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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Apr/15/24 11:19:07 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I highlighted just how many people have security clearance in the country already. Over the last eight years, it is almost a quarter of a million people. The government ministers themselves, and likely some of the parliamentary secretaries, have the privilege of access to a lot of classified, sensitive information. NSICOP gets access to things, although it is prevented from accessing ongoing current investigations. Again, ultimately, just because someone has it, and this gets to my point, it does not meant he government has to give it. When a committee, such as foreign affairs or public safety, makes the case for why it needs access, and it secures it, that is the will of Parliament. I have given a couple of examples, of the Afghan detainee files and the Winnipeg lab files, that show that it does not mean that the access is going to get there, but part of the reason, in both of those cases, that the government came up with an ad hoc process was that it said members of those committees did not have appropriate classification. The bill before us would help address that, but ultimately it is on the individuals to protect the information if it could compromise security for individuals in this country.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Ms. Heather McPherson (Edmonton Strathcona, NDP)

Apr/15/24 11:20:24 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I think the bill has some very interesting portions to it. It was interesting to listen to the member speak today. I have received security clearance because of some of the work I have done with my other colleagues on the Winnipeg lab documents, and I recognize his perspective that the bill would increase transparency. I think it is very important to have that there. I also recognize that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act is supposed to have a statutory review every five years, and we are two years overdue on that. The question I have for the member is this: Has he looked at what other countries around the world do? We know that the U.S. has much more oversight, but I am wondering whether he has looked at other G7 countries, other allies, and how they deal with this issue.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Mr. Alex Ruff

Apr/15/24 11:21:08 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I have looked at some of them, but not specifically on this process, because for a lot of them it is actually a lot simpler to get a security clearance or access to information. In general, the U.K. has a much broader system to allow it. I am not proposing we adopt a U.S. system of congressional or senatorial oversight; I am just suggesting the first step in a process that would just allow us to apply. As I have mentioned, my bill would not guarantee that a member or a senator would actually get the clearance, and it would not guarantee they would get access. All it is saying is that the government of the day, regardless of political party, would not be able to deny somebody's applying to get a security clearance.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Mr. Alex Ruff

Apr/15/24 11:22:36 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, my whole point is to increase the level of education and, I would argue, parliamentary oversight. I talked at length about accountability and transparency. Ultimately, all of us in this place were elected to represent Canadians. There is a huge demand, and I am sure the member has heard from some of his constituents, asking why they cannot know about certain things. In reality, there are legitimate reasons why we need to protect information. I am just saying that here is a way, through a proper process, that Parliament could actually get to know the information, hold the government to account and provide greater transparency as we continue to improve national security and intelligence in this country.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Mr. René Villemure (Trois-Rivières, BQ)

