Hon. Percy E. Downe: Honourable senators, we have before us today Bill C-13, the first major change to the Official Languages Act since 1988, and it reflects a series of recommendations to update the legislation. The Official Languages Act was originally introduced in 1968 and passed in 1969 — almost 55 years ago — and 54 years ago, this was groundbreaking and important legislation that has served our country well over the years. Colleagues, times have changed, and the bill before us today is a missed opportunity to include Indigenous languages in our Official Languages Act.

The Official Languages Act of 54 years ago was the right thing to do in 1969, and now, in 2023, we have the opportunity to also do the right thing and give Indigenous languages equal status and the same legal protection as our two official founding languages.

Colleagues, we have to step back and ask ourselves if the policy of our two founding languages — French and English — is a carryover from our colonial past. Prior to francophones or anglophones arriving in this part of North America, there were many Indigenous languages already spoken here. Those are the true founding languages of the land on which we now live.

Colleagues, is it not better to reflect on the true history of Canada and recognize that we may have many Indigenous languages as founding languages? Can the Senate play a major role and also seize this historic opportunity to send Bill C-13 back to the House of Commons and tell them to do better, tell them to include protection of Indigenous languages in this bill and tell them to provide the same legally enforced protection to Indigenous languages that we provide to English and French in this country? Colleagues, let us embrace the new Canada. Let us embrace the future rather than resisting change and fighting for the status quo.

The beginnings of Bill C-13 that is before us lay in the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which provided the push for the legislation which followed. Speaking in support of the Official Languages Act in the House of Commons in 1968, then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau said:

In all parts of the country, within both language groups, there are those who call for uniformity. It will be simpler and cheaper, they argue. In the case of the French minority, isolation is prescribed as necessary for survival. We must never underestimate the strength or the durability of these appeals to profound human emotions.

Surely these arguments are based on fear, on a narrow view of human nature, on a defeatist appraisal of our capacity to adapt our society and its institutions to the demands of its citizens. Those who argue for separation, in whatever form, are prisoners of past injustice, blind to the possibilities of the future.

We have rejected this view of our country. . . .

That is what then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau concluded. These powerful words from 1968 would also apply to Canada today when we discuss Indigenous languages. But they were spoken over half a century ago, before there was a more complete understanding of the Indigenous culture of Canada.

But make no mistake: As early as 1963, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was explicit about the importance of language to culture, stating:

Language is also the key to cultural development. Language and culture are not synonymous, but the vitality of the language is a necessary condition for the complete preservation of a culture.

That same argument can — given our heightened awareness of Indigenous culture and history — be extended today to Indigenous languages.

More recently, in its June 2015 final report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission called upon the federal government to “. . . acknowledge that Aboriginal rights include Aboriginal language rights.”

Colleagues, today the governments of Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and British Columbia are the only areas in Canada that have passed legislation aimed at protecting and promoting Indigenous languages. When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported, the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau committed itself to implementing all its recommendations. In addition, Canada supports the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in which culture and language rights are central to 17 of the declaration’s 46 articles and its protection and promotion of Indigenous culture.

For example, Article 13 of the UN Declaration states that:

Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.

Article 8 specifically mentions that:

Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or the destruction of their culture.

To that end, and in response to the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-91, An Act respecting Indigenous Languages, which received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019.

Unfortunately, the Indigenous Languages Act, unlike the Official Languages Act, does not provide legal protections for Indigenous languages in the same way that the Official Languages Act protects both official languages. The Indigenous Languages Act promotes Indigenous languages through positive measures, but the Commissioner of Indigenous Languages does not have the same enforcement powers as the Commissioner of Official Languages, powers which are being strengthened in Bill C-13 before us. More importantly, those who believe their Indigenous language rights are being violated have no recourse to courts for those perceived violations under the act, unlike Part X of the Official Languages Act, which allows for complaints to be remedied by a federal court.

Why are there no similar court remedies in Bill C-91, the Indigenous Languages Act? Colleagues, it is an act of good intentions, an act of reassuring words and a paternalistic pat on the head, but no enforcement.

In the past, the Senate has shown leadership on language issues. Bill S-3 was introduced in 2005 by the late senator Jean‑Robert Gauthier, and was intended to give some teeth to the Official Languages Act by stressing the binding nature of the commitment set out in Part VII of the act. Second, it imposed obligations on federal institutions regarding the implementation of this commitment.

Third, the bill included a remedial power that allows the courts to monitor the implementation of the act by governments. This bill was passed by both houses of Parliament and received Royal Assent in November 2005.

Colleagues, we owe it to the Indigenous community to embrace the new Canada we are building together. The old Canada thinking in this bill is partly the result of the distorted history we all studied when we were in school and the massive gaps in our knowledge of the Indigenous community, their customs and their society.

This absence of knowledge in Canadian society about our Indigenous history is slowly ending, and this bill should give legal protection to Indigenous language rights, thereby moving past the outdated view of only two official languages.

Once again, colleagues, the Senate, if it has the will — as it has done in the past — can improve language legislation and change the status quo.

(On motion of Senator Martin, debate adjourned.)

