and the Employment Insurance Act (Employment Insurance Council).

She said: Honourable senators, this bill is the result of discussions between several groups, representatives and labour market stakeholders, all with an interest in employment insurance.

The Canadian Labour Congress played a leading role for the unions. The FTQ, the CSN, Unifor and Canada’s Building Trades Unions also participated in the discussions.

For employers, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce was the main contact point. The Fédération des chambres de commerce du Québec, the Conseil du patronat du Québec, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business and the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters also took part in the discussions.

I would also like to thank the two EI commissioners, Pierre Laliberté, the Commissioner for Workers, and Nancy Healey, the Commissioner for Employers, for their thoughtful contributions to the discussions. I also want to thank my team, the law clerks and my special adviser, Michel Cournoyer, a long-time contributor to the consultations.

The purpose of the bill is to enhance social dialogue within the Canada Employment Insurance Commission. Its current structure, based on consultation, does not meet today’s needs. This system is funded entirely by the employers and the workers, and it plays a major role in the labour market with respect to compensation, but also with respect to employment policies that facilitate transitions. It failed at that task during the pandemic, so a major reform is needed. The effectiveness of the changes will depend on the stakeholders’ participation in defining and implementing these changes. The bill is a response from labour market partners. As I was saying, the commissioners actively participated in it.

This bill is rather simple. Through federal legislation, it seeks to create a council that will be in charge of providing advice to the current Canada Employment Insurance Commission. The bill proposes that this council, which will be co-chaired by the Commissioner for Workers and the Commissioner for Employers, be made up of an equal number of labour and employer representatives. Unlike the current commissioners, the members of the council will not be paid. The creation of this council will therefore have no specific budget impact.

What is social dialogue? Often when I talk about social dialogue, people say, “What are you talking about?” It’s true that social dialogue is not something we hear about every day in Canada. However, it’s a fairly common practice, especially in Quebec, and it’s even more widespread in most industrialized nations.

The International Labour Organization, the ILO, an agency of the United Nations, proposes the following definition of social dialogue:

Social dialogue is defined by the ILO to include all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy. Social dialogue takes many different forms. It may exist as a tripartite process, with the government as an official party to the dialogue, or it may consist of bipartite relations between the representatives of labour and management at company level (or trade unions and employers’ organizations at higher levels). Social dialogue may be informal or institutionalized, and often involves both. It may take place at the national, regional, international, cross-border or local levels. It may involve the social partners in different economic sectors, within a single sector or in a single company or group of companies.

The ILO further states:

The main goal of social dialogue itself is to promote consensus building and democratic involvement among the main stakeholders in the world of work. Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage good governance, advance social . . . peace and stability and boost economic progress.

When we read about how social dialogue is a collective bargaining or information exchange process, we can see that Canada does practise social dialogue to a significant extent. Consultation, as it is often understood, is just the beginning of an ongoing social dialogue intended to achieve consensus. A second reading of the ILO definition makes it clear that social dialogue is not a unilateral or one-way process, unlike the consultation processes that governments in Canada carry out as they are developing bills.

Consultation is less effective than social dialogue. It is the beginning of the process, and it is less effective, but why? The short answer is that consultation produces many answers, whereas social dialogue zeroes in on a solution or solutions that are mutually acceptable and generally mutually beneficial.

Consider labour relations in a business. Labour relations experts understand right away that a negotiated contract is always better than a contract imposed by an arbitrator after consulting the parties. More often than not, when the balance of power is even and the process is undertaken in good faith, negotiation results in mutually beneficial agreements with respect to productivity and equity. The result often resembles a positive-sum game in the way labour, production and compensation are organized.

That is not necessarily the case with arbitration. The arbitrator listens to both parties’ official versions and then splits things down the middle, producing a less-than-optimal outcome.

[English]

In short, social dialogue is a form of negotiation at the national level which results in the determination of more effective and fairer labour market policies than would otherwise be the case.

It is an effective process because it reveals the multiple facets of the same reality. It allows for innovation in mutually beneficial solutions. It allows the unexpected effects of policies to be taken into account and the losers to be compensated. Social dialogue also ensures greater social acceptability among companies and the workforce, facilitating its implementation.