Apr/15/24 11:32:52 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-377

Madam Speaker, the Conservative member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound is proposing that we examine Bill C-377. It is an important bill that requires serious consideration. The bill summary states the following, and I quote: This enactment amends the Parliament of Canada Act to specify that a member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information.... The whole issue of confidentiality is rather vague in the bill. Like my kind neighbour from Barrie—Innisfil, this morning, I received an email because I am a member of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The committee had asked Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada for some information about TikTok because we are doing a study on that app. This morning, we got an email saying that it is none of our business. Come on. The question that has to be asked is whether parliamentarians, who have the privilege of obtaining information, should be able to get it. The answer is yes. Now, let us look at how that should be done, what the guidelines are and what could be done. What are we talking about here? If we want to define privacy, we are talking about a secret. What is a secret? A secret is what is not said. It is as simple as that. However, that includes things that we do not wish to say, things we cannot say and things we must not say. It can be a bit tricky. Everyone agrees that the government must be accountable. However, it cannot be the sole judge of what it is to be accountable for. The member who spoke earlier cited the example of the special committee that studied the documents concerning the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg. I was part of this committee. It was a good initiative, but, quite frankly, we had to twist the government’s arm for nearly two years before this came about. Yes, it was a good choice, but there were many bumps in the road. The member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound wants to promote a bill aiming to rectify certain situations and to ask Parliament to act wisely when it comes to accountability. The topic of secrets is by no means new. According to Voltaire, “To say the secret of another is a betrayal, to say yours is a stupidity”. The current government seems to be taking a page from Voltaire. What is a secret? For the purposes of our discussion, it is the redacted portion. The French term for redaction, “caviardage”, dates back to the time of Nicholas I in Russia. At the time, it meant to conceal or remove. I am going to stay with the idea of conceal. To redact something is to conceal it. Over the years that I worked in the ethics field and the months that I spent on the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, I came to realize that redaction is one thing, but preventive redaction is another. Preventive redaction is when something is excessively redacted just in case. That is problematic. According to an article that appeared in the spring 2022 edition of Foreign Affairs entitled “Keeping the Wrong Secrets”, the preference is to conceal more so as not to conceal too little. The article goes on to say that information that is kept secret often should not be. Certain information is treated like the Crown jewels, but at the same time we fail to even protect private data. This is all frustrating. The example cited in the article, which was positively ridiculous, had to do with a Christmas card that someone had redacted. Frankly, this makes no sense. The sheer number of “overredacted” documents is huge. At the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, historians have come to tell us they cannot learn anything about the Second World War because the information is classified “Top Secret.” There are things that will always remain secret, but I cannot believe that the entire body of government decisions concerning the Second World War must be off limits. When documents are needlessly redacted, we cannot attain wisdom, we cannot do as our good friend Socrates suggested, which is “know thyself”. If we do not know our own history, we cannot know ourselves as a population, as a people. There are things that must be kept secret, but for how long, for what purpose and from whom? These questions must be asked as part of the debate sparked by Bill C-377. That said, I understand that certain things, of an intimate, sacred, delicate or dangerous nature, must be kept secret forever. These are things we have always sought to keep secret. However, the bill does not deal with the intimate, sacred, delicate or dangerous. It deals with classified information. We know from experience that there is a confidential level, a secret level and a top secret level. There is also a “for Canadian eyes only” level for certain documents. We can see that classified documents are often classified at too high a level. This prevents people who should know from being able to know. Of course, many pieces of information marked “Top Secret” come from a foreign source, such as a member of the Group of Five, and making the information public could well harm that member. We have to be careful and use judgment. It takes judgment, but the Winnipeg report basically consisted of 600 redacted pages, pages that were redacted by the ad hoc committee. When we see 600 pages redacted under the pretext of national security and in the end there are only 13 or 14 pages left, then no wonder we have questions about the “overredacting” at issue, the “overclassification” or the excessive secrecy, if you will. Unfortunately, keeping too many secrets leads to mistrust. Not keeping enough secrets, of course, is unworkable. Too many secrets breed mistrust, and, in today's world, with its echo chambers and the conditioning created by some social media, this leads to defiance. We saw some of that defiance in the streets last winter in front of Parliament, but that is not the only form of defiance. Let me come back to Bill C‑377, a bill to provide access to documents under two conditions. First, individuals must pass a personnel security screening process. That makes sense. Second, they must need access to the information for the purposes of their work. Of course, it is easier to define the scope and parameters of that work for public officials than it is for parliamentarians. In the case of a parliamentarian, it may be more complicated, but it can still be done. As I said earlier, the government is accountable to Parliament for all of its activities. It should not have the right to decide on its own what needs to be kept secret from the get-go. That is a first recommendation. Bill C‑377 takes this into account by proposing subsection 13.1(1), as follows: A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information.... The proposal is good, but let us just say that it seems an automatic approach that could go awry at times. Bill C-377 considers parliamentary privileges. It is a step forward, but it could be dangerous. One thing I do like about this bill is that the government will not be the sole judge of its own secrets. That is a very good thing. However, it does not mean that information should be handed over lock, stock, and barrel simply upon request. That could be dangerous. My colleague spoke earlier of the Winnipeg lab. I sat on the ad hoc committee that studied that issue, which was made up of parliamentarians from four parties. I will say again that the committee was struck as a result of a wild discussion. Nevertheless, we four parliamentarians were able to issue an opinion on the redaction in question and that opinion was submitted to three judges for arbitration. To my great surprise, their verdict was identical to that of the committee members. The document was released “unredacted”. There was no national security issue concerning that document. There was certainly some embarrassment, along with some shame and discomfort, but no national security issue. As La Rochefoucauld, another soul I greatly admire, said, everyone agrees that a secret must be inviolable, but we do not always agree on the nature and importance of the secret, and we consult only ourselves on what we should reveal or withhold. That is the dilemma here. The problem is that the government itself decides what should be kept secret. As a second recommendation, I propose that steps be taken to put an end to overclassification and preventive redaction. Redaction keeps us from knowing who we are and what happened, and it exacts a great cost in terms of maintaining the secrets in question. With Bill C‑377, we have an opportunity to initiate a discussion on the very concept of secrecy. That kind of reflection is healthy for democracy. It can only make parliamentarians more confident, while boosting Canadians' confidence in parliamentarians and government, which admittedly could really use it. Let us begin this reflection.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Mr. Michael Cooper (St. Albert—Edmonton, CPC)

Apr/15/24 11:41:36 a.m.
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Re: Bill C-377

