Senator Housakos: Yes, I did.

Senator Oh: Yes. Senator Housakos, did you talk to Kenny Chiu about what the truth is about what happened to him?

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore: Senator Oh, do you have a question for Senator Housakos?

Senator Housakos: Absolutely.

Hon. Leo Housakos (Acting Leader of the Opposition): Will Senator Saint-Germain take a question?

Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you, Senator Housakos, for the question. There is a trap in it, so I will first address the question and then the trap.

As for the question, I do agree that Motion No. 30 does not fix the problem it pretends or wants to fix. On the contrary, I believe this motion is counterproductive, because it will provide some delays that are not relevant regarding an emergency bill or a bill the government pretends is an emergency bill.

As for the trap, I would agree with you that if we use the Rules wisely, as they are written wisely, from a sober-second-thought perspective, I would say that the majority are very well thought out and do not need to be amended. However, I still believe that, given the contemporary Senate, some rules have to be updated in order to provide more fairness for all senators and all groups, and also — and I intend to be polite — to “undust” some practices that are time-consuming and that don’t have any impact on our efficiency — on the contrary.

That’s my answer.

[Translation]

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: Thank you, Senator Housakos, for drawing attention to my op-ed. I encourage all of you to read it for yourselves rather than rely on the caricature that he has offered.

Senator Housakos, you have been quite clear in saying that China is an authoritarian state, which I entirely agree with. You also described it as “tyrannical.” I’m not sure I would go that far, but it’s certainly a Leninist state.

I think you said that all entities in China are subject to the direct or indirect control of the Chinese state.

Let me put my question in the reverse. Can you name some legally constituted entities in the People’s Republic of China that would not fall under the definition of directly or indirectly controlled or influenced by the Chinese state and therefore would not be subject to registration under this bill?

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore: Senator Housakos, as I see more senators rising, you have, as acting leader, unlimited time. Do you wish to continue to answer questions?

Hon. Victor Oh: Thank you, Senator Housakos. Would you take a question?

Hon. Leo Housakos (Acting Leader of the Opposition): Honourable senators, my question is for the government leader in the Senate.

In 2017, the Trudeau government imposed an annual automatic escalator tax on beer, wine and spirits, allowing the government to increase its tax year after year without proper parliamentary scrutiny or ministerial accountability. At the time, the Department of Finance official admitted to the Senate National Finance Committee that the Trudeau government didn’t estimate the impact of the new tax, saying the change was “. . . too small to have an impact.”

An answer to a question on the Senate Order Paper shows that during its first three years, this tax brought in a revenue of over $5.5 billion, including over $1.8 billion in 2019-20 alone, government leader.

The next increase to this tax is set to occur Friday, April 1, and that’s no April Fool’s joke. Will your government scrap this tax, government leader?

Hon. Leo Housakos (Acting Leader of the Opposition) moved second reading of Bill S-237, An Act to establish the Foreign Influence Registry and to amend the Criminal Code.

He said: Honourable senators, it is very apropos that after all the questions regarding foreign influence on the debate on Bill S-233 and the good questions from Senator Kutcher, I will be dealing with it a little more, regarding an issue in terms of foreign influence in our institutions. There are many ways that foreign entities can influence our institutions and our country.

Honourable senators, I rise to speak to Bill S-237, which would amend Canada’s Criminal Code and establish a foreign registry for entities and individuals who seek to influence Canadian policy and Canada’s democratic institutions and processes on behalf of identified foreign regimes.

Foreign interference and influence are not new, but with the advancement of technology and information sharing, it is becoming more pervasive and is likely being used as a tool by authoritarian regimes. In this regard, the occurrence is increasing and thus making it a growing threat. Canada’s intelligence agencies have long been warning about this threat of malign foreign influence toward our democracy and our society. Several reports have outlined these warnings, including the 2019 CSIS Public Report, released on May 20, 2020, and the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

The 2019 CSIS report states that espionage and foreign-influence activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside Canada and are direct threats to Canada’s national security and strategic interests.