[Translation]

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, when shall this bill be read the second time?

(On motion of Senator Gold, bill placed on the Orders of the Day for second reading two days hence.)

[English]

Hon. Yonah Martin (Deputy Leader of the Opposition): I move that this bill be adjourned in my name for the balance of my time.

(On motion of Senator Martin, debate adjourned.)

[Translation]

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator McCallum, seconded by the Honourable Senator Boisvenu, for the second reading of Bill C-226, An Act respecting the development of a national strategy to assess, prevent and address environmental racism and to advance environmental justice.

The Hon. the Speaker informed the Senate that a message had been received from the House of Commons with Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms).

(Bill read first time.)

Hon. Marilou McPhedran: Honourable senators, hello, bonjour, tansi.

As a senator for Manitoba, I acknowledge that I live on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Cree, Oji‑Cree, Dakota and Dene peoples, and the homeland of the Métis Nation.

I acknowledge that the Parliament of Canada is situated on unceded and unsurrendered Algonquin Anishinaabe territory.

[English]

I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-226, introduced in the other place by Member of Parliament Elizabeth May, Co-leader of the Green Party of Canada, and sponsored here by my esteemed Manitoba colleague Senator M.J. McCallum.

Honourable senators, it is heartening to note that this is one of the rare private member’s bills that received government support, as you heard when Senator Gold spoke in favour earlier this week.

It is my hope that I can best voice my support for this bill — which asks the Minister of Environment and Climate Change to develop a national strategy to counter environmental racism — by noting the ways in which passage of this bill will bring Canada more into alignment with existing international obligations including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Let us recall that apologies have been issued by Canada to Indigenous peoples, and now we must see actions to match. Bill C-226 could well galvanize such actions.

Having reviewed other contributions to this debate, the international context has certainly been mentioned, but I hope it will be helpful if I add some more detail to this aspect of why Bill C-226 is so deserving of our support.

Allow me to begin to observe why alignment with and implementation of our international human rights obligations is important and relevant to this bill on countering environmental racism.

To quote the Institute for Research on Public Policy just yesterday:

While Canada has long had a stellar reputation internationally for protecting human rights, our domestic track record is more dismal than that reputation would suggest. Time and again, decision-makers have failed to implement United Nations human rights treaties and recommendations at home on issues including the rights of Indigenous peoples, racism, gender equality, refugees and migrants, disability, housing, law enforcement and corporate accountability.

At the core of Canada ratifying any international rights treaty is our constitutionally entrenched commitment to equality rights, as well as the practical outcome that people in Canada can not only know and claim their rights, but — through implementation — they can also live their rights.

In the international context, Canada has recognized various human rights implicated by hazardous substances and wastes through its ratification or accession of seven United Nations human rights treaties. Under these treaties, Canada has specific obligations. These obligations, assumed voluntarily by Canada in signing and ratifying such treaties, clearly set out commitments to protect, respect and fulfill universal human rights, including the right to life and dignity; health; security of the person and bodily integrity; safe food and water; adequate housing; and safe and healthy working conditions.

Canada has specific obligations regarding the human rights of all people in Canada — all underpinned by protection from discrimination. These rights and obligations combine to create a duty for Canada to counter environmental racism.

In Bill C-226, we see a practical, measured way for Canada to take some big steps forward in bringing Canada more into alignment with existing international human rights obligations.

With the bill’s short title, national strategy respecting environmental racism and environmental justice act, it is set out in this bill that the national strategy must include measures to examine the link between race, socio-economic status and environmental risk; collect information and statistics relating to the location of environmental hazards; collect information and statistics relating to negative health outcomes in communities that have been affected by environmental racism; and assess the administration and enforcement of environmental laws in each province. It must also include measures to address environmental racism in relation to possible amendments to federal laws, policies and programs; the involvement of community groups in environmental policy-making; compensation for individuals or communities; ongoing funding for affected communities; and the access of affected communities to clean air and water.

In his 2020 report on Canada, the UN Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes — after visiting a number of racialized communities, and meeting with government representatives in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec — noted:

Canada has obligations regarding the rights to information, participation, access to justice and remedies, and specific obligations regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples, children, different genders, workers, minorities, migrants, and persons with disabilities, among other vulnerable groups . . . .

Together, these rights and obligations create a duty for Canada to prevent exposure to toxic and otherwise hazardous substances. The only way to protect against violations of the above human rights is to prevent exposure. . . . However, businesses have critical responsibilities to prevent exposure as well.

To respect my time boundaries today, I’ll limit references to former UN special rapporteur Baskut Tuncak in his report on Canada, but I do want to note that he acknowledged that Canada has ratified all international chemicals and wastes treaties, and is in the process of moving toward adhering to the Basel Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention, which Canada adopted in 1992, with the primary objective of protecting human health and environments from the adverse effects of waste. If Canada respects and implements the Basel Ban Amendment, hazardous waste can no longer be exported to other countries from Canada.

