Hon. Brent Cotter: Your Honour, I didn’t have the time that others had to plan their submissions on this matter. I will be brief and focus exclusively on inviting your approach regarding the interpretation of this question.

Senator Plett offered a strongly literal interpretation of the Rules on this question — so literal that he was even charmed by the absurdity of one or two of his own points. I confess that I was charmed as well and chuckled over in this corner.

Senator Gold, as part of his response, offered a literal interpretation as well. It was one literal interpretation duelling another, which suggests, “All I have to do is state a thing.” Now, that might be literally true, but I much prefer the observations of Senator Dalphond that there has to be something reasonable on that basis. Your Honour, I would invite you — on those questions — to reject each of those points.

Your Honour, I think it would not honour the institution of the Senate for you to apply a purely literal interpretation. As I think Senator Dalphond identified, you are an arbiter of the statutory interpretation of this question. I want to quote a passage from the same case that Senator Gold referred to. With the greatest respect, I think it is a better passage that makes this point; it also makes the same point that Senator Dalphond articulated.

This is a quote from a case called Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. in the Supreme Court of Canada by a highly respected, not particularly — let me just say a highly respected judge, Justice Iacobucci. This case is often referred to as the leading case of statutory interpretation in Canada on the subject of absurdity. This is what Justice Iacobucci had to say:

It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences.

— in my view, the gutting of Senator Gold’s role on this question —

. . . an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment . . . .

Let me go further in reference to the leading commentator on the subject of statutory interpretation, somebody by the name of Sullivan:

Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile . . . .

I think that is exactly what is being advanced in this case. I think Senator Gold’s main argument, with which I agree, is that the substantive, purposive interpretation is what is called for here. I endorse that point of view, and I urge it upon yourself as Speaker in this ruling. Thank you very much.