It goes on to warn of the vulnerability of democratic institutions and processes, including our elections. Furthermore, according to a hot issue note prepared for a March 24, 2021, committee appearance by then Minister of Public Safety Bill Blair:

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

Honourable senators, we have all witnessed and many of us have voiced concerns about the impacts of foreign interference and influence on our democracy and our foreign and domestic policy. This is not a partisan issue. On the contrary. The truth is, if we don’t start addressing it in a meaningful way, it will absolutely erode public trust in our elected officials and our processes and institutions.

I know there certainly was a lot of talk about foreign involvement in the recent “Freedom Convoy,” in particular about foreign financing, something that was not actually borne out during committee hearings in the other place.

Some have also expressed concern about foreign involvement and funding of other protests, including all manner of illegal blockades in Canada. Leaving aside the particular political agendas of different activist groups, I know from the tweets and public statements of many of my colleagues, the issues of foreign interference and influence concerns you as much as it does those of us on this side of the chamber. I hope that means, in addition to your always thoughtful reflection on all legislation that comes before this chamber, that I can also count on our support for this particular bill as it seeks to remedy something for which we’ve all expressed concern.

Foreign interference and influence are real, and it is very much happening right here in Canada. In many cases, it is financial and, in other cases, it comes in the form of disinformation; sometimes both. In the worst cases, those acting on behalf of foreign regimes have intimidated and even threatened Canadians and others on Canadian soil or threatened their loved ones back home in order to silence them or influence their actions, including how they vote in our elections. While we already have laws in Canada to deal with some aspects of these coercive actions, such as removal of persons by the Canada Border Services Agency and penalties under the Canada Elections Act, far more can and should be done.

And, no, the answer isn’t in chipping away at our freedoms and democratic processes and institutions by ourselves. The last thing we should do to fight foreign disinformation, for example, is to limit free speech. That is not to say we shouldn’t reject the promulgation of foreign propaganda from our airwaves, as we did recently with Russian state-controlled broadcaster RT, formerly Russia Today. But that is a very different beast than censorship of our own citizens. We should not seek to emulate the tyrannical regimes against which we are attempting to guard by silencing our own citizens.

That is why I was troubled to learn of Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly’s comments during a house committee last week in which she testified regarding foreign propaganda:

My mandate as foreign minister is really to counter propaganda online. Social media companies need to do more. They need to make sure that they recognize that states have jurisdiction over them, that they’re not technology platforms, that they’re content producers. And it is our way collectively to make sure that we can really be able to have strong democracies in the future because this war is being fought with 21st-century tools, including social media.

Colleagues, while I’m happy to hear this government express concern over foreign interference, I am less than comforted by Minister Joly’s comments. The first job of any foreign minister is to defend the national interest and the values we hold as Canadians, which include free speech. So I repeat: The answer to combatting foreign interference isn’t to censor our own citizens. Instead, the foreign influence registry and accountability act will force greater transparency by exposing those who do seek to influence, on behalf of foreign regimes, our policies, public debate and decision making.

By identifying those acting in the interests of a foreign entity rather than in Canada’s interests, we introduce a measure of accountability for both those agents and the officials who receive them. Why shouldn’t we have such a registry? Do Canadians not deserve to know who is lobbying their public officials on behalf of foreign entities?

This is no different, really, than the lobbyist registry. The Lobbying Act recognizes that free and open access to government is an important matter of public interest and that lobbying public office holders is a legitimate activity. The registry proposed by this bill is no different. It recognizes that lobbying by foreign entities and individuals as a matter of public interest and benefit to Canada is a legitimate activity. However, the Lobbying Act also recognizes that Canadians and even public office holders themselves should be able to know who is engaged in these lobbying activities. The very same can and should be said about those lobbying public office holders on behalf of foreign entities.

I would argue that, on that principle alone, this legislation should be passed without hesitation. Colleagues, transparency, openness and public accountability are vital elements in Canada’s democracy process. We shouldn’t abandon those principles in our efforts to combat foreign interference in our affairs.

This bill does just that. For those are of you unconvinced of the need for such a registry, and others who will make the argument that this legislation and any such registry would or is meant to target one particular entity or one particular group of people, allow me to further make my case.