[Translation]

The actual process of social dialogue is very different from the specific, time-limited public consultations that are carried out by elected officials or civil servants to support political decisions that have sometimes already been made. Consultation generally puts all of the information in the hands of decision makers and, more importantly, it does not allow for innovative solutions because it does not encourage dialogue between the parties.

Consultation, as it is typically practised, is not a consensus-building process; on the contrary, it often results in opposing positions from those being consulted. As a result, the public servants and politicians who decide on the strategies to use will very often make someone unhappy. There may be winners and losers, which will make it more difficult to implement the strategies.

In short, social dialogue is a more transparent process than consultation because every stakeholder has access to the information provided by the others. Feedback is provided at the same time that information is being validated around the table. This process encompasses the concerns of the various stakeholders. Social dialogue results in common solutions and promotes social consensus, which bilateral consultation simply can’t do. It also facilitates policy implementation. In short, it is a positive-sum game.

I will now shift from theory to things that are more tangible. I had the opportunity to observe social dialogue in the context of labour market policies in Quebec. I would like to tell you a bit about the accomplishments of the Commission des partenaires du marché du travail.

The Commission des partenaires du marché du travail has existed in Quebec since 1993. It started out as the board of directors of the Société québécoise de développement de la main-d’œuvre, or SQDM, a public organization whose mandate was to manage the labour and training programs funded by Ottawa and Quebec. In 1994, at the request of Quebec’s employer and worker associations, the composition of this public organization’s board of directors was changed so that the members would be representatives of associations instead of individuals. The government of the day agreed to that request and, at the same time, I became the chair of this organization during its restructuring.

At that time, the minister responsible for this file supported the priorities of the Forum pour l’emploi, a non-profit organisation created in 1987 to provide a framework for social dialogue in Quebec. To be clear, the Forum pour l’emploi was born out of a collective desire on the part of Quebec’s economic players to help lower the unemployment rate and stimulate growth and productivity.

The catalyst for this movement was the publication of a book called Le défi du plein emploi — un nouveau regard économique, which offered a new economic perspective on the challenge of full employment. I co-wrote it with my colleague Lise Poulin-Simon, who left us too soon in 1995. Our book compared the economic policies on employment of countries that had managed to weather the economic period of the 1976 oil crisis relatively well, while Canada had been experiencing stagflation since 1976. The book generated a lot of public interest, so two former federal officials came to us and challenged us to carry out what we had proposed in the book. We decided to take on the challenge, so we brought together a group of people who came from different backgrounds, but who were all interested in collective action.

The non-profit organization was initially co-chaired by Claude Béland, who will be familiar to some of you and who was president of Mouvement Desjardins at the time, and by Louis Laberge, then president of the FTQ and the Fonds de solidarité. It was composed of all the key players in Quebec’s labour market. Union and employer associations were all represented, as were the municipalities, some large companies, youth and women’s associations, and the vocational training sector.

The Forum pour l’emploi was eager for a major reform of labour programs and for the federal and Quebec government to coordinate or even merge their programs in order to focus their efforts on obtaining concrete results in terms of workforce integration and reduction of unemployment, rather than compliance with the programs.

Consequently, employer and labour representatives lobbied the federal government to decentralize its programs and measures and download them onto the provinces.

The objective was to create a labour development fund that would be managed by Quebec. In 1996, an agreement was signed to create the fund, with funding from the federal and Quebec governments. The agreement included and still includes results-based objectives, and program-based management was replaced by results-based management. At the time, more than 100 programs were abolished. Those programs were designed for certain categories of people, and they bore the imprint of the minister who had wanted to create them. There was no budget flexibility, so, at the end of the year, the unspent amounts of money allocated to each program were returned to the public treasury, even if the dire needs of the people in the labour market had not been met.

Needless to say, the official evaluations of these programs were negative. The social partners made it possible to transition to results-based management of public funds, as opposed to program-based management. That is a huge achievement.

The SQDM has now been replaced by Emploi-Québec, which combined SQDM staff, staff from federal employment services offices and social assistance workers. The Commission des partenaires du marché du travail is still involved in managing Emploi-Québec, more specifically in the area of training and employment services. Results-based management is still being used, and the labour market partners have to ensure that governments don’t indirectly erode their progress by once again creating politically motivated programs targeting specific categories of people.

They ensure that the socio-economic logic of the labour market takes precedence over politically motivated objectives.