The UN special rapporteur also noted numerous concerns; for example, he noted the “jurisdictional quagmire” faced by Indigenous peoples — where reserves often fall between the cracks of federal and provincial jurisdiction, posing a risk for unregulated exposures. For example, throughout Canada, provincial drinking water quality standards are not applicable on reserves, and federal standards are not legally binding, as they have yet to be set. As stated by the UN special rapporteur, “Jurisdictional separation is not an excuse for shortcomings by the Government in taking prompt action to address toxic exposures.”

He also noted:

. . . marginalized groups, and Indigenous peoples in particular, find themselves on the wrong side of a toxic divide, subject to conditions that would not be acceptable elsewhere in Canada.

Honourable colleagues, environmental racism has two main components: distributive spatial injustice and procedural injustice. The first is concerned primarily with the inequitable location of industrial polluters and other environmentally hazardous projects, and the second focuses on institutional mechanisms and policies that perpetuate inequitable distribution of those activities.

Close to home for me, year after year, Indigenous leaders in Manitoba present well-documented actions of Manitoba Hydro that — as they have noted — show how these two components of injustice operate in systemic ways to the detriment and, far too often, the destruction of First Nations communities.

According to Wa Ni Ska Tan, an alliance of Manitoba First Nations:

Manitoba Hydro has profited for over a hundred years at the expense of its First Nation partners. It pushes for the development of devastating hydroelectric mega projects to make millions of dollars exporting power to the United States, and Indigenous communities pay the price a thousand times over. New partnerships . . . are more of the same, with communities being saddled with millions of dollars in debt — on top of cultural and environmental costs — for a generating station that provides little or no economic benefit.

Colleagues, there is a cruel irony in the fact that many First Nations families report high electricity bills — often upward of $500 per month. This seems particularly unfair, as the power is generated from their now-destroyed ancestral lands.

In short, in Manitoba, Indigenous traditional livelihoods and ways of being are often undermined or destroyed by environmental racism. For example, Senator McCallum has spoken here about the negative impact of “man camps” — how the influx of external workers for hydroelectric developments can lead to increased sexual exploitation, substance abuse and social disruption, exacerbated by incidents marked by racism and sexism that have led to violence and loss.

In concluding his report on Canada, the UN special rapporteur made a number of recommendations that are addressed positively in Bill C-226. I will note one that relates directly to the adoption of this bill: “Establish a sound environmental justice framework based on the principles of procedural justice, geographic justice, and social justice . . . .”

Colleagues, given the importance of the issues discussed, and being conscious of how time will become more limited for non‑government bills as we navigate the precious — and pressured — final weeks before we rise in June, I now invite your active support for this bill. Let’s send it to committee for continued study as soon as we possibly can.

Thank you. Meegwetch.

(On motion of Senator Martin, debate adjourned.)

[Translation]

The Senate proceeded to consideration of the eighth report of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, entitled Amendments to the Senate Administrative Rules, presented in the Senate on May 16, 2023.

Hon. Patti LaBoucane-Benson (Legislative Deputy to the Government Representative in the Senate), pursuant to notice of May 17, 2023, moved:

That, when the Senate next adjourns after the adoption of this motion, it do stand adjourned until Tuesday, May 30, 2023, at 2 p.m.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, when shall this bill be read the second time?

(On motion of Senator Gold, bill placed on the Orders of the Day for second reading two days hence.)

[English]

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore: Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

Hon. Peter M. Boehm moved:

That the tenth report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, entitled Strengthening Canada’s Autonomous Sanctions Architecture: Five-Year Legislative Review of the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act, tabled in the Senate on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, be adopted and that, pursuant to rule 12-24(1), the Senate request a complete and detailed response from the government, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs being identified as the minister responsible for responding to the report, in consultation with the Minister of Public Safety.

He said: Honourable senators, I rise today to speak to the tenth report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, entitled Strengthening Canada’s Autonomous Sanctions Architecture: Five-Year Legislative Review of the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act.

This comprehensive report is the culmination of eight meetings between October 26, 2022, and February 15 of this year. Over the course of the committee’s study, it heard from 26 expert witnesses, including officials from Global Affairs Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, legal and banking experts, renowned academics, sanctions advocates and members of civil society. I will highlight three particularly high-profile witnesses from whom the committee was honoured to hear.

Bill Browder is an author and head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign. His lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, was, of course, the inspiration for Canada’s Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, also known as the Sergei Magnitsky Law.

Evgenia Kara-Murza is Advocacy Coordinator of the Free Russia Foundation. Her husband, Russian political activist and opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza, is imprisoned in Russia on charges of treason, partly for speaking out against the war in Ukraine. Like her husband, Ms. Kara-Murza is an unwavering and courageous long-time advocate for introducing Magnitsky laws around the world and targeting Russia in particular with Magnitsky-style sanctions.

Finally, we heard from our dear former Senate colleague and my predecessor as chair of the committee, the Honourable Raynell Andreychuk. It was former Senator Andreychuk who spearheaded Canada’s Sergei Magnitsky Law by sponsoring then Bill S-226, which received Royal Assent on October 18, 2017.

Senator Andreychuk’s bill and the date it became law provided the impetus for the committee’s study. The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act prescribes a report and review requirement under section 16. Section 16(1) states:

Within five years after the day on which this section comes into force, a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this Act and of the Special Economic Measures Act must be undertaken by the committees of the Senate and of the House of Commons that are designated or established by each House for that purpose.