From the Government of Canada’s own website — again, from that hot issue note prepared for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s then Minister of Public Safety Bill Blair’s appearance at committee — I quote:

Threats to Canada’s national security, such as foreign interference and espionage can harm multiple areas of our society. They can have impacts on our democratic processes, our economic prosperity, our critical infrastructure, and even members of our communities.

It goes on to say:

CSIS has observed persistent and sophisticated state-sponsored threat activity for many years now and they continue to see a rise in the frequency and sophistication of this threat activity.

This note, available to read on the Government of Canada’s Public Safety website goes on to describe the nature of these activities. It states:

Canada has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. These states are manipulating information, including employing disinformation, to sow doubt . . . discredit democratic responses . . . and erode confidence in values of democracy and human rights.

It is important to note that disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices . . . . State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.

Honourable senators, some of that was in reference to our response to COVID-19, but CSIS does equally warn of the threat more broadly. In an effort to counter foreign interference in the 2019 federal election, the government created the SITE Task Force, which stands for Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections. So concerned was our government with electoral interference that they did this.

It’s not good enough to only be concerned with this when you think it negatively affects your chosen outcome. We have heard a lot about alleged Russian collusion with or in favour of Donald Trump in the United States, but the issue of foreign interference is much broader. What I believe we face is a deeper systemic challenge related to foreign interference by authoritarian states.

We need look no further here in Canada than what happened in our most recent federal election with, amongst others, the author of this bill, the bill’s predecessor and former member of Parliament Kenny Chiu. Mr. Chiu lost his seat in the 2021 election in large part because of a disinformation campaign about his bill — a disinformation campaign that was clearly linked to a foreign power. Writing in the journal Policy Options in January, Sze-Fung Lee and Benjamin Fung noted that the tactics used against Mr. Chiu were indicative of foreign interference, and said, “. . . these tactics could be deployed against any group in an information and psychological warfare campaign.” Imagine — Mr. Chiu introduced legislation aimed at curbing the very thing to which he fell victim.

Elaborating on their findings, Ms. Lee and Mr. Fung noted that the use of fake news is widespread in diaspora communities via social media apps like WeChat and WhatsApp. They point to research that indicates people tend to accept misinformation as fact if it comes from a credible and trustworthy source, and that feelings of “trust” can also be based on feelings of familiarity. Ms. Lee and Mr. Fung write:

The reliance on internet information often results in the creation of an “echo chamber” that is further exacerbated by the filter effect of the online algorithm. Applications such as the “WeChat Moment,” a feature in WeChat, which is widely used by the Chinese community, similar to Facebook and Instagram, allow individuals to view others’ stories. Thus, the Chinese community is being trapped in the vicious cycle of reinforced information consumption patterns.

The authors of this article highlight that Beijing was able to use Mr. Chiu’s pro-democracy, anti-communism activism and his vocal criticism of Beijing’s atrocious human rights record to depict him and his bill as radically discriminatory against the Chinese. They were successful in categorizing the bill’s primary objective as being one of suppressing pro-China opinion, and perhaps most troubling to many in the Chinese diaspora community, as a means to surveil organizations and individuals in the community right here in Canada.

Honourable senators, we will never know if this campaign of disinformation alone is what ultimately cost Mr. Chiu his seat in the Greater Vancouver area, but there is no denying that it occurred and that it at least, in some part, played a role or very well could have played a role in him losing his seat. That’s cause enough for concern. Whether it was the primary cause of Mr. Chiu’s defeat or not is immaterial to the fact that we must take steps to ensure against it happening in the first place to Mr. Chiu or anyone else.

Our colleague Senator Woo will no doubt take just as much exception to this bill as he did with Mr. Chiu’s original bill. Senator Woo has been quite vocal in questioning the validity of the argument of foreign interference. He has asserted that the attacks on Mr. Chiu may simply have been indicative of a debate within the Chinese community. In his opinion piece in Policy Options from January of this year, our colleague Senator Woo takes issue with the idea behind Mr. Chiu’s bill because “many Chinese entities . . . could theoretically be subject to direction from the Chinese state,” because they operate from the territory of that authoritarian state. Well, yes, Senator Woo; that is precisely the point. The reality is that in an authoritarian system, an entity that is based on such a state could indeed be acting as an instrument of that state.