[English]

In short, this story aims to show that social dialogue in the labour market and at a national level is more than consultation. Social dialogue is about consulting each other to give advice that respects the collective logic of the labour market and to find — together — optimal solutions for specific needs. In many cases, in many countries, social dialogue is used to manage unemployment insurance programs as well as investments in labour force development.

[Translation]

What we can learn from this story is that society wins when economic and social partners are involved in making decisions regarding labour market policies.

The partners collect information on the ground that is not reflected in statistics. They put policies into practice, incorporate them into their human resource management practices, and live with the impact of these policies. Their participation is necessary for the programs to be successful.

[English]

Public intervention in employment and labour must respect the logic of the labour market and not the electoral logic in the number of votes. Our sustainable prosperity depends on it. Programs cannot change every four years and follow political logic.

[Translation]

However, social dialogue is not a spontaneous practice. Initiating productive social dialogue requires various conditions, one of which is mutual trust between the parties. Not all employers have a good relationship with their employees, and vice versa. Social dialogue can be a powerful antidote to the polarization generated by social media. However, in order to thrive, social dialogue needs an environment that fosters mutual trust. Governments have a role to play in creating environments that foster this trust. That is not always easy when the politicians leading government institutions are often simultaneously involved in divide-and-conquer strategies.

[English]

As an OECD report for the Global Deal mentions:

. . . social partners and the government cannot build and maintain an effective dialogue without mutual trust. While there is no single recipe to build up trust, OECD studies have identified some key determinants of trust in one specific institution, namely the national government. These include integrity of high-level government officials’ . . . government’s reliability in case of crisis, openness to citizen’s voice . . . as well as responsiveness to citizen’s concerns . . . . In addition, the following factors enhance trust . . . i) availability of institutions and structures where social partners can regularly meet and discuss to arrive at a common understanding (from work places level up to national level); ii) access to accurate information by all sides . . . iii) mechanisms that ensure enforcement of collective agreements and other commitments . . . iv) institutional stability to create shares and anchored expectations; v) respect for autonomy of social partners; and vi) avoidance of excessive mutual strife and competition between social partners themselves.

[Translation]

Every study that has examined social dialogue has found that at least two conditions must be met in order for it to be sustained and effective. The first is the recognition and willingness of governments to engage in social dialogue as a means of determining public policy on labour issues.

The second is the importance of institutionalizing this practice in order to sustain mutual trust and develop a culture of consensus building.

Esteemed colleagues, at the risk of repeating myself, social dialogue is one of the best ways to achieve efficiency and equity in the production system and the labour market. That is why the International Labour Organization, the ILO, has always promoted social dialogue at the international level in every country, even the least developed. The ILO has produced recommendations and conventions identifying best practices in this field, and Canada has signed numerous ILO conventions. The government of Canada supports the practice and recognizes the importance of social dialogue through its international commitments.

For example, in 2016, the federal government supported the Global Deal for Decent Work and Inclusive Growth, an initiative launched by Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and developed in cooperation with the OECD and the ILO. The objective of the deal is to harness the potential of social dialogue as an instrument for promoting better quality jobs, fairer working conditions and more inclusive growth, in line with the UN 2030 agenda.

In addition, the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, which expresses the contemporary vision of the ILO’s mandate in the era of globalization, was adopted in 2008 by all of its members, including Canada. The declaration promotes decent work through a coordinated approach to achieving four strategic objectives: employment, social protection, social dialogue, and fundamental principles and rights at work.

As the declaration states, social dialogue and tripartism are the most appropriate methods for adapting the implementation of the strategic objectives to the needs and circumstances of each country and translating economic development into social progress, and social progress into economic development, for example. Canada ratified the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, No. 144, in 2011. The convention recognizes social dialogue between representatives of the government, employers and workers in operating these procedures with respect to matters concerning ILO activities.

Employment Service Convention, 1948, No. 88, was ratified by Canada in 1950. Article 4 stipulates that representatives of employers and workers on these national advisory committees shall be appointed in equal numbers after consultation with representative organizations of employers and workers.

Honourable colleagues, social dialogue plays an important role in many societies, and not just democratic societies. History has shown us that private market institutions and the principle of competition do not function optimally in the labour market, especially when we are talking about compensation, employment insurance or skills development. By the same token, central planning of production and of the labour market does not work either in countries that are considered undemocratic.