This is the procedural answer to why the committee undertook this study and when, but it was not thrust upon us either. The committee actively sought authorization from the Senate to conduct this study, which was granted on October 17 of last year. In my completely unbiased opinion, the Senate Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee was best placed between the two houses of Parliament to take this on, given both the Senate’s strong reputation for committee work and the Senate’s less partisan nature.

Section 16(2) states:

The committees referred to in subsection (1) must, within a year after a review is undertaken under that subsection or within any further time that may be authorized by the Senate or the House of Commons, as the case may be, submit a report on the review to Parliament, including a statement of any changes that the committees recommend.

Well in advance of the one-year mark, that is what the committee has done, colleagues, and I’m expanding on that a little bit today.

Part of the reason I as chair was so keen on the committee undertaking the first comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of the Sergei Magnitsky Law and of the Special Economic Measures Act, or SEMA, was because, as we all know, sanctions have been one of the most used diplomatic tools and one of the most debated issues of the past 15 months since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Also, these legislative instruments have become increasingly important in the government’s tool kit, particularly as the United Nations Act is used less frequently given the gridlock at the United Nations Security Council on sanctions issues — and so many others. In other words, colleagues, both procedurally and topically, this was the right time for this study.

As the report states, over the course of the study, witnesses highlighted various improvements made to the sanctions regime over the past five years, including the creation of the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. However, witnesses also said that the Government of Canada must improve how it communicates information on autonomous sanctions to the public and called on the government to develop clear guidance on the interpretation of sanctions regulations.

After hearing from the 26 expert witnesses, the committee concluded that Canada must outline the goals it wishes to achieve through the imposition of sanctions and must analyze the results regularly.

It was clear in our deliberations that the committee believes in the usefulness of the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act. However, as is outlined in the report, the committee is making 19 recommendations to improve the coherence and operation of Canada’s sanctions regime. I wish to highlight a few of the more consequential recommendations.

Recommendation 19 calls on the government to:

. . . amend the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) to require that new regulations made under either Act include a sunset clause that would prescribe a date for the termination of the sanctions regime unless renewed prior to the expiry of the term.

As the committee heard, there is a fair bit of precedent in the use of sunset clauses and sanctions laws around the world, including by the European Union and the United Nations.

Dr. Meredith Lilly, a professor at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, summarized the need for sunset clauses during the committee’s meeting on November 2, 2022. Dr. Lilly said these measures could “. . . ensure that outdated and unnecessary sanctions are removed, and it can also decrease the politicization of the sanctions.” She further argued that automatic sunsetting clauses:

. . . force a discipline on the public service to continuously monitor and stay abreast of the developments to inform any renewal decisions.

Basically, the committee is advocating for sunset clauses to amendments to Canada’s sanctions regimes to ensure that the laws always serve their intended purposes and are, without politicization, consistently reviewed by well-informed policy‑makers.

In recommendation 18, the committee recommends that committees of the Senate and the House of Commons conduct a comprehensive review of the two acts every 10 years to ensure that Canada’s autonomous sanctions regimes remain fit for purpose. This recommendation is deliberately non-prescriptive to give the government of the day flexibility in determining how to amend the Sergei Magnitsky Law in this regard.

What this could look like, in my opinion, is that to ensure ongoing review, the designated committees in the Senate and the House of Commons could alternate five-year periods so that, in effect, the Sergei Magnitsky Law and SEMA would each be reviewed every five years, and by each committee every ten years.

For example, the Senate Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee reviewed the laws in 2023; the House committee could do so in 2028; then it would be back to the Senate in 2033, et cetera.

Other fundamental recommendations include those on communication; interdepartmental cooperation; administration and enforcement; collaboration with allies, civil society and the academic and research communities; and delisting.

With regard to interdepartmental cooperation, the committee noted the establishment of a sanctions bureau at Global Affairs Canada and the need to ensure that officials engaged in sanctions work — especially in the RCMP, CBSA, FINTRAC, CSIS and CSE — are well versed. Increased cooperation among domestic departments and agencies also requires closer collaboration with similar units in jurisdictions with which Canada is allied.

On communication, I was struck by the extent to which a more effective sanctions regime comes down to better communication with the public regarding the effects and implementation of autonomous sanctions. That is why recommendation 10 calls on the government to:

. . . provide more detailed identifying information on sanctioned individuals and entities in the regulations made pursuant to the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law).

The committee further recommends:

The government should also include detailed identifying information in the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List, along with the justifications for listing individuals and entities.

Colleagues, I will not recite every recommendation. I simply wished to highlight a few that I feel are particularly important.

I encourage those of you who are interested to read the report, as it is, I think, an exceptional piece of work, of which I am proud as chair, on a subject that is both crucial and timely, especially given the significant increase in the use, by Canada and our allies, of autonomous sanctions since Russia invaded Ukraine.

I wish to thank committee members and other colleagues who participated in these meetings, the staff — in particular, the committee analysts who drafted the report — and the expert witnesses, without whose time and commentary this study would not have happened and this report would not exist.