In my view, just because the investigation and management of this problem is complicated by the web of influence and control that an authoritarian state possesses, it does not mean that we should not take action to protect ourselves. I would argue that regardless of the challenges, it is imperative that we take action. And no, that does not mean that Mr. Chiu’s legislation or mine is an attempt to single out any one group of people. I think it is highly irresponsible and dangerous for anyone, much less a holder of high public office, to make such a claim.

An example of the disinformation campaign that was perpetrated on Mr. Chiu comes from a WeChat post claiming that this bill’s predecessor would have had extremely negative consequences for immigrants from mainland China. It claimed, quite obviously falsely, that the bill would automatically harm economic, cultural and technological exchanges between Canada and China. The post goes on to claim that because the bill was undoubtedly targeting mainland Chinese associations. Perhaps the most egregious of the claims about this bill was that the bill aims to control and monitor mainland China’s speech and behaviour. Honourable senators, that’s just ludicrous and ridiculous. I think all of us here can understand just how ridiculous it is.

Unfortunately, Senator Woo reiterated and attempted to further legitimize this false narrative in his opinion piece, going so far as to suggest that exchanges between a Canadian member of a Chinese cultural group and a senator may be subject to a registry. Honourable senators, that is an absolute misrepresentation of the purpose of this bill and also a misrepresentation as to what a registry would look like in practice.

This bill is not attempting to target or single out China or Canada’s Chinese diaspora; far from it. What this bill is about is understanding the nature of foreign involvement and potential interference by authoritarian regimes in Canada. I believe that we must take the steps needed to try to better understand and address the challenges represented by such entities in our nation. Nobody, least of all yours truly, is suggesting that foreign interference in our democratic institutions, policies and processes is limited to just one actor; far from it.

The communist regime of China is just one example of a state that is most certainly engaged in such practices. It’s well known and understood. It’s accepted and recognized. I’ve also mentioned Russia. We can’t observe what occurred in the United States and then claim that we are somehow immune to the same influence and interference.

In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is no question that information warfare played a key part in Russia’s state strategy. Part of that campaign has been to manipulate and shape international opinion. In this regard, we need to understand that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine did not begin in 2022, it began years earlier, and Russia’s parallel disinformation campaign has been an integral element of Russian state strategy.

If we’re speaking about Russia, we must also consider Iran. According to a study out of Simon Fraser University’s School of Communication, Russia and Iran appear to have been the most active in targeting Canada with disinformation.

Simon Fraser professor Ahmed Al-Rawi bases his arguments to this effect on analysis he has carried out of tweets, identified by Twitter as coming from Russian and Iranian state actors. These were posted between 2010 and 2019. Professor Al-Rawi calls the campaign of disinformation repeated and systematic.

In a Toronto Star article last year discussing the study, Professor Al-Rawi said that he had seen tweets by Iranian trolls written in French falsely linking former prime minister Stephen Harper to ISIS ahead of the 2019 election. He’d also seen Russian trolls falsely suggesting that the man who killed six people in a Quebec City mosque in 2017 is innocent. Then, there are the memes of Justin Trudeau — hundreds of them, the Toronto Star points out — that the author describes as sexist and include images using Photoshop of the Prime Minister “wearing headscarves paired with Islamophobic messaging.”

Professor Al-Rawi calls this “microtargeting,” and its objective is to sow division in Canadian society and to mobilize certain groups. In some instances, these tweets promoted certain positions about events that were happening outside Canada, including some as early as in 2014 at the time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. We continue to see such campaigns, now related to disinformation around the invasion of Ukraine.

Honourable senators, this is not a partisan issue. This is a matter that should be of grave concern to us all, both as parliamentarians and as Canadians. However, it’s not just disinformation with which we need to be concerned. Members of various diaspora communities here in Canada have anecdotal evidence of overt threats and attempts at intimidation being carried out within their communities. The objective has been to dissuade people from voting, speaking out against a regime or being activists, which we take for granted in our democracy.