Madam Speaker, I rise to speak in support of Bill C-377, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, which was introduced by my colleague, the hon. member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound. This legislation would amend the Parliament of Canada Act to specify that when a member of Parliament or a senator requests a secret security clearance, that the member would be treated as being deemed to need to know the information for which the security clearance is sought. This is important because, as it presently stands, it is highly unlikely that any individual member of Parliament or a senator would receive a security clearance. Unless a member or a senator already has a security clearance as a result of their profession prior to being elected or appointed, or has served as a member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, the chances of a member of Parliament or a senator successfully obtaining a security clearance are almost zero. That is because security clearances are issued on a need-to-know basis. Essentially, the policy of the Government of Canada is that members of Parliament and senators do not need to know. That may come as a surprise to Canadians. I would submit that it is problematic, which I will get into momentarily, but that is the policy. This bill would change that; it would amend the Parliament of Canada Act such that, for the purposes of processing security clearance applications, members of Parliament and senators are deemed to know. In short, it provides a presumption that when a member of Parliament or a senator applies, they be granted a secret security clearance. That is what Bill C-377 would do. That is all Bill C-377 would do. It is important to note what this bill would not do. It would not guarantee that a member or a senator would be granted a security clearance. They would have to be vetted, just as any Canadian who applies for a security clearance must be vetted. If they are deemed untrustworthy, or if there are security issues or other red flags associated with the member or the senator, pursuant to the security clearance review process, they would be turned down. They would not obtain a security clearance. This bill would not change that. Moreover, this bill is targeted insofar as it applies specifically to secret security clearances, and I emphasize “secret” security clearances. It does not apply to, and will not create, a presumption of issuing a top secret security clearance to members of Parliament and to senators. Further, it is important to note that just because someone has a security clearance, it does not mean they have the unfettered ability to obtain whatever information they want. Obtaining a security clearance merely gets one's foot in the door. I would further note that this bill would importantly establish a certain level of uniformity with respect to how applications for security clearances involving members of Parliament and senators are dealt with because, at present, the process has been one that is ad hoc in nature. Members of NSICOP have security clearances, quite appropriately so. However, if members of NSICOP have security clearances, would it not also make sense for members who serve on committees such as the national defence committee, the foreign affairs committee and the public safety committee to also have security clearances, provided they are properly vetted? The government has established, for instance, a special committee to review the classified Winnipeg lab documents. Members on that committee were granted security clearances. Similarly, with respect to reviewing the Afghan detainee documents, the Harper government established a special committee in which members again had security clearances. Therefore, there is no consistency and no uniformity, with the granting of such clearances being done on an ad hoc basis. I would submit that this is not desirable and can be improved; this bill would improve it by providing greater certainty and transparency around the application process. As I noted at the beginning of my speech, I find it problematic that, as a general rule, members of Parliament and senators are unable to access security clearances. After all, Parliament deals with matters of national security and intelligence, which fall within its purview. It is the responsibility of Parliament to hold the government accountable and to provide meaningful oversight on these matters. It follows that not having a security clearance and, therefore, not having the ability to access what may be pertinent information around national security and intelligence matters impedes the ability of members of Parliament and senators to do their jobs, to hold the government to account and to provide proper oversight and accountability. In addition, there is value in members having security clearances, insofar as this enables them to better understand national security and intelligence matters. It creates a culture of greater awareness and enables a member to, in certain areas, perhaps fill in the blanks and have a better context with respect to national security and intelligence issues that they might be dealing with as, for example, a member of a parliamentary committee or a shadow minister. In that regard, I cite the ruling of Speaker Milliken in April 2010 concerning the Afghan detainee documents. Speaker Milliken said the following: “In a system of responsible government, the fundamental right of the House of Commons to hold the government to account for its actions is an indisputable privilege and in fact an obligation.” He quoted, “The right of Parliament to obtain every possible information on public questions is undoubted, and the circumstances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the houses.” With respect to members of Parliament and senators being trusted with sensitive information, Speaker Milliken said: The insinuation that members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities. I concur wholeheartedly with Speaker Milliken. This bill is an important step in the right direction to enhance transparency and accountability around national security and intelligence matters, as well as from the standpoint of better empowering members of Parliament and senators to fulfill their oversight responsibilities.

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Context: House Hansard - 299 - Apr/15/24

Mr. Maxime Blanchette-Joncas (Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, BQ)

Apr/15/24 5:48:33 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, it is not easy for Canada to have any credibility on the international stage when it comes to security. A major player in the government told us that “Canada is back”, but it is definitely not. Canada was eyeing a seat on the United Nations Security Council, but it lost the bid. When it comes to security, Canada has had problems, especially with the Winnipeg lab, a maximum-security facility. When it comes to security, this report talks about recognizing a terrorist group and putting it on the list of terrorist entities, a targeted list, so that the group is identified by the government and its security agencies. I would like my colleague to talk about sanctions. The government, along with other G7 countries, seems inclined to impose sanctions on the Iranian regime and the current Iranian government. The government is already having difficulty targeting, analyzing and monitoring the sanctions against Russia. I cannot see how it will manage to do the same for Iran. I would like my colleague to enlighten me and to explain in practical terms how his government is trying to resolve the situation and act in an effective, meaningful way.

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