There are social dialogue institutions all over the world at several levels of government. Many are national and help define major issues with economic and social policies as well as the strategies that are needed in response. Several countries practise social dialogue to deal with more specific issues, such as workforce development.

[English]

As an example of the importance of social dialogue on the macro level, the International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions is an organization that assembles economic and social councils from 72 countries in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia. It was created in 1999 and has its head office in Brussels, Belgium.

[Translation]

Many countries, such as France, Belgium, Greece, Cameroon, Brazil, Mexico and China, are part of this association. The Scandinavian countries are leaders and pioneers on labour matters, as are Germany and Austria, both of which are countries that I studied and observed in action in a previous career. More than half of European countries have established tripartite institutions that are actively involved in managing labour and employment insurance programs.

Over the past few years, we have seen increased interest in social dialogue on the international stage. This is not surprising, given the challenges associated with mobilizing collective action to achieve a common objective as important as the sustainable development of our planet.

The UN sustainable development goals and 2030 agenda will require us to develop a common strategy and engage in constructive, robust social dialogue at all levels. To make the transition to green economies, we will have to adopt sustainable labour market practices, because this is where wealth is created and distributed.

What about social dialogue at the federal level in Canada? Before I get to that part, I want to pay tribute to an economist I never knew personally but would have enjoyed meeting in the context of this bill. I am talking about Donna Wood, who passed away in 2019. After spending 25 years in the public service in Alberta and then Northwest Territories, in the field of public policy, she taught in the political science department at the University of Victoria. She published several books on social policy, both in Canada and internationally, and on federalism.

Professor Donna Wood extensively analyzed the evolution of social dialogue in Canada. For this reason, for the next part of my speech, I will be drawing freely on her writings and on the scientific studies I conducted when I was a university professor alongside Professor Lise Poulin-Simon. I will also draw on my professional experience in the employment sector.

At the federal level, the first tripartite experiment began when unemployment insurance was created in 1940. At that time, the unemployment insurance program was established under the direction of the tripartite, arm’s-length Unemployment Insurance Commission.

The program was originally funded through equal contributions from employers and employees, equivalent to 40% of the cost of the program for each group, and the federal government provided the remaining 20%. The federal government stopped contributing to the plan in 1990.

This tripartite commission carried out important responsibilities with respect to managing unemployment insurance from 1940 to 1976. In 1965, the tripartite commission lost the responsibility for employment and placement services, which were transferred to the Department of Labour and subsequently to the Labour and Immigration Department.

In 1976, the commission’s responsibility for managing compensation was transferred to the Department of Employment and Immigration. The commission’s composition was changed from three members to four, with one representative for employers, one representative for labour, and two departmental representatives. The chair of the commission was the deputy minister of the department. It was then that the commission came to closely resemble the commission of today. In short, its responsibilities are to assess the employment insurance program, approve policies, make certain regulations, set the premium rate and, until recently, oversee the administrative appeal tribunal, although that responsibility was taken away from it in a roundabout way. More on this later.

For almost 35 years, employment insurance was a tripartite institution that the government steadily stripped of its powers to govern a system that the partners currently fully fund. The year 1976 is also when the employment insurance system began to undergo many transformations in response to political problems that were often not aligned with the logic of the labour market. The coverage rate of that system was about 80%, but it fell to under 50%.

In addition to the former tripartite Unemployment Insurance Commission, several advisory committees were established between 1941 and 1998. The last one was the Canadian Labour Force Development Board, which was established in 1991 and dissolved in 1998.

[English]

For various reasons, these institutions ended up dissolving. According to the late Professor Donna Wood’s analysis, the most influential factor to cause the demise of advisory bodies was the propensity of the Government of Canada to reorganize and realign government responsibilities, abandoning or changing advisory committees in the process. As UI, as it was then known, and its various component pieces were moved around organizationally by the federal government, advisory committees were recast and weakened. The lack of legislation establishing these advisory committees most likely contributed to their easy dismantling.

However, in the case of the Canadian Labour Force Development Board, Professor Wood gathers that the government may have unwelcomed some of the messaging and therefore reduced its financial support, which ultimately led to business stakeholders pulling the plug.