Canadians are often threatened — not only their own safety but also the safety of loved ones back home in order to achieve the desired effect. Activists for human rights are told that if they continue to speak out their parents, brother or sister back home will pay the price. These aren’t idle threats, colleagues. Often, the message is delivered or reinforced through a phone call with their loved one who may have just received a visit from the authorities.

Rukiye Turdush, a Canadian Uighur activist, described Chinese police making videos of their visits that could then be played for their Canadian relatives.

They’re not even covert about it anymore. They’re very overt, as we recently saw with the threats against the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Watch, Benedict Rogers. Using the draconian national security law, Mr. Rogers was threatened with a large fine and imprisonment by Chinese authorities because of his activism against the Communist regime and standing up for the people of Hong Kong. If they’re that brazen with someone who has such a high public profile, colleagues, imagine the tactics and threats they employ against others.

Other countries engage in similar practices. Take the case of Javad Soleimani. Mr. Soleimani’s wife was among the 85 Canadian citizens and permanent residents who were murdered on January 8, 2020, by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, when they indiscriminately and unapologetically shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752. After speaking out about the murder of his wife and so many others by the IRGC, Mr. Soleimani started receiving messages stating that the IRGC was aware of his activities, that they could target him anywhere and that he had better be careful. Imagine facing those kinds of threats and intimidation on Canadian soil. Mr. Soleimani reported the incidents to police, but says not enough has been done to alleviate the growing fears of Iranian Canadians.

Mr. Soleimani told a media conference in late 2020:

One day Canada was the safest place for all of us to live, but currently it’s not at all safe.

From that same press conference, The Canadian Press detailed the story of Chemi Lhamo, a University of Toronto student who recalled a harrowing tale of harassment to which she was subjected when she ran for student government in 2019. Ms. Lhamo spoke of the thousands of messages she received that included threats of rape and murder directed at her and her loved ones. Ms. Lhamo brought these messages, as well as reports of being followed on campus, to various law enforcement agencies, including the campus police, Toronto police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian Security Intelligence Service. As Ms. Lhamo stated:

Ultimately, I still do not have a physical piece of paper that says, here’s a report that we did, or here is the information on the people that have been threatening to kill you on Canadian soil.

Honourable senators, this is happening right here on Canadian soil to Canadian citizens. It’s happening in our communities, on our university campuses and throughout our institutions. We must do something to address it.

Colleagues, I don’t profess that this bill is a cure-all. However, in terms of seeking to better catalogue foreign attempts to influence our political leaders and our institutions, I believe that it can be an important first step. It also builds on what was proposed by former MP Chiu and incorporates an amendment to the Criminal Code that also strengthens our ability to hold accountable those who do not respect our laws and, indeed, our democratic system.

What this bill does not do, colleagues, is target one group of people or new Canadians coming to this country. New Canadians are looking for a better life. They are often looking to leave behind the oppression that was endemic in the country they left. They are looking to ensure the oppression they left behind does not follow them to these shores. In that regard, this bill seeks to ensure that everyone in Canada can pursue their dreams and live their lives free from threats and intimidation.

This bill has widespread support from Canadians. A Nanos Research poll conducted last year showed that 88% of Canadians surveyed supported the passage of a foreign agent registration act to combat foreign influence. The call for a foreign agent registry also comes from a wide array of civil society and community groups, including Canada-Hong Kong Link, The Central and Eastern European Council in Canada, Saskatchewan Stands with Hong Kong, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement and the Council of Iranian Canadians.

Honourable senators, at a time when all the world’s democracies face an unprecedented threat, Canada must take firm measures, similar to the legislation that has already been enacted by many of our democratic allies, such as Australia and the United States. This bill will provide transparency and give us an important tool to better protect our democratic order against attempts being made to potentially subvert that same order.

I strongly urge you to support this bill in order to strengthen and protect our democracy, our democratic institutions and our freedom. Thank you.

Hon. Peter M. Boehm: Would Senator Housakos take a question?