Colleagues, there may be other senators who wish to speak on this report. I very much look forward to more debate on this important topic. It is my hope that this motion, and thus the report, will be adopted very soon — as in very, very soon — so that we can maintain momentum and start the clock on the 150 days the government will have to provide a full and detailed response. Thank you very much.

Hon. Lucie Moncion moved the adoption of the report.

She said: Honourable senators, this report contains a recommendation of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration to amend a section of the Senate Administrative Rules.

The provision in question, section 11 of Chapter 3:03, currently states that the consent of the Internal Economy steering committee is required for any commercial use of the Senate’s intellectual property, except by way of fair dealing, an exception set out in the Copyright Act.

The committee recommends that this provision be amended such that the steering committee’s consent is no longer required when the commercial use is insignificant in nature or when a statutory exception other than fair dealing applies.

[English]

The Senate of Canada creates and owns a variety of intellectual property, from the recordings of debates in the chamber or in committee to the material we make available on our website to communicate our work to Canadians. Per the Senate Administrative Rules, requests from members of the public to use this intellectual property are addressed by the Administration, specifically by the Communications Directorate, with the support of the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel. As is currently required by the section at issue in this report, whenever a request has a commercial element to it, no matter how incidental, insignificant or improbable, the Administration will bring it to the steering committee for direction.

By adopting this report, the Senate will simplify the process by which requests from the public are addressed, as it will reduce the number of requests that must be considered by the steering committee while preserving its role in approving or rejecting significant commercial uses of intellectual property.

I would add here that the Administration will provide quarterly reports on the requests it receives and how they have been handled.

Finally, this report will also add reference to statutory exceptions to intellectual property generally and confirm the Administration’s current practice, which is to comply with Canadian law and any exceptions that might apply.

Thank you. With this, if there are no questions or debate, I move the adoption of the report.

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: Honourable senators, given Senator Boehm’s admonition, I’ve decided to speak now rather than next week. As a result, my comments may be less organized than I would like them to be.

I have no disagreement with the chair’s summary and I want to thank him, Deputy Chair Senator Harder and all my colleagues for the excellent work that we did on this report.

Colleagues, the report was very much about the machinery and mechanics of our sanctions regime and how we could make it better. It included questions of administration, clarity of sanctions tools, coordination with allies, reporting, as well as consideration of unintended consequences.

We spent much less time, though, on the question of efficacy, which is to say, “Do sanctions work?” On this, the closest that we came to a conclusion is, “It’s difficult to say.” That is in the official press statement.

When it comes to the traditional criteria for measuring the success of sanctions — i.e., change of behaviour or deterrence of such bad behaviour in the future — I did not hear a single witness say unequivocally that sanctions have been successful. On the other hand, we did hear that sanctions may be considered successful based on a number of other criteria that are non‑traditional. These include the desire to punish, the need to show solidarity with allies and the need to appeal to public sentiment.

Unfortunately, these other criteria are not the ones that we officially cite as reasons to have sanctions in the first place. Perhaps these new criteria are, in fact, the reasons for Canada to have sanctions — but if that is the case, let’s be honest in saying so.

The reason I raise this issue is because, of late, we have become the world champions in autonomous sanctions and perhaps have forgotten, as Senator Boehm has rightly pointed out, that sanctions are one among a number of diplomatic tools that we have to address difficult international problems and, indeed, that sanctions may not even be the best tool for a particular problem.

You know the old saying about the tendency to use the tool you have in front of you to deal with a problem. If you have a sledgehammer, that is what you will use; however, it’s not clear that a sledgehammer is the best tool, indeed.

Ultimately, sanctions are a form of economic coercion, and we take great umbrage, of course, when economic coercion is directed at us.

The proliferation of the use of sanctions, the widespread use of sanctions, the increasing tendency and preference to use sanctions, the finessing and the extension of different types of sanctions, while possibly necessary, is ultimately a statement on the failure of diplomacy. I’m not sure this is a gold medal situation.

This is a real concern because we’re actually going around the world talking about how we are the world champion in autonomous sanctions. When we say this, I don’t know which of the new criteria we’re using to give ourselves this award. Is it that we get a gold medal because of our solidarity with allies in imposing sanctions? Is it that we get a gold medal because we are the best at punishing people? Is it that we get a gold medal because we are the best at the political appeal of sanctions, the populist instinct for wanting to do something about a difficult situation? I don’t know, but I am pretty sure that we do not yet have the evidence that the traditional criteria — change of behaviour and deterrence — have been met in awarding ourselves any top prize.

Honourable senators, this problem is compounded by the issue of inconsistency in the application of autonomous sanctions, which, by the way, is one of the findings in our report but probably one that will not be given very much attention. It is important, though, because inconsistency in the application of autonomous sanctions is not just a trivial case of “whataboutism,” but it fundamentally undermines the slender moral authority on which we have to impose sanctions in the first place. It is a recommendation, and I do hope we pay attention to it.

Sanctions have real and long-term consequences for affected countries, even when they are attempts at targeting just the bad guys. They are difficult to unwind once they are applied, which is why I so much agree with one of the recommendations around the sunset clause for autonomous sanctions. This too is an important finding of the report, and I hope it gets serious attention.