For almost 20 years, the Canada Employment Insurance Commission has worked to facilitate business and labour input into employment policy in Canada. When input on larger issues than EI is needed, the Government of Canada has set up ad hoc consultations or has referred the issues to committees, such as the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, or HUMA — because we do not have a committee on human resources in the Senate — in the lower chamber, which serve as fast-track options for governments seeking more specialized advice on short notice instead of permanent advisory bodies that tend to have broad and long-term expertise.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the Economic Council of Canada as an example of multipartisanship in Canada.

This organization, financed by the federal government, was created in 1963 and dismantled in 1992, when the studies of the council did not please the government of the day or the Department of Finance. The council was first composed of labour, business and other groups’ representatives. Its composition was changed later by the appointment of individuals instead of representatives of institutions. It produced applied studies on issues of growth equity in the labour market and other issues of the day. Its mandate was to help build consensus in Canada. I had the privilege to be appointed for two mandates of three years each to the economic council, once by former prime minister Pierre Trudeau and reappointed by Prime Minister Mulroney.

To conclude this section of my speech, let me quote Professor Donna Wood from one of her last articles, entitled, The Seventy-Five Year Decline: How Government Expropriated Employment Insurance from Canadian Workers and Employers and Why This Matters:

There are many reasons why business and labour oversight and input into EI has diminished over time. Certainly, the combination of Cabinet government and executive federalism creates in Canada a closed, elite dominated process involving primarily politicians and bureaucrats in any policy area. The absence of vertically integrated, highly representative encompassing ‘peak’ pan-Canadian business and labour organizations exacerbates the business-labour divide and impedes their capacity to interact with government and with each other. The dismantling over the past 20 years of all pan-Canadian advisory committees and research institutions responsible for employment has eliminated spaces where fruitful conversations used to occur.

To conclude my speech, let me again cite Donna Wood’s report:

Putting the business-labour-government partnership on a more formal footing through a National Labour Market Partner’s Council would go a long way towards optimally re-positioning Canada’s labour market programming for the 21st century.

[Translation]

That’s exactly what this bill does.

Employer and worker organizations have enthusiastically welcomed this bill.

[English]

The Honourable Perrin Beatty, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, stated that:

With the creation of an employment insurance advisory council, Senator Bellemare’s Bill S-244 will enshrine a true and meaningful tripartite approach between business, labour and government. This will ensure that the Employment Insurance program is sustainable, responsive, non-partisan, inclusive and relevant for current and future generation of Canadian employers and employees.

The president of the Canadian Labour Congress, Ms. Bea Bruske, declared that:

Bill S-244 will absolutely strengthen the voices of the social partners in the work of the tripartite EI commission. In turn, by inscribing social dialogue at the heart of the EI system, Senator Bellemare’s bill will improve the efficacy and responsiveness of labour market policy-making in Canada to the benefit of workers in our economy.

[Translation]

This bill was officially endorsed by these two major organizations, as well as all the other organizations that participated in the consultations. It’s up to the government to take it from here.

This bill is important because the employment insurance system is in need of an overhaul and the people who contribute to the system need to be involved in reforming it, not only as a matter of principle, but also to ensure it is equitable and effective.

Honourable colleagues, I would ask that you quickly support this bill at second reading so it can make its way to committee as soon as possible.

Thank you. Meegwetch.

Senator Ringuette: Let me start by congratulating you for introducing this bill, as well as on your speech.

I fully support the idea of having a socio-economic dialogue between the communities, the provinces and the federal government. In fact, I support dialogue between all our organizations.

However, I wonder if you could explain something about your proposal to create an advisory council. How will our remote regions, our Indigenous communities, our forestry workers, our agricultural workers and our fisheries workers have a voice? They have been affected, and are still being affected, by the changes to the EI system over the past 20 years. These changes have been made to the detriment of workers in these regions. How will they be included in the bill you’re proposing?

Senator Bellemare: Thank you for the question. I was anticipating it.

There was much discussion among all the groups. I had several Zoom meetings with the groups that helped me prepare this bill. The important thing was to find a way to reach the territories, First Nations populations, the remote regions, and so on. At first, we were looking for a way for the advisory council to be able to specifically include and connect with the Forum of Labour Market Ministers, while also including First Nations representatives. That was impossible for all sorts of legal reasons. The Forum of Labour Market Ministers has no legal status. What’s more, they’re not contributors. The group was concerned about ensuring that when we discuss Part 1, on contributions, it would be possible to invite groups from remote provinces or regions so that they could participate in the debate.