Senator Housakos: I have looked at the Australian model. I find it is a lot more rigid than what we’re proposing over here. Again, I did not want to go outside of the realm of public office‑holders and public officials in this particular instance. I’m very cognizant of the fact that I don’t want to infringe upon the private life of corporations and other entities in Canada. There’s always a fine line. Is it something that we can look at? Do we want to strengthen it up to the point where we hold people accountable once they leave public office? I’m not averse to those kinds of suggestions, amendments and changes as we go along.

Clearly, we have a problem — based on the reports we’ve seen from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and our intelligence services — and we are being infiltrated at the highest levels in our institutions right now. This would be the first step, and as we go along we need to continue to be vigilant. As we also know, it doesn’t address cyber and social web influence, which is very powerful.

I think this is very concrete and specific. It deals with entities that are affiliated with these totalitarian regimes that are very often trying to influence our public institutions and our public Crown corporations in various other sectors.

Senator Housakos: Absolutely.

Senator Housakos: Senator Woo, I can tell you that your op‑ed and comments over the last while have garnered enough attention without me having to draw any attention to them.

Where we fundamentally differ on in this debate is that China is a tyrannical state. It’s unfortunate that a member of the upper chamber doesn’t recognize that. We don’t recognize that what happened in Tiananmen Square as an accident. It was tyranny. What is going on with the Uighur people is tyranny. It is something that is recognized around the world, including our own Parliament, and it is shameful that we didn’t recognize it in this chamber.

To stand up and say that you take exception to the comments of me referring to the administration and the regime in China as tyrannical is in itself outrageous.

The United Front is just one example of an organization operating in Canada funded directly to uphold the principles of that tyrannical regime. Organizations like Huawei are state funded. They’re international multinationals that have been recognized by organizations like CSIS and the RCMP in engaging in security espionage right here in our country.

We’ve had these organizations. Our security forces tell parliamentary committees that we need to take action and do something about it. I find it outrageous that a parliamentarian questions the veracity of that information and questions the veracity of where we are vis-à-vis a democracy and the Republic of China.

Senator Housakos: Thank you for that very thoughtful speech. Again, it was well articulated.

Senator Tannas, I hope we’re still friends after I ask the question, but we’ve done a fair amount of naval-gazing in this place. We’re always looking at the Rules. Of course, I’m not against the idea of constant improvement. Nothing is static. We should review the Rules.

However, I’ve been here a number of years, and at the end of the day, we have rules to give certain advantages to the government. We have rules to protect the role of the opposition. I’ve looked at the last few parliaments. Have there been any examples where we haven’t found a consensus to make sure the opposition’s voices are heard? Are there any examples where this chamber hasn’t respected the agenda and timelines of the government in order to respond to important issues, be it during COVID or what-have-you?

It seems that every time we engage in debate here, we need to fix something. I listened to your speech carefully, and it doesn’t seem that the proposition that we have here is fixing anything. Is it really fixing a problem that exists?

Second, we also have time allocation, which the government, of course, has hailed as a badge of honour due to the fact they’ve never used it, which it is, because it also indicates that we have found consensus among leadership, even though we’ve added so many leadership groups.

Would you agree that we’re not really fixing anything at this particular point with this motion?

Senator Housakos: If the honourable senator will take another question, I will be very brief. I seem to get a sense, especially from Senator Miville-Dechêne, and I do know this, that some senators have been frustrated with the pace at which things move here.

The truth of the matter, though, if you will admit, Senator Saint-Germain — is that we choose to sit Tuesday to Thursday. This Parliament has a calendar schedule of Monday to Friday. Like the House of Commons, we can easily be sitting Monday to Friday.

Do you agree we could easily be sitting past the end of June to deliberate issues? It’s the choice of the leadership groups that we rise when we rise.

Again, going back to my point, I don’t think this is an issue that will be resolved by the Rules. The Rules are there to have this chamber sit as long or as little as we want. Thank God, in 2022, in Canada, it doesn’t take two days to come to Ottawa unless you’re coming by horse and buggy. The truth is if we wanted to sit intensely, we could.