To conclude, honourable senators, this report was a very useful exercise in our statutory review of the Sergei Magnitsky Law. I hope the government will take it seriously. When we come around to the next five-year review or — in the case of Senator Boehm’s suggestion — the next ten-year review, I hope that we will be able to say with some satisfaction that we’ve actually reduced our use of sanctions and that we’ve become smarter in the use of ongoing sanctions, not because we are turning our backs on injustices in the world but because we have found a better way to address them. Thank you.

Hon. Yonah Martin (Deputy Leader of the Opposition): I’d like to adjourn the motion standing in the name of Senator Housakos.

Hon. Donald Neil Plett (Leader of the Opposition): Honourable senators, I rise to speak today to Inquiry No. 5 proposed by Senator Harder, calling the attention of the Senate to the role and the mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, the skills and capabilities required for it to fulfill its role and mandate and how it should be organized and resourced in the 21st century. I would like to address Senator Harder’s specific proposal and also make some comments about what we are facing today as a country when it comes to policing.

First, with respect to Senator Harder’s inquiry, its scope is extremely broad. If one considers all the components of the issues he raises, it includes the RCMP’s role, the RCMP’s mandate, the skills and capabilities required to fulfill the RCMP’s role, the skills and capabilities required to fulfill the RCMP’s mandate, how the force should be organized in the 21st century and how the force should be funded in the 21st century. When one looks at the scope, it touches not only on the federal role of the RCMP, but also its role in eight provinces and three territories.

We need to remember that within the domain of federal policing, the RCMP is responsible for all ordinary federal law enforcement; drug enforcement; weapons trafficking enforcement; fugitive apprehension; the protection of the Governor General and the Prime Minister, as well as other at‑risk officials and diplomats; for the policing of properties in the National Capital Region; and counter-espionage, counter‑subversion and counterterrorism roles that are carried out in conjunction with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. We then have the separate mandate of RCMP policing in eight of Canada’s ten provinces, in many municipalities in those provinces and in Canada’s three territories.

When we are examining the role of the RCMP and the mandate of the RCMP, in addition to other issues that Senator Harder raises, this constitutes an extremely broad area. All of these areas touch on multiple complexities in policing. They also involve significant machinery of government issues, ones that would likely take years of work to both understand and address.

I understand that it is tempting to come to quick conclusions, one of which is that the RCMP’s mandate is too broad. Indeed, Senator Harder has already come to that conclusion, and in this regard, I refer to Senator Harder’s remarks in 2021, when he stated that the RCMP’s mandate is:

. . . simply too large and too heavily oriented to a provincial policing role that is no longer appropriate for a critically important federal organization. It’s too big to succeed.

For my friend Senator Harder, a conclusion has already been arrived at. I don’t know if this is what his intention was, but in reading his words, one might surmise that he’s already come to the conclusion that the RCMP must be broken up. That may be what the senator is advocating, but we should be under no illusions about the complexities of doing that since presumably eight provinces and three territories would have their own views.

I know that some provinces, such as Alberta, are considering the option of creating a provincial police force. Such police forces already exist in Ontario, Quebec and, to a more limited extent, in Newfoundland and Labrador. But what may work in some provinces may not work in others. Senator Harder was quite correct when he said in his remarks that:

Many Canadians, especially in Western Canada, see the RCMP as a much-loved symbol of a measured and responsible approach to policing in their communities.

I can certainly confirm that from personal experience.

In rural Manitoba, we have all grown up with the RCMP which, in my experience, has always provided exemplary service. I also believe that many provinces themselves would not be in a rush to simply create new provincial police forces out of thin air. There are potentially enormous transition costs associated with creating new provincial police forces. Canada’s debt today is unprecedented.

Frankly, I would suggest that, today, the additional cost burdens associated with potentially creating new provincial police forces are not ones that we would want to assume. In that regard, I think we need to be careful before we rush to the conclusion that, in all areas and in all provinces, the RCMP, as Senator Harder put it, is too big to succeed. In my view, that puts the cart before the horse because there are multiple areas of policing that we first need to fully understand before we arrive at such a definitive conclusion.

When Canadians consider the broader issue of policing in Canada, there are many issues that they want to see addressed before we jump to the conclusion that it is the RCMP’s current organization that is at the root of the problem. I would just like to highlight some of the issues in policing that I believe we should be looking at before we accept such a conclusion.

To start with, we have a very serious problem in Canada today when it comes to the smuggling of guns destined for criminal organizations. It is quite clear that the gun-smuggling problem is really at the root of much of the violence in our urban centres.

We also see a growing problem when it comes to the manufacture of 3D-printed guns. I recently met with police officers who were very alarmed by the growth of the 3D‑printed‑gun problem.

When it comes to gun smuggling, Toronto Police Chief Myron Demkiw recently testified in the House of Commons that approximately 86% of crime guns seized were ones that had been smuggled into our country. We do not hear a lot about that. What we hear from today’s government is that they want to target law‑abiding sport shooters and collectors, people who have lawfully and responsibly held their firearms for decades.

