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Decentralized Democracy

House Hansard - 45

44th Parl. 1st Sess.
March 24, 2022 10:00AM
  • Mar/24/22 10:16:01 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I want to rise briefly in the House today to comment on the point of order raised by the member for Barrie—Innisfil earlier this week. The point of order was raised again—unfortunately, in my opinion—by the member for La Prairie. I am sure all members are aware of the subject of these points of order, which I consider frivolous. Nevertheless, I will address some of the points that were raised. My Conservative and Bloc Québécois colleagues have clearly—perhaps even deliberately—misunderstood the nature of the historic agreement that will enable us to deliver exceptional results for all Canadians. The Conservatives' and Bloc's entire argument rests on an erroneous depiction of this confidence and supply agreement, which they are incorrectly calling a “coalition agreement”. I would like to remind those members that confidence and supply agreements are not coalition governments, and the U.K.'s Institute for Government distinguishes very clearly between coalitions and mere confidence and supply agreements, as follows: Confidence and supply agreements, made publicly available, can provide for stable government that can operate without fear of defeat on key votes in exchange for specific policy and procedural concessions, and on the basis that support parties are consulted and kept informed of government plans. They do not, of course, guarantee majority support for the entirety of a government’s legislative programme, so ongoing negotiations are needed to enable the government to get its business through. But they do allow the main party to hold all the ministerial posts...and to control the policy agenda more extensively than when power is shared in coalition. For smaller parties, such agreements offer the opportunity to achieve certain cherished policy objectives and earn political credit for that. They must commit to backing the government on [certain] votes, including on often politically difficult budget plans, but they do not have to make the more extensive across-the-board compromises of coalition, allowing them to preserve their distinct identity. One need only look at the details of the agreement, which was made public, to see that it is a confidence and supply agreement, not a coalition. Under the terms of the agreement, the NDP agrees to support the government on confidence and budgetary matters in exchange for concrete progress in various policy areas. The NPD remains as an independent party and an independent caucus, and continues to approach individual legislative items on a case-by-case basis and hold the government to account. There are no cabinet posts for the NDP. Several examples of such agreements can be found at the provincial level, and each of these legislatures has recognized the parties' right to maintain their own structure and the processes to which they are entitled in opposition. In British Columbia, the Green Party was actually given more committee seats and status as a consequence of the confidence and supply agreement, which stated: Both caucuses recognize that, in order to promote greater stability, the government must be able to negotiate with the three BC Green Party MLAs as a single, recognized caucus. Similarly, to be a credible partner and fulfill the responsibilities that will be required of them, the BC Green MLAs require access to legislative tools that are only available to recognized political parties and sufficient support staff. In Yukon, the Yukon NDP sits as its own caucus and is afforded all the rights and privileges accorded to opposition caucuses. Several examples also exist in other countries, and I would specifically point to the confidence and supply agreements that have been negotiated in countries that use the Westminster parliamentary system. In the United Kingdom, in 1977, the Labour Party was able to stay in power thanks to a confidence and supply agreement with the Liberal Party. In return, the Labour Party agreed to make political concessions to the Liberal Party. In 2017, the Conservative Party won a minority government and entered into a confidence and supply agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party. In Australia, in 2010, the Australian Labor Party formed a minority government and entered into a confidence and supply agreement with three independent MPs and one Green MP. In all of these examples, the opposition parties retained their full rights and powers to hold the government to account. In New Zealand, as noted previously by the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, the confidence and supply agreement saw Green Party members enter cabinet and still treated as an opposition party within Parliament. Confidence and supply arrangements are common in New Zealand due to the mixed member proportional representation system that is used there. Conservative and Bloc House leaders are wondering what is in the agreement. It is freely available online and I, of course, would be more than pleased to offer them a copy of the agreement. What is in the agreement? There is a historic expansion of our health care system to include dental care right across the country, which is important for more than 10 million Canadians. It includes the passing of the Canada pharmacare act, finally, for 10 million Canadians who cannot afford their medication. It includes historic investments in affordable housing for the first time since the ending of the national housing program decades ago. It includes significant investments for indigenous-led affordable housing. It includes just transition legislation to combat climate change, anti-scab legislation to protect workers and much more. In conclusion, I hope the Speaker will rapidly rule on this and remind the Conservative and Bloc House leaders that a confidence and supply agreement is not a coalition government. This agreement is clearly in the interest of Canadians.
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