The federal tripartite council will be composed of a minimum of 12 members, including the two commissioners and five representatives from major associations. That’s the formula used by Quebec’s Commission des partenaires du marché du travail. It doesn’t include all the regions, but it is associated with regional councils and equity committees, so that’s a good starting point for responding to this major concern. Experience has shown that, from the outset, it’s essential to ensure that the tripartite issues of this large labour market system are considered.

This bill would give the council the power to invite whoever it wants to attend meetings. I think this will be what happens, since it’s important to bring the different parties together.

This is an advisory council, not a decision-making committee. The advisory council would have a mandate to provide advice and make recommendations to the commission regarding its assessment of programs and policies. The council could potentially also make assessments on its own initiative and present its findings to the minister and to Parliament.

This council will not manage employment insurance. We are not there yet. This is an advisory council that will support the two commissioners in carrying out their duties.

[English]

Hon. Ratna Omidvar: Thank you, Senator Martin, for being indefatigable in your defence of “lost Canadians.” I am the official critic of the bill, and I always thought of a critic as someone who is unfriendly or opposed to the bill, but this is certainly not the case. I am very friendly to the bill, as you well know.

When I became a senator in 2016, and because of my established interest in citizenship, I started to get a lot of emails about “lost Canadians.” I had never heard the term before, to be honest. I was, frankly, lost when I heard that terminology. For those of us who have found Canada, who know what a privilege it is to be a Canadian, to have inadvertently lost citizenship because of what I can only describe as bureaucratic fumbling and missteps is unimaginable.

When I rose subsequently — it was, I think, my first major speech in the Senate — as a sponsor for a major citizenship bill, I described citizenship as a home. I drew a picture of a house, a home, that has a strong door and a lot of windows to let the sun shine in, but also a very strong roof to keep the danger out. The foundation of this welcoming but safe home is grounded in a few essential principles.

The first and most important is equality among citizens. Equality sees all citizens — by birth or naturalization, mono-citizens or dual citizens, whether they’ve been citizens for 50 years or a month — treated equally under the law. Equal rights, equal responsibilities and, when necessary, equal punishments. These are not aspirational goals. These are the floor, the absolute foundation of how equality is expressed in Canada.

The second is the principle of facilitating citizenship or making it easier for people to get citizenship. I think of this, again, as the main floor of the house, a welcoming home with a big fire, blazing to keep out the wretched cold, and with a big welcoming door. However, “lost Canadians” have lost the warmth of this fire. In fact, they were kicked out of the home. Think of it as an eviction.

As we know, our immigration system and our citizenship laws are incredibly complex. Because of this complexity, they sometimes catch people in their net, and it is hard for people to get out and deal with this devastating yet unintended outcome. I will admit that this was not intended. This was accidental, but how often do we in this chamber deal with unintended but devastating outcomes of legislation that was passed either in the other house or here?

Senator Martin has already provided you with the background of how “lost Canadians” came to be lost. I am not going to repeat that. I will just tell you about how currently “lost Canadians” deal with becoming found. It is on a case-by-case basis. They have to make an application to the minister and to the ministry to get their citizenship back. I wonder about the equity of a case-by-case basis, when what we really need is a systemic solution. A case-by-case basis means that everybody who is lost needs to have the same kind of determination and agency as Byrdie Funk, who was a famous “lost Canadian.” She petitioned the court, she petitioned the minister and got her lost citizenship back, but again, it is taken case by case. Senator Martin’s proposal is a systemic fix.

Senator Dalphond last time asked a reasonable question: How many people does this impact? Not that many actually. Maybe a few hundred. Maybe 200. We don’t know, because maybe the “lost Canadians” don’t even know that they’re lost until they have to apply for a passport, and then they find out.

The consequences of losing your citizenship are also severe. While waiting to get your citizenship, you may not have a social security number that is valid. You may not be able to get a job. You may not be able to travel, and you may have limited access to health care — all this at a time when a potential deportation could be in the works. So this is very severe, even if it is for a few hundred people. I think we all understand that injustice to one person, a few people or even a hundred people is intolerable in our system.

I also want to point out that there are other lost Canadians, and I congratulate and commend Senator Martin for being focused and practical on dealing with those whom we can help most immediately. Legislation is never the art of perfection. I believe it is the art of what is possible. This legislation is in our reach. Colleagues, I urge you to support it. Thank you.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?