Many engage in wishful thinking that, if we go after sport shooters and collectors in Western Canada or rural Ontario and Quebec, somehow the gun crime in Toronto and in other urban centres will be reduced. This is an ideological approach to gun control that is ignoring the fact that gun smuggling by organized crime and criminal gangs and 3D gun-making lie at the root of much of the problem.

It would have been very useful had Senator Harder’s inquiry proposal focused on that type of very specific problem, a problem that actually impacts ordinary Canadians. It is a problem that particularly impacts Canadians who live in many of our urban centres. It also disproportionately impacts Canadians who live in vulnerable communities directly impacted by the scourge of gun and gang crime.

When we consider the role of the RCMP in all of this, questions that I think are appropriate include: What resources are available to the RCMP to stop gun smuggling across the Canada‑U.S. border? How is the RCMP organized to carry out that task? Would it make sense to devolve such a mandate to a dedicated agency, such as those which exist in the United States when it comes to cross-border smuggling? That sort of investigation is desperately needed and it would address a real and growing problem.

Colleagues, we need to be more aware of the fact that Canadians are being confronted with a major problem related to crime growth in Canada. Too often in this chamber we are in a bubble where ideology prevails and we are willfully blind to what is going on outside this building.

The CBC recently reported Statistics Canada information which reveals that violent crime in Canada is up some 30% since 2015, the year the current government took office. According to Statistics Canada, there were 2 million crime incidents in Canada in 2021. There were 788 homicides in 2021, 29 more than in 2020. Almost half of the nearly 300 firearm homicides in Canada were reported by police as gang-related. My own province of Manitoba had the second-highest homicide rate in our country.

I would wager that more Canadians are concerned about how to make the RCMP as effective as possible in fighting crime on our streets than they are about how we reorganize the RCMP because some senators have prematurely concluded that it is too big to succeed.

If you asked people in Manitoba what their most urgent concern is with respect to the RCMP, I doubt very much that they would answer, “We urgently need to get rid of the RCMP and set up a provincial police force.” What Manitobans want is for the problem of crime to be addressed and for all police services to get the resources that they desperately need.

In my recent meeting with Winnipeg police officers, they told me how property crime in Winnipeg has exploded. It has exploded because of the growing drug use and drug dependency.

These days, the Winnipeg Police Service is not able to respond effectively to property crimes because they are too consumed with the rise in drug-driven violent crime; some of that is the product of lax laws and a revolving-door justice system. There are those in this chamber who instinctively reject that, but the evidence is very conclusive.

The National Post recently published an investigative report which illustrates how the government’s so-called safer supply of drugs is fuelling a new opioid crisis. The study interviewed 20 health-care experts and revealed that a significant portion of the so-called safer supply drugs are being distributed through government-funded programs and then sold at a huge markup on the black market to fund the ongoing purchase of fentanyl.

Fentanyl, as senators know, has killed more than 35,000 people since 2016. This is a staggering number, colleagues, which rivals most war zones anywhere. As much as we would like to pretend otherwise, the problem is not going away. In the past number of years, communities across Canada have been flooded with cheap opioids. One doctor is quoted in the study as saying:

I meet people in my office that buy large amounts of it and then ship it off to Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the United States, where it’s much more valuable.

That drug use on Winnipeg streets has helped fuel the explosion of drug-based crime. There is the additional problem that individuals committing most of the crime often tend to come from the same group of criminals.

Michael Weinrath, a criminologist at the University of Winnipeg, has analyzed the problems and estimates that while high-risk offenders only constitute 10% to 15% of all offenders, they nevertheless account for 50% to 70% of all the crime. As he recently stated, “A smaller proportion of repeat offenders are violent and keep committing violent offences . . . .”

Knowledge that this is happening is widespread.

A CBC story last year reported on this growing problem of prolific offenders in Canada. Prolific offenders are individuals who commit a disproportionate percentage of crimes. Such individuals may commit dozens, even hundreds, of crimes, and yet they keep getting short sentences as a result of our system. This is a growing problem throughout Canada.

Last year, the BC Urban Mayors’ Caucus, which consists of mayors from 13 municipalities representing more than half of the province’s population, wrote a letter to provincial ministers demanding action on the matter of prolific offenders.

But provinces can only do so much. What we need are federal laws and a federal government actually willing to address this. We also require courts and judges willing to put the rights of ordinary citizens and communities first when it comes to dealing with high-risk and prolific offenders.

Quite frankly, colleagues, the rights of Canadians to be safe in their homes and in their communities are more important than the so-called rights that these offenders have to be on the street.

I can tell you that what Manitobans want in the face of this is for our laws to be effective so that police can forcefully tackle the growth in crime as well as the criminal gangs who are both driving it and exploiting it.

A 2019 poll conducted by Probe Research found that the number-one community issue for Manitobans was the problem of crime, with 39% of Manitobans ranking that problem as their number-one community issue. The problem of drugs ranked second at 20%. Four years later, those concerns by Manitobans have multiplied.

None of this is to say that the mandate or organization of the RCMP should not be part of a broader policing discussion, but I believe it is vital that, when we consider the issue of policing in Canada, we start by addressing the real on-the-ground problems faced by police services in Canada.

One of those real problems facing the RCMP and many other police forces is the shortage of front-line officers on the street. That is certainly a problem in my province of Manitoba. This is why Manitoba’s Minister of Justice, Kelvin Goertzen, recently held an urgent meeting with Minister Mendicino.

That meeting request was to address the specific issue of the job vacancy rate in the RCMP. As Brian Sauvé, President of the National Police Federation, which represents RCMP members, has pointed out, recruitment is becoming a very serious challenge for not only the RCMP but for all police forces.

Policing shortages result in unsustainable workloads and exhausted officers. All of this seriously and negatively impacts community safety.

This problem, colleagues, is not unique to Manitoba. A vacancy rate of 20% was recently reported for the RCMP’s authorized strength of about 7,100 in British Columbia. This problem is also not unique to the RCMP. Detachments of the Ontario Provincial Police are also reported as understaffed, and in 2020, more than 1,000 front-line constable positions were vacant, representing 26% of the total front-line constable positions. These are very serious operational shortcomings.

Why is this serious problem with policing not being addressed? Why is the Government of Canada instead so ideologically fixated on repealing minimum sentences even though crime on our streets is growing? Those are issues that the Senate should examine.

In terms of RCMP vacancies, cadets for the force are recruited into training cohorts called troops, each of which typically includes 32 cadets. Between 30 and 50 troops should be trained per year, which would allow for the addition of about 800 to 1,200 new officers every year.

We have statistics that for the RCMP alone in 2018-19 — just as an example — there were more than 8,000 applications to join the force. So in one year alone, there were about eight times as many applicants as there were training positions. If this is the case, why is recruit output apparently not keeping pace with the number of applications? Why is this such a challenge? Are we training a sufficient number of officers to even replace those who are leaving? If not, why not?

These are very specific questions that any Senate inquiry should consider.

We know that the current waiting list to get into the RCMP is long. Some applicants speak about waiting a year, two years or even three years after they apply. Why is the wait so long? What are the main problems with RCMP recruiting? Is it mostly a problem of training capacity at RCMP Depot Division? Why are the bureaucratic hurdles as cumbersome as they appear to be? Has RCMP recruiting drifted too far away from merit and meeting the force’s most urgent operational requirements?

There appears to be no shortage of applicants from Canada’s many demographic communities. We know, for example, that of more than 8,000 applicants in 2018-19, 1,476 self-identified as visible minority applicants, 357 identified as Indigenous and 1,489 were women. Yet, somehow there are still serious personnel shortages within the RCMP. Why is that?

Canadians would immediately understand the importance of honestly addressing and answering those questions.

Colleagues, we need to remember the immense dangers that our police officers are facing each and every day. When Constable Grzegorz Pierzchala of the Ontario Provincial Police was murdered just after Christmas last year, he was the fifth police officer murdered in Canada in the fall of 2022.

Then we heard the terrible news concerning the deaths of Constables Travis Jordan and Brett Ryan of the Edmonton Police Service. In April, Sergeant Maureen Breau of the Sûreté du Québec was murdered when she responded to a call. And now we have the tragic death of yet another Ontario Provincial Police officer, Sergeant Eric Mueller, in Bourget, just east of Ottawa. Two other officers were wounded.

This is an unprecedented and terrible situation. My condolences go out to the family and friends of Sergeant Eric Mueller, especially as the funeral procession and service were held earlier today. Please know that our thoughts and prayers are with you, with all of the OPP officers and the entire community of eastern Ontario as you mourn the loss of a dedicated man — a man of service.

In 2021, only two officers were murdered in Canada, but in just the past several months, nine officers have been murdered and another RCMP officer, Constable Harvinder Singh Dhami, died in a collision while responding to a call.

The rise in criminal violence in Canada, the overcrowded conditions that confront our front-line officers and the increasing attacks on our police officers are the issues that should concern us the most.

I’ll make no mistake. I applaud Senator Harder for his sentiment and concerns, but in my view it would be more productive if we focused on the very immediate policing problems that Canadians face.

After that, if need be, we can get to questions of organization. But let’s start by being honest about the real policing challenges that are confronting Canadians every day of the week.

Thank you.

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

(Debate adjourned.)

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the inquiry of the Honourable Senator Harder, P.C., calling the attention of the Senate to the role and mandate of the RCMP, the skills and capabilities required for it to fulfill its role and mandate, and how it should be organized and resourced in the 21st century.

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore: Is leave granted, honourable senators?

The Hon. the Speaker: Was that a question, Senator Harder?

The Hon. the Speaker: Was that a question, Senator Harder?

Hon. Jane Cordy, pursuant to notice of May 11, 2023, moved:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit with the Clerk of the Senate, no later than June 30, 2023, a report related to its study on the Federal Framework for Suicide Prevention, if the Senate is not then sitting, and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Senate.

She said: I move the motion standing in the name of Senator Omidvar.

Hon. Hassan Yussuff: Will the senator take another question?

Hon. Peter Harder: Senator Plett, would